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ABSTRACT 
MESSIANIC LIGHT: UTOPIAN DISCOURSE IN THE WORK OF 
THEODOR W. ADORNO, LUCE IRIGARAY AND GIORGIO AGAMBEN 
Heather A. Thiessen 
December 15, 2010 
What is the idea that "utopia" names? How can discourse 
represent that idea? Setting aside temporarily deeper problems 
with the idea of representation, and focusing on how a complex 
philosophical discourse might approach the problem of conveying 
or representing a large, only fairly precise, and important idea 
is the question of this dissertation. It ultimately answers that 
question obliquely, by focusing on the way the utopian discourse 
present in the work of three late 20th century philosophers, 
Theodor W. Adorno, Luce Irigaray, and Giorgio Agamben, addresses 
a subject position that can be named a "subject of possibility." 
How this subject of possibility might relate to the possibilities 
for transcendence located in the material world that is the stage 
for utopian imagination is another area of the study's 
investigation. 
The dissertation introduces the question with a look at the 
problems associated with utopia. It considers utopian discourse 
in select works of each of these thinkers, paying attention to 
dystopian context, identification of style and language, subject-
object considerations, and the discursive treatment of space and 
time. In particular, it traces the theme of messianic expectation, 
v 
in a loose secular sense, through this discourse. Finally, it 
links the way the messianic theme provides content to the idea of 
utopia present in this discourse. It claims that the messianic 
idea thematizes a materialist interpretation of transcendence and 
metaphysical experience that is developed in the work of each of 
these authors. That is, these authors locate the metaphysical 
moment necessary for the idea of utopia in the transcendent 
relation of the material subject to the subject of language and 
thought; in its concrete difference from that subject. This 
materialist moment provides a base for a non-representational and 
trans formative approach to utopian imagination and perhaps even 
utopian practice, by linking the idea of "utopia" to a non-
linguistic understanding of the negation of suffering. 
vi 
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The Flavor of Utopia 
In 1948, Marcia Brown's retelling of an old European folk tale 
earned her the first of her many Caldecott citations and medals. As she 
tells the story, three weary, hungry soldiers returning from war and 
still far from home trudge into a little town; their pleas for 
hospitality are denied by the self-interested villagers. The soldiers 
then ask for the use of a pot, some water, and three stones - to make 
stone soup. Little by little, they persuade the curious and unbelieving 
villagers to contribute a bit of this and a bit of that: a couple of 
carrots, a head of cabbage, even some meat. At last, they share the 
tasty and plentiful stone soup, occasioning a general festival; the 
soldiers spend the night in the best beds in the village, and depart 
the next morning to exclamations of gratitude. 1 
Despite first appearances, the story of stone soup is not a story 
of making something from nothing. It is more precisely a story of 
making something from something: ordinary soup from the ordinary 
ingredients of soup. The recipe for stone soup calls for mobilizing and 
realizing present possibilities, albeit possibilities that are blocked 
by the situation. Stone soup is possible soup that is, under the 
1. Marcia Brown, Stone Soup (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947). It seems 
unlikely that the story's Christian subtext, from the search for room and food 
at the beginning to the naming of the three soldiers as "wise men" at the 
conclusion of the tale, is entirely coincidental in this text composed by a 
Baptist minister's daughter. 
1 
circumstances, impossible. Its impossibility under the circumstances 
makes its being something extraordinary the precondition for its being 
anything, however ordinary, rather than nothing. The completely 
possible, ordinary soup becomes possible, but only in the form of the 
extraordinary, completely impossible stone soup. The soup's very 
impossibility is the indispensable ingredient that produces its 
possibility. 
As a tale of impossible social felicity made possible, Stone Soup 
has a utopian flavor. It smacks of the anticipatory utopian 
consciousness that according to Ernst Bloch surfaces persistently in 
every cultural medium, from dreams and innocent entertainments to 
developed programs for radical structural change. 2 Its ingredients - art, 
in the form of illustrated text; religion, condensed in symbols and 
allusions; images of subjective agency and collective action - make it 
an appetizing introduction to a longer rumination on utopian discourse. 
That longer meditation concerns the works of another trio of 
thoughtful practitioners of possibility: Theodor W. Adorno, Luce 
Irigaray, and Giorgio Agamben. It finds in these thinkers' texts the 
construction of a "subject of possibility" capable of utopian 
imagination and striving. This subject of possibility differs from the 
classical subject of the western humanities, but can nevertheless 
assemble and be informed by fragments of utopian promise. This subject 
can, moreover, undertake the practice of cultivating the consciousness 
to which those fragments give rise, and of elaborating their promise. 
The discursive appeal to and construction of this subject of 
possibility constitutes a timely mode of utopian discourse. Whether 
2. Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 3, trans. Neville Plaice, 
Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). 
2 
that discourse, in effect, promises to make something from something in 
the manner of stone soup, is the ultimate question of this study. 
This first chapter introduces and outlines a rationale for the 
presentation that follows. It first discusses the way this text uses 
the terminology of "utopia" and "utopian discourse," and identifies 
some recurrent themes connected with the idea of utopia. It then 
discusses reasons for undertaking an examination of utopian discourse, 
and for considering these thinkers' utopian discourse in particular. 
Finally, it outlines the plan of the subsequent work, and identifies 
the key issues that will structure the consideration of the individual 
thinkers' texts. 
Terminology 
"Discourse" - In General 
For the purposes of this project, "discourse" designates text that 
represents ideas, and that generates those ideas in the course of 
representing them. 
Walter Benjamin claimed that all philosophy is "a struggle for the 
representation of ideas.,,3 "Discourse" appears here as the medium of 
that struggle, and the form in which its contending representations 
appear. This project thereby affirms the possibility and value of 
treating discourse as a representational form in the utopian case, 
despite the ongoing "crisis of representation" that qualifies 
Benjamin's claim, and that affects the appropriation of discourse by 
postmodern readers. 4 
3. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne 
(London: Verso, 1998) 37. 
4. There is by now a vast literature treating issues around representation 
raised by postmodern understandings of text. For the early attack on 
representational theories, see Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. 
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). A useful summary 
discussion of issues related to representation is Pauline Marie Rosenau, Post-
Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads and Intrusions (Princeton: 
3 
The sense of "discourse" as relatively extensive textual treatment 
of some subject matter has long been familiar to the humanities. s The 
use of the term "discourse" here sets this project in that framework 
first of all, in contrast to one or another of the methods of discourse 
analysis that characterize linguistics or cultural studies. 6 It signals 
the use of a method that consists of a reading of text oriented by a 
motivating concern, in this case by the question "What do these texts 
say about [the idea of] utopia?" 
Nevertheless, this project also embodies an understanding of this 
discourse as participating in a larger discourse, in the sense of a 
larger body of enunciations, more or less loosely governed by rules of 
expression, which actively accomplish effects in a social milieu. That 
understanding of discourse takes as given the sense of discourse as 
generative or effective, which analysts since Foucault have brought to 
the usage of the term discourse. Thus, while this project looks most 
Princeton University Press, 1992). Helpful discussions of the relationship of 
representational issues to text and interpretation occur in Teresa L. Ebert, 
"Review: The Crisis of Representation in Cultural Studies: Reading Postmodern 
Texts" American Quarterly 38 (Winter, 1986) 894-902; Jeffrey T. Nealon, 
"Thinking/Writing the Postmodern: Representation, End, Ground, Sending" 
boundary 2 20(Spring, 1993) 221-241; Steven Ward, "The Revenge of the 
Humanities: Reality, Rhetoric, and the Politics of Postmodernism" Sociological 
Perspectives 38 (Summer, 1995) 109-128; Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: 
The Demands of Holocaust Representation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000); George Hartley, The Abyss of Representation: Marxism and the 
Postmodern Sublime (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
5. For one relatively recent and illuminating example of this usage, see 
Barbara Herrnstein Smith, "On the Margins of Discourse," Critical Inquiry 1, no. 
4 (1975): 769-798. 
6. A general introduction to discourse analysis as used in the field of 
linguistics is Gillian Brown and George Yule, Discourse Analysis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), where it generally refers to the specialized 
analysis of language in use, in contrast to the analysis of more formal 
properties of language considered in the abstract. The specialized method of 
critical discourse analysis, or CDA, which has been seen as a boon to cultural 
studies, is outlined in a number of sources by Norman Fairclough and others, 
including Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity: 
Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999). General introductions to discourse and discourse analysis which include 
assessments of the contribution of Michel Foucault's influential methods, and 
which emphasize the reading of texts prevalent in the humanities, include Diane 
Macdonell, Theories of Discourse: An Introduction (London: B. Blackwell, 1986) 
and Sara Mills, Discourse (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
4 
closely at specific textual instances from the larger utopian discourse 
of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, it accepts certain basic 
understandings that stern from the perception of discourse as a socially 
productive site of the operation of power. 
These premises have been outlined with particular clarity and 
concision by Samuel R. Delany in an article that also constitutes a 
reflection on the content of utopia and on the relationship of that 
content to language and desire, ~The Rhetoric of Sex, the Discourse of 
Desire.,,7 These premises identify discourse as fundamentally linguistic, 
structured, constructive, directive, and pervasive. In particular, this 
understanding of discourse takes seriously the view that people corne to 
understand what is being discussed, and to become able to recognize it 
as a phenomenon of their world, by reading about it, participating in 
conversations about it, and drawing inferences about it on the grounds 
of the statements made and not made in the discourse. Implicit rules 
that govern what meanings a particular word can and cannot assume, how 
a particular word can and cannot be used in utterances that remain 
intelligible, and which other words a particular term can and cannot 
intelligibly combine with, constitute part of the operation of 
discourse. The idea that the operation of discourse is one of the 
routes both for the constitution and the contestation of power, and one 
of the vehicles for the exercise of power, is running in the background 
throughout this project. s 
7. Samuel R. Delany, "The Rhetoric of Sex, the Discourse of Desire," in 
Tobin Siebers, ed., Heterotopia: Postrnodern Utopia and the Body Politic {Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994} 229-272. 
8. The basic theory linking discourse to power sterns from the work of Michel 
Foucault. Representative works would include the early The Order of Things 
[{London: Routledge, 1989}], and the late History of Sexuality [Volume 1: An 
Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley {New York: Vintage Books, 1990}]. Foucault's 
early critics concentrated on the tendency of this understanding of discourse 
to dissolve useful lines of meaning mapped on to terminology, seen as important 
for the pursuit of political projects. See for instance Nancy Fraser, "Michel 
5 
Methodologically this project relies on a kind of hermeneutical 
"coasting," in the metaphorically nautical sense. It proceeds by 
staying within sight of the shoreline of the surface meaning of the 
text, with occasional stops for some limited etymological or 
philological exchange. It recognizes, in order to avoid, the deeper 
discursive waters trolled by archaeological, genealogical, or 
deconstructive methods. In essence, it presents something approaching a 
motivated commentary - an antique creative form, associated with forms 
of contemplative reading practices characteristic both of religious 
communities and of modernist aesthetics - on these texts. 9 
Nevertheless, this method takes seriously the perspective that 
discourse is a form of text-making that directly and indirectly 
produces the referents around which it fabricates its texts. In that 
sense, discourse and the making of texts are related to textiles, and 
to the arts or crafts of transforming fibrous raw materials into 
substances with visible surfaces that sometimes have utilitarian 
functions as well as specific aesthetic effects. Io One of the central 
Foucault: A 'Young Conservative'?" Ethics 96, no. 1 (1985): 165-184, and Roger 
Paden, "Foucault's Anti-Humanism" in Human Studies 10, no. 1 Foucault Memorial 
Issue (1987): 123-141. From the standpoint of this project, however, Foucault's 
importance lies in the insight that power operates impersonally and 
discursively, and in the applicability of that insight to various fields of 
discourse, such as "fine art" or "religion." 
9. On commentary as a creative form, see Giorgio Agarnben, Infancy and 
History: On the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 
2007), 160. On the relationship of commentary to the practice of religious 
reading, see Douglas Griffiths, Religious Reading: the Place of Reading in the 
Practice of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). On contemporary 
secular efforts to revive commentary as a creative form, see Glossator: 
Practice and Theory of the Commentary 1 (Fall, 2009), 
http://ojs.gc.cuny.edu/index.php/glossator/issue/view/37, and in particular 
Nicola Masciandaro, "Introduction," Glossator l(Fall, 2009) i-ii, 
http://ojs.gc.cuny.edu/index.php/glossator/article/viewFile!510!552 (accessed 
May 16, 2010). 
10. Etymologically, contemporary English terms "text" and "textile" both 
derive from Latin texere, to weave. Until recently, a "textile" denoted that 
type of "fabric" produced by weaving. "Fabric," which derives from the Latin 
faber, workman, could be produced by any of a number of methods other than 
weaving, such as knitting, felting, or crocheting. Contemporary usage, which 
6 
questions of this project concerns the qualities of the idea "utopia" 
that emerges from these participants' discourse around utopia. 
Furthermore, insofar as this dissertation extends and elaborates 
the discourse it studies, it does so as a self-conscious participant in 
that discourse. For that reason, this discussion of discourse may also 
be the place to mention - more accurately to confess - the guilt borne 
by this project, and its own form, in relation to the works it analyzes. 
All discourse has some particular, identifiable form, form being one of 
those things that cannot take place "in general," but only in some 
particular or other. An integral feature of all the works being 
considered here is a principled break with certain conventional forms 
of totalizing discourse, embodied paradigmatically by the academic 
treatise. Subjecting these works to a study presented in that form 
resembles a prima facie admission to not even having learned the first 
thing from them, if not a willful repudiation of their wisdom. Pointing 
out that these thinkers' works have all already been subjected to more 
than one full-length academic study only constitutes the preschooler's 
defense of "They started it," which is inevitably met with the grown-
up's answer, "Then you could have ended it."ll The argument that the 
linear treatise form is kinder to the reader, a fact amply documented 
by the texts under consideration themselves, merely diffuses the guilt 
without mitigating it. 
makes "textile" and "fabric" functionally synonymous, suppresses the ancient 
distinction of the "weaver" versus the all-embracing "worker." 
11. See, for example, Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics: 
Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: The 
Free Press, 1977); Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine 
(London: Routledge, 1991); Penelope Deutscher, A Politics of Impossible 
Difference (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Catherine Mills, The 
Philosophy of Agamben (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2008); Leland 
de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009). 
7 
What hope for forgiveness in this matter may remain rests in the 
narrow topical delimitation on which the dissertation form takes its 
stand. The form of a whole assumed by a dissertation normally 
incorporates a tacit recognition of its strictly partial character with 
respect to that elusive knowledge that might justly lay claim to 
wholeness. It frequently constitutes, as it does in this particular 
case, something preliminary as well, however ultimate it appears from 
at least one standpoint. 12 The claim to totality being made here extends 
only as far as the boundaries of the project, which have tried to 
respect the spirit of Tolstoy's moral advice. 13 For that reason the 
presentation here may, as will be hoped, constitute more a clumsy than 
an iniquitous departure from its teachers' instruction, metaphorically 
speaking. 
Specifically Philosophical Discourse 
The discourse to be considered here is specifically philosophical 
discourse. This is not automatically the case in a study of utopian 
discourse, and deserves a brief word. 
Benjamin's insistence that philosophy concerns itself with the 
representation of ideas implies that even philosophical discourse is 
intrinsically, albeit highly abstractly, aesthetic. The philosophers 
under consideration here would share this view. That common outlook is 
one reason to devote attention to their presentational concerns and 
strategies. 
Philosophy is a refuge for utopian thinking in the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries. One argument that resurfaces in this study is that 
12. "Every new beginning comes from some other beginning's end." Dan Wilson, 
"Closing Time," in Semisonic Feeling Strangely Fine, MCA UK ASIN B0000062XN. 
13. Tolstoy gives a lot of moral advice. The reference here is to the advice 
implicit in the dramatic meditation on the ultimate futility of overreaching, 
"How Much Land Does a Man Need?" Leo Tolstoy, "How Much Land Does a Man Need?" 
in How Much Land Does a Man Need? and Other Stories, trans. Ronald Wilks 
(London: Penguin, 1993) 96-110. 
8 
--------------------------------------------------
the dystopian challenges of the 20th and 21st centuries are consequences 
of basic patterns of thought. Philosophy is not necessarily a 
liberating practice. Nevertheless, the radical reformation of 
dysfunctional basic thought may constitute a pro-utopian political 
practice, particularly insofar as it creates space for engaged utopian 
expectation or imagination. In this respect, philosophy is a discipline 
much like architecture, all the more so because basic thought is 
something frequently encountered in a distracted and routine state. 14 
These philosophers are each engaged in investigations that have to do 
with pushing the limits of what thoughts can be represented in the 
philosophical representation of ideas, given the relationship of 
philosophical discourse to its understanding as representation, or to 
the way philosophical forms come to be translated into ideas by readers 
of texts. In a sense, these are philosophical texts that deal with the 
philosophical equivalent of architectural problems like spanning long 
rivers or deep gorges or attaching habitable buildings to the sides of 
hills. Agamben's assertion that "only in the burning house is the 
fundamental architectural problem apparent for the first time" links 
that architectural figure to the basic problem of art in modernity, but 
the metaphor could apply to philosophy as well. ls 
14. See Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction," Marxists.org, www.marxists.org/reference/ 
subject/philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm, xv. According to Benjamin, 
architecture is appropriated in a state of distraction. Here we are looking 
into the "architecture" of western thought. The metaphor of architectural 
revision makes a radical - in the etymological sense - claim. The task is to 
move the bearing walls of thought. 
15. Giorgio Agamben, The Man Without Content, trans. Georgia Albert 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) 115. Adorno includes comments about 
functionalism in modern architecture as illustrative of the basic problem of 
locating truth in a balance of elements, when it sometimes requires a 
heightening of extremities. See Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. 
Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneappolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 44. 
Irigaray talks enough about architecture, particularly in the context of the 
Heideggerian house of language, to have inspired architectural texts devoted to 
her implications for architects. See Peg Rawes, Irigaray for Architects (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2007). 
9 
This focus on philosophical discourse affects the understanding of 
utopia that appears in this study. Utopia is most often understood as a 
fictional narrative form, and is sometimes defined as SUCh. 16 This study, 
however, focuses specifically on the emergence of utopia in 
philosophical discourse, what Irigaray calls "the discourse on 
discourse."n 
"Utopia" 
The understanding of discourse outlined above informs the use of 
the term "utopia" in this project. For the purposes of this text, 
"utopia" names an idea. If, as Walter Benjamin claimed, philosophy is a 
struggle over the representation of a certain number of words, or names 
for ideas, "utopia" is the name under consideration here .18 Philosophers 
and their allies have struggled over the definitive or dominant 
representation of that idea at least since the word was introduced to 
the English language by Thomas More in 1516. 
While the representations of the idea named "utopia" vary, their 
contents and descriptions typically cluster near one or another of the 
twin rubrics given by the dictionary: either a "state, condition or 
place of ideal perfection" or a "visionary, impractical scheme for 
social improvement.,,19 The philosophical struggle over the 
representation of the idea of "utopia" entails in particular the 
discourse that positions the word closer to one of those poles than the 
other, that attributes this or that determinate content or 
characteristic to the state or condition named "utopia," that suggests 
16. Krishan Kumar, Utopianism. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1991) . 
17. Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter with 
Carolyn Burke (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985) 74. 
18. Walter Benjamin, ibid. 
19. Funk & Wagnal1s Standard College Dictionary (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., 1966). 
10 
what might be entailed in bringing about its ultimate achievement, and 
that says which attitudes towards that achievement would be appropriate. 
Understanding "utopia" this way emphasizes its nominal character. 
That emphasis postpones some problems of reference that arise when 
utopia is considered differently. If "utopia" is taken to designate a 
substantive, a "state, condition, or place," the question of its 
ontological status can quickly take center stage. Utopia as an 
existential or empirical entity can, however, appear only as a lack or 
an absence, at best a phantasm, in any event "meaningless" or 
oxymoronic from an analytical perspective, and disqualified a priori as 
an object of knowledge or, even more controversially, truth. Asking 
about the properties of such a non-entity would be incoherent; asking 
whether those properties are desirable or not would be ludicrous. If 
the emphasis rests on "utopia's" status as a place of "ideal 
perfection," debates about the accuracy of that epithet, based on this 
or that property, can derail a preliminary inventory of qualities. If 
"utopia" purportedly designates some potentially realizable state or 
condition, a number of other distracting questions, related to the 
problem of passing from imaginary to actual, arise. Attention shifts to 
whether "utopia" already actually exists in an alternative space, might 
actually exist but does not exist at present, simply ought to exist, if 
so where it exists, and so on. 
Emphasizing "utopia's" nominal character only postpones, rather 
than resolves, all these essential ontological, ethical, and political 
problems, which lie beyond the scope of this study. Eventually, all the 
questions return, as questions about the status of the object of 
discursive representation, or about the relationship of discursive 
representation to an actual or imaginary entity, or the criteria for 
the defensibility of a given representation, or the relationship of 
11 
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some discursive treatment to this or that praxis. Before they do, 
however, this study of some specific properties of a portion of the 
discourse around utopia will, it is hoped, have had time enough to 
glean its insights. 
This text, then, avoids the general question of the relationship of 
an image to an empirical model. It does not attempt to determine 
whether a specific proposed arrangement does or would actually 
constitute a realization of utopia, in the sense of a concrete state or 
condition in which people are actually happy. It sets aside questions 
related to the accurate assessment of utopian claims. Instead, it 
confines itself to an examination of how three thinkers have treated 
the idea of utopia, and in particular how they have constituted the 
subject of utopian discourse and practice, in select works. 2o 
The nominal treatment of utopia outlined here also constitutes a 
departure from the study of utopia as a form of fictional narrative or 
as a form of social experiment. An argument implicit in this project is 
that the utopian idea can, and does, emerge in forms other than that of 
narrative fiction or experimental enclave. It also surfaces as a vital 
reference point in the philosopher's struggle to "think the break" with 
the context of philosophy from within that context. 21 
20. Avoiding the question of the assessment of utopian claims is not meant 
to suggest that the question itself is not important. A good argument might be 
made that it is perhaps the most important question related to utopian 
discourse. It is not, however, the first question, nor the question this 
dissertation sets out to answer. 
21. Adorno claims dialectics is the effort to break out of the objective 
context of delusion from within. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. 
E.B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1995), 406. Fredric Jameson argues that the 
function of the utopian text, understood as a developed fictional form in 
contrast to political exhortation or "great prophecy," is to force its readers 
to "think the break" that constitutes the imaginable alternative to a closed 
system of reference presented as having no other. Fredric Jameson, 
Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science 
Fictions (London: Verso, 2005), 231-232. 
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Even this nominal treatment does, however, sometimes register a 
second sense of the term "utopia." Normally, "utopia" in this text 
names the idea, represented in discourse, of a state, condition, or 
place with desirable properties, variously described. Occasionally, 
however, "utopia" can designate a projected cultural achievement. That 
cultural achievement typically takes the form of a pattern of social 
relations, that is being pursued in light of some version of that idea. 
This concession finally proved unavoidable. The idea named "utopia," as 
represented in utopian discourse, frequently includes the element of 
its own cultural or political achievement. From time to time, then, it 
becomes necessary to mention the ineluctably related idea of people's 
wanting or trying to achieve it, for instance by undertaking an 
intentional utopian praxis, or by acting in the direction of "utopia." 
In general, formulations like "utopian striving" or "utopian praxis" 
refer to the pursuit of "utopia" as an achievement, one that takes the 
form of a pattern of social relations. Making reference to that pursuit 
does not automatically imply a conviction that any particular pursuit 
of utopia could or would succeed, or that the particular version of 
utopian achievement pursued is actually worth pursuing. It points out 
that sometime, somewhere, someone might have some conviction like that, 
and might do something about it. 
While "utopia" names an idea, "utopian discourse" does not 
necessarily invoke that name. This project has paid attention first of 
all to these thinkers' explicit references to "utopia." Its goal has 
been to situate those references within the context of each thinker's 
project, and to discern the relationship of each thinker's treatment of 
the idea of utopia to that project. In pursuing that goal, it has drawn 
as well on texts that contribute to the communication of an idea that 
might aptly be named "utopia," even where that idea appears incognito. 
13 
Backstory - Established Features of Utopia 
The notion that an idea can appear incognito only makes sense if 
there are criteria for recognizing that "idea other than by name. 
Criteria like that can arguably be provided by the idea's historical 
associations, in the case of an idea with a history. The idea of utopia 
does have a history, beginning with its appearance in Thomas More's 
fictional Utopia. Some content has been assigned to the idea of utopia 
in the course of that history, and constitutes a starting place for 
developing something like a field guide to the utopian concept. That 
guide to the utopian concept will help in discerning utopian themes as 
they "flit through" the work of Adorno, Irigaray, and Agamben, or as 
they come together to form a "legible constellation" that amounts to 
utopian discourse in texts that avoid the name of utopia. 22 
The field guide developed here emphasizes some aspects of the 
utopian tradition more than others. This section provides some 
additional background for the utopian features that play the largest 
part in the reflections that follow. These include three features in 
particular: the relationship of utopia to place and time; recurrent 
themes in utopia's characteristic content; and the extent to which 
utopia itself can become the object of representation. With respect to 
the content of utopia specifically, the discussion focuses on the three 
rubrics of "happiness," "desire," and "the negation of the negative," 
or the idea of "suffering overcome." 
Utopia as Place 
Utopia is ineluctably associated with space and time, as "place." 
The very name "utopia," as is widely known, derives from the Greek 
topos (place), which compounded with the Greek negation ou (no, not) 
22. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. 
E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1974) 87; Negative Dialectics, 407. 
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reads more or less literally "no-place.,,23 Thomas More himself announced 
the play on words encoded in the Greek source of the name by voicing 
the wish that this Utopia, no-place, might some time become a Eutopia, 
good place. 24 Less often mentioned by commentators is another Greek 
possibility, iou, a genitive signifying "of poison" or "of rust," which 
could make of the yet-to-be-decided u-topia someplace even more 
negative than no place at all. 
The identification of utopia with a fictional place does not 
resolve the question of the relationship of utopian place to that which 
its audience inhabits, even when one takes into account "the well-known 
shift in Utopias from space to time, from the accounts of exotic 
travelers to the experiences of visitors to the future. ,,25 In particular, 
the question perennially arises of whether utopia could coincide with 
the place and time of "here and now" or "the real world.,,26 The problem 
with every potential answer lies not only in the indeterminacy of 
utopia. The place and time of the "here and now" or "real world" is at 
least equally complicated by its discursive associations. Jameson has 
asserted that utopia relates to the present as "disruption," in its 
function of forcing an imaginative engagement with the rupture between 
what appears to be a closed system of signification (the here .and now, 
the ideologically-specified real world) and any utopian alternative. 27 
The practical political question of the relationship of utopian space 
23. The place name Utopia did not "literally" mean "no place" in the English 
of its day, while in Greek u Torro~ is literally incomplete. Louis Marin reads 
this nominal undecidability as different from ambiguity, which would apply to a 
"univocal name," and as signifying the operation of the specifically utopian 
form of neutrality. Louis Marin, Utopics: Spatial Play (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, Inc., 1984), 91. 
24. Thomas More, Utopia, trans. Paul Turner (London: Penguin Classics, 1965) 
27. 
25. Jameson, ibid., 1-2. 
26. See among others J.C. Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of 
English Utopian Writing 1516-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); 
Marin, ibid.; Kumar, ibid., 25; Jameson, ibid. 
27. Jameson, ibid., 231-2. 
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and time to the place of what people popularly take to be the real is 
evaded by a utopian "secession" that marks the utopian text's otherness, 
and that permits - indeed, that forces - a "thinking of the break" that 
would be effectively repressed within the dominant symbolic order if it 
were to take another form. 
Michael Rothberg argues that Adorno's use of the term "nach 
Auschwitz," after Auschwitz, generates a new, specifically late modern 
and potentially postmodern chronotope. That is, it constitutes the 
"simultaneity of spatial and temporal articulations in cultural 
practices" that was the essence of Mikhail Bakhtin's organizing concept 
of chronotope. 28 A similar argument applies in the case of utopia. The 
mention of "utopia" functions chronotopically, as a fusion of space and 
time that establishes both an essential discontinuity and an essential 
continuity. The discontinuity of the utopian with the "here and now," 
as being not-(here-and-now), highlights the contrast of utopia with the 
space-time of the here-and-now. Nevertheless, utopia always entails an 
essential and inescapable failure of discontinuity, because this 
negation of the here-and-now is nevertheless known and knowable, and is 
for that reason precisely not the full negation of the here-and-now. 29 
Like a single character in a television farce impersonating another, so 
that both characters cannot appear together in space and time without 
catastrophic denouement, the utopian chronotope is constructed around a 
removal from "real" space and time along at least one, if not both, 
dimensions. This utopian removal, however, which presents itself as a 
complete antithesis of the situation of its enunciation, always 
28. Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust 
Representation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). On the 
concept of the chronotope, see Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and the 
Chronotope in the Novel: Notes Toward a Historical Poetics," in The Dialogic 
Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and 
Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) 84-258. 
29. Jameson, ibid., in particular 170-181. 
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incorporates a specific relation of accessibility to this situation. 
Its here-and-now audience can imagine itself there-and-then, by a 
corresponding, determinate displacement - e.g., an earlier or later 
birth date, or a trip to the distant location that leaves its here-
and-now consciousness unaffected, but for its access to the utopian 
scene. Utopia thereby depends upon its depiction as accessible to 
inhabitants of the here-and-now, though exclusively in an imaginative 
way. 
The innate connection of utopia to place and time makes it 
reasonable to check for the operation of utopian discourse in the way 
issues of place and time surface in texts by Adorno, Irigaray, and 
Agamben. And as will become clear, while these philosophers do not 
address issues of space and time through the same narrative forms 
identified in Louis Marin's and Fredric Jameson's analyses of fictional 
utopian texts, these thinkers' utopian discourse reflects the 
chronotopic nature of utopia by operating in part through their 
treatment of the categories of space and time. 
Utopia as the Place of Happiness 
Since utopia as a chronotope is a place, a socially articulated co-
relation of time and space, the question arises as to what kind of 
place utopia is. One emphatic touchstone of the utopian place is 
happiness. 
The specific association of the name utopia with the idea of a 
place of happiness is as old as Thomas More's suggestion that the state 
or condition that was "Utopia" or "No-place" actually qualified for the 
epithet "Eutopia" or "Good place," "Happy place." More explicitly links 
utopian happiness to the goals of the western philosophical and 
theological traditions, through his inclusion of a Utopian verse which 
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asserts the superiority of Utopia over Plato's Republic. 3o The happiness 
associated with utopia is the very happiness or flourishing, eudaemonia, 
that has been the goal of proper ethical and political order in the 
west since Plato's Republic and Aristotle's ethics. Utopia's claim to 
superiority is here secured on grounds reminiscent of the medieval 
theologian's ontological proof, the logic according to which the 
greatest good imaginable must exist, since the greatness of what can be 
thought apart from its existence is exceeded by the greatness of that 
which can be thought of as having existence. 31 Since ultimately the 
contemplation of the greatest imaginable good entails eternal bliss, 
More's Utopia appears to point both to the philosophers' and the 
theologians' greatest imaginable happiness. 32 
Although some analysts of utopia emphasize the centrality of 
elements other than happiness as definitive of the utopian condition, 
happiness is a recurrent touchstone of the utopian. Fabulous hedonistic 
utopias, like the Land of Cockaigne or the Big Rock Candy Mountain, 
have their foundation in the unalloyed happiness that presumably 
consists in the complete and effortless fulfillment of physical needs. 
Ernst Bloch includes what he terms "French happiness," an intense state 
30. Utopia priscis dicta ob infrequentiam / Nunc Civitatis aemula Platonicae, 
/ Fortasse victrix (nam quod ilia literis / Denlinavit, hoc ego una praestiti, 
/ Viris et opibus, optimisque legibus) / Eutopia merito sum vocanda nomine. 
"The ancients called me Utopia or Nowhere because of my isolation. At present, 
however, I am a rival of Plato's republic, perhaps even a victor over it. The 
reason is that what he had delineated in words I alone have exhibited in men 
and resources and laws of surpassing excellence. Deservedly ought I to be 
called by the name of Eutopia or Happy-place." Thomas More, Complete Works (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), Vol. IV, 20-21; cited and translated in 
Marin, ibid., 91. 
31. Utopia's detailed literary existence also resonates with one of the 
early objections to that logic. That objection, developed by an otherwise 
obscure Benedictine monk, Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, depended on the absurdity of 
thinking that the existence of a certain Lost Island, which came to be known as 
Gaunilo's Island, was proved by its status as the "most excellent" island. 
Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, "Pro Insipiente," in First Philosophy: Fundamental 
Problems and Readings in Philosophy, Vol. III God, Mind and Freedom, ed. Andrew 
Bailey (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2004) 26-28. 
32. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300) 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 303. 
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of the delight of the senses, and joy, the "aristocracy of happiness," 
as "images of the fulfilled moment" that describe the utopian 
imagination. 33 Fredric Jameson cites the words of the doomed youth 
Arthur in Roadside Picnic as a "brief glimpse" of the "impossible and 
inexpressible Utopian impulse," albeit an impulse that cannot be 
disentangled in its literary form from its various anti-utopian 
complications: "HAPPINESS FOR EVERYBODY, FREE, AND NO ONE WILL GO AWAY 
UNSATISFIED! "34 
Happiness, in other words, acts as one familiar and well-attested 
thematic marker of utopian discourse. Invocations of the realization of 
happiness, its pursuit, and its difficulty of achievement may for that 
reason signal the operation of utopian discourse. Examples would 
include Adorno's reference to "complete happiness," and its denial, in 
the concluding sections of Negative Dialectics, or Irigaray's 
projection of "a felicity within history" as one goal of a political 
praxis attentive to the implications of sexual difference. 35 
Seen in this way, as the land of happiness, utopia emerges as the 
end not only of influential currents in the western intellectual 
tradition's ethical, political, and theological endeavors, but arguably 
also in its artistic or aesthetic practices. Where Stendhal claims 
beauty is only the promise of happiness, Adorno identifies that promise 
as definitive of art generally.36 The happy utopian end of these 
33. Bloch, ibid., 937. 
34. Jameson, ibid., 295; Arkady and Boris Strugatsky, Roadside Picnic, trans. 
Antonina W. Bouis, Cryptomaoist Editions, 126, http://www.cca.org/crn/ (accessed 
May 21, 2009). 
35. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 404; Luce Irigaray, I love to you: Sketch 
of a Possible Felicity Within History, trans. Alison Martin (New York: 
Routledge, 1996). 
36. "Stendhal's dictum of art as the promesse du bonheur implies that art 
does its part for existence by accentuating what in it prefigures utopia." 
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 311. "Stendhal's dictum" is presumably the 
frequently-quoted definition of beauty found in the work On Love (De l'amour) 
by the 19th-century writer Marie-Henri Beyle, pen-name Stendhal, namely "La 
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endeavors embodies the dual sense of end as aim and as culmination and 
conclusion. 
That equation raises a concern about the identification of utopia 
with happiness. With respect to art, for instance, Adorno claims "If 
the utopia of art were fulfilled, it would be art's temporal end. ,,37 
Jameson notes that the putative "end of art" is part of the radical 
depersonalization and detemporalization that gives rise to concerns 
about Utopian boredom and "fear. ,,38 Whether the achievement of utopia 
would really spell the end of all art, it seems likely to entail the 
end of the novel. 
The suspicion that happiness would put a stop to the effort, or 
struggle, embodied in art and other reflective activities sterns from a 
particular - modern and postmodern - understanding of happiness. That 
understanding views happiness as the antithesis of alienation. For that 
reason, the experience of happiness seems to be at odds with the self-
consciousness required for conceptualization and activity, including 
the conceptualization of and the striving for utopia. Adorno, e.g., 
insists that the experience of happiness lies in the moment; it is 
perceptible only in retrospect, as something irretrievably past, and 
the "only relation of consciousness to happiness is gratitude: in which 
lies its incomparable dignity.,,39 Happiness, in this account, is an 
intrinsically unknowing experience that excludes what we think of as 
"consciousness," with its structure of the knowing subject, the known 
object, and the separation between them. 
beaute n'est que la promesse du bonheur." (Beauty is only the promise of 
happiness.) For a discussion of the slippage between Stendhal's "beauty" and 
Adorno's "art" see James Gordon Finlayson, "The Work of Art and the Promise of 
Happiness in Adorno," World Picture 3: Happiness, proceedings of the 2009 World 
Picture Conference, October 23-24, 2009, Oklahoma State University, 
http://www.okstate.edu/worldpicture/ (accessed March 22, 2010). 
37. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 32. 
38. Jameson, ibid., 182-184. 
39. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 112. 
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If Adorno is correct, and if utopia is taken to be a place of 
happiness, it affects the chronotopic character of utopia. To the 
extent that utopia is an experiential chronotope, an articulation of 
space and time that supports experience, and if the experience it 
supports specifically excludes "consciousness," the hallmark of the 
epistemological subject, the subject of knowledge, than utopia can have 
no knowing subject. From this perspective, that subject's relation to 
utopia is of a perpetual contemplation of the interior of the candy 
shop through the constitutive barrier of the shop window. 
Moreover, when utopia is understood strictly as a place of 
happiness, almost everything about utopia remains unspecified. 
Consulting the conditions for happiness, as these are given by the 
experience of happiness, provides a fragmentary and episodic account of 
Bloch's "images of the fulfilled moment," rather than the detailed 
specifications that are associated with utopia's familiar generic forms. 
The systematic efforts that have been made to analyze the conditions 
for happiness in the course of the elaboration of western ethics, 
politics, art, and religion, in seeking to grasp the universal or 
background conditions for a general happiness, miss the concrete, 
conjunctural, even idiosyncratic qualities of the modern experience of 
happiness. 
The problem with happiness as the content of utopia is further 
complicated by the particularity of its social and historical 
determinants, again as seen from the vantage point of modernity. The 
chief goal of most civilization has been to ensure that those who fail 
to uphold the basic canons of commendable conduct will experience 
misery in this life and fearfully expect additional and overwhelming 
misery in whatever world may lie ahead. The thesis that civilization 
rises on a foundation of renunciation and alienation, and that the 
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abandonment of this renunciation and alienation would promote the 
happiness or pleasure people associate with immediate gratification, 
already contains the germ of the insight that only within a particular, 
concrete social and historical conjuncture, private as well as public, 
do people acquire the affective and symbolic equipment to experience 
happiness as such.4o This history makes human happiness very largely if 
not entirely contingent on what society and our learning of it, through 
all available channels, has invested with the quality of being able to 
produce happiness. All particular utopian discourse will prove, on this 
argument, always already bound to the images of the fulfilled moment 
provided and authorized by the larger discourse of which it is a moment. 
Utopia as Desire 
The understanding that happiness is conjunctural and historically 
mediated has not always dominated discussions of happiness as it does 
today.41 However, the contemporary understanding of happiness points 
towards the need to consider desire, and its local determinants, in 
relation to the content of utopia. That exploration resonates with more 
recent thematizations of utopia as well. 
Ruth Levitas proposed to define utopia as "an expression and 
exploration of desire" in her now-classic work The Concept of Utopia. 42 
In that work, Levitas argues the need for a definition that will 
accommodate the various formal treatments of utopia, from detailed 
utopian fiction to sociological analysis on the order of Mannheim's 
Ideology and Utopia, and that will span the different possible emphases 
evident in discussions of utopia. Earlier theorists had emphasized 
40. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. James Strachey 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1961). 
41. Finlayson, ibid. 
42. Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1990), 191. 
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either form, content, or function; Levitas sought a definition that 
would account for variations in these emphases across time. She 
concluded with the assessment that: 
Utopia expresses and explores what is desired; under certain 
conditions it also contains the hope that these desires may be 
met in reality, rather than merely in fantasy. The essential 
element in utopia is not hope, but desire - the desire for a 
better way of being. 43 
Where Bloch had presented the principle of hope as the ubiquitous 
utopian principle in human culture, Levitas was willing to identify the 
expression of desire, even desire that knows itself to have no hope of 
fulfillment, as utopian. 
Levitas' definition of utopia as desire, according to Fredric 
Jameson, was instrumental in transforming utopian studies into a 
coherent sub-discipline. 44 That effect surely carne, at least in part, 
from the peculiar resonance it established between a definition that 
made desire itself central and the postmodern preoccupation with desire 
itself as an object of fascination and contemplation. This 
preoccupation, in turn, sterns from the status of desire as a phenomenon 
whose concept brings together Hegelian-dialectical roots, Lacanian-
discursive theoretical trajectories, and Debordian-spectacular, 
consumerist actualizations and implications. 45 All contemporary 
understandings of desire emphasize its discursive character. Some lend 
credence to the position that postmodernity realizes the conditions for 
a "meta-utopian" condition in which different, even incompatible, 
utopian visions can be accommodated and pursued simultaneously.46 
43. Ibid. 
44. Jameson, Archaeologies, note p. 2-3. 
45. Madan Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and 
Postmodernism, 2nd edition (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1993), 17-
26, 93-97. 
46. See Leonard Harris, "Postmodernism and Utopia, an Unholy Alliance," in 
Racism, the City, and the State, ed. Malcolm Cross and Michael Keith (London: 
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An acute fictional commentary on the notion of the desire-defined 
meta-utopia appears in Ursula K. LeGuin's "The Ones Who Walk Away From 
Omelas."n In that story, "Ornelas" appears initially as a self-
consciously utopian and explicitly meta-utopian construct; while it is 
almost impossible to describe, it is explicitly open to a variety of 
imaginative constructions and to significant pluralism of desire, along 
with its satisfaction. The problem with the meta-utopia of Ornelas, 
however, is a single, central jarring element that vitiates its utopian 
claim in the eyes of the people who walk away. That problem is the 
society-wide conscious acceptance of a quantum of perpetual, 
constitutional suffering imposed on a speechless and uncomprehending 
other. The utopian solution in Ornelas fails, at least from the 
perspective of the ones who walk away, precisely insofar as it founds 
itself on this suffering. LeGuin's tale dramatizes another, traditional, 
theme associated with the idea of utopia, which will prove central to 
the discourse studied here. 
Utopia as the Negation of Suffering 
Both the idea of utopia as a place of happiness and that of utopia 
as an expression and exploration of desire presuppose and include the 
idea of utopia as a place unmarred by suffering. This project, in 
particular, finds the negation of suffering to be paradigmatic with 
respect to the utopian discourse it explores. Sometimes, the idea of 
the negation of suffering appears directly. Importantly, however, 
insofar as utopia emerges as an image or representation of an idea 
related to happiness or desire, these representations also incorporate 
Routledge, 1993) 31-44; Patricia J. Huntington, Ecstatic Subjects, Utopia, and 
Recognition: Kristeva, Heidegger, Irigaray (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998). 
47. Ursula K. LeGuin, "The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas," in The Wind's 
Twelve Quarters (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) 275-284. The story was 
originally published in 1973. 
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the negation of suffering, presented under the aspect of the negation 
of a negative as a positive. That is, utopian happiness, or utopian 
expressions of desire, inevitably emerge as positively tinged visions 
of the negation of suffering. 
The negation of suffering itself in its utopian form, true to the 
chronotopic character of utopia, predictably fuses a temporal dimension 
with the site of utopia. Suffering may appear as "having been overcome 
at last" or "never again to be" or even - in the case of those utopias 
proj ected into the past - "not yet having been. "48 It is arguably the 
temporal dimension ascribed to this negation, and in particular its 
imaginable prospective character, that has made the association of 
utopian imagination and ideas of "progress" or "revolution" as strong 
as it has sometimes seemed. Fredric Jameson's analysis, which finds the 
utopian form intrinsically non-programmatic or non-strategic, also 
comments on the unparalleled political interest that attaches to the 
utopian literary form. The persistent political relevance of utopia 
seems to depend precisely on this non-programmatic and emphatic display 
of an imaginable alternative to the "unspeakable world that is."49 
Utopian negation of suffering stands in a clear relationship to the 
satisfaction of desire, even though it is not identical to that 
satisfaction. For that reason, recognizing utopia as the idea of the 
negation of suffering extends rather than abandons Levitas's insight 
into the desirous character of utopia. Desire has long been regarded as 
a form of suffering by philosophers and theologians. 50 The etymological 
48. For the notion of utopias projected into the past, see in particular 
Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922). 
49. Jameson, ibid., 232; Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 403. 
50. Stoics, Epicureans, and Buddhists agree that desire fuels the fires of 
suffering. See Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in 
Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Susan R. 
Garrett, No Ordinary Angel: Celestial Spirits and Christian Claims About Jesus 
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derivation of passion in the Greek verb pathein, to suffer, is 
reasonably well known. Utopia functions as the imaginative 
transformation of that desirous suffering, such that the "expression 
and exploration" of desire identified by Levitas amounts to giving a 
positive form to the negation of suffering. Suffering appears, then, as 
the ma~erial from which utopia takes its shape. 
The material that is suffering has some peculiar characteristics, 
especially when compared with the accounts of desire given in the 
western theoretical tradition. Desire in that tradition arises from a 
specific lack of a desired object; that is, desire in its structure 
elaborates the relationship of sUbjectivity to absence. Most recently, 
the relationship of desire and lack has been theorized in Lacanian 
psychoanalytic thought. These theories, too, link desire to lack or 
absence. 51 This original relationship gives rise to the question of 
whether a positive desire, based on pleasure or happiness without the 
mediation of suffering, is even possible. 
By recognizing this relationship, the argument here is that issues 
of desire necessarily arise in conjunction with experiences of 
suffering, even if it is the awakening of desire itself that gives rise 
to the awareness of suffering. The choice to focus on the aspect of 
suffering and the involvement of suffering in the constitution of 
utopian discourse, however, in preference to that of desire has some 
important consequences. First, it responds explicitly to emphases 
present in these theorists' works, which take up suffering as an 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Roger Corless, The Vision of Buddhism: 
The Space Under the Tree (New York: Paragon House, 1990). 
51. Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A feminist introduction (London: 
Routledge, 1990); Darian Leader and Judy Groves, Introducing Lacan (Cambridge: 
Icon Books, 2001); Jacques Lacan, My Teaching, trans. David Macey (London: 
Verso, 2008). 
26 
explicit theme. More importantly, however, it shifts the terms of the 
question of the representation of utopia, and the concept of utopia. 
The shift in terms is precisely that of a shift in what has to be 
represented, and the presence of concrete content in that 
representation. Desire, following Lacan, is a property of the symbolic 
order. Its movements are motivated within a symbolic system that only 
permits the operation of desire in an alienated and distorted way. 
There is a permanent schism between desire and need, or the counterpart 
of the Lacanian real, what would amount to the unthematized concrete. 
What this means in the case of utopian representation is that 
projections of the character or content of utopia themselves always 
already presuppose a particular, socially-imposed or regulated, 
systematization of what may be desired, what can appear as desirable. 
This will officially fail to disrupt the system itself, with its 
prohibitions and permissions. This will be true even, or perhaps 
especially, when it is the organization of this symbolic order that 
produces specific symptoms of suffering. 
Suffering, on the other hand, anchors desire in the concrete and 
objective. As Adorno says, "suffering is objectivity that weighs upon 
the subj ect. ,,52 Thus, while utopia does indeed "appear abstract amidst 
concrete things," its relationship to suffering invests this abstract 
image with an intrinsic and inescapable concreteness. 53 Thus the very 
idea of utopia participates in the name-like structure of Adorno's 
"concept," or "thought," which contains in its innermost cell that 
which is not thought, not abstraction. 54 This concrete cellular 
character of utopia, which it stubbornly maintains in every guise in 
52. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 83. 
53. Ibid., 57. 
54. Ibid., 408. 
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spite of its imaginary and abstract mode of appearance, constitutes a 
-
central feature of utopian discourse and remains at the center of the 
analysis here. 
Suffering and its enformation in utopia further renders utopia, 
while abstract in its form as a negation of suffering, concrete in its 
contents as a body of suffering which concrete human subjects cry out 
to have negated. Following Ernst Bloch, and in contradistinction to 
post- or anti-humanist trends, this project takes seriously concrete 
individual human subjects, as sufferers, dreamers, and imaginers of 
alternatives. 55 An underlying premise, which will be honored albeit 
sometimes tacitly and implicitly, is that the materialistically and 
pragmatically understood subject of the humanities, the human subject 
of such things as lost car keys, mortgage payments, and reading a 
bedtime story to a child, is deeply concerned in the prospects for 
utopian discourse, and whatever conceivable and possible pro-utopian 
activity. This concrete subject is neither, precisely, the universal 
subject of enlightenment reason, nor a collective subject, but is 
always whatever particular and concrete human subject, whose specific 
predicates or qualities matter, though they mayor may not identify the 
subject in a definitive way.56 More to the point, this outlook with 
respect to the subject might be called a conventional understanding of 
the everyday and popular-philosophical understanding of the human 
subject. Difficulties with the theoretical formulation of this subject 
notwithstanding, this understanding amounts to an assertion that 
someone like this subject still has to be considered theoretically as 
55. See in this regard Douglas Kellner, "Ernst Bloch, Utopia and Ideology 
Critique," Illuminations, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kelll.htm 
(November 17, 2009). 
56. The important subject of suffering, and of the concern with utopia, may 
then coincide with Agamben's "whatever singularity" as discussed in The Coming 
Community. Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). 
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well as practically, and still ultimately has to be at least one of the 
actual subjects both of theory and of praxis. 
utopia as Unrepresentable 
Russell Jacoby identifies a stream of utopian thought he labels 
"iconoclastic" utopianism that contrasts with what he terms "blueprint" 
utopianism. Jacoby's blueprint utopians are those that, like Thomas 
More, describe the utopian scene in minute detail. The iconoclastic 
utopians, in contrast, avoid detailed images. Jacoby theorizes that 
these utopians, deeply influenced by Jewish messianic thought and 
schooled by the Torah's ban on images, developed their utopian 
expressions in an anti-pictorial direction. He explicitly includes 
Theodor Adorno as an iconoclastic utopian thinker. For such utopians, 
the place of happiness is unrepresentable for reasons having to do with 
the need to avoid falsifying the picture of utopia by fixing it in a 
particular, static, and ultimately idolatrous form. 57 
Utopia is arguably unrepresentable for reasons beyond Jacoby's 
thesis, however. One argument is that utopia, to be different enough to 
be worthwhile, must be so different that its representation would be 
unintelligible. 58 The prohibition on images may have been reimposed for 
historical and political reasons. On this argument, what can be 
expressed in the idiom of the current symbolic structure is ipso facto 
already reconciled to it and consequently offers no hope for its 
radical redemption. So utopian discourse itself has to borrow a page 
from Adorno's aesthetic theory: utopian discourse has to depend on 
texts that are utopian without talking about utopia, texts that paint 
the absence of the positive they want to evoke, or texts that explore 
57. Russell Jacoby, Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian 
Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
58. See Jameson, Archaeologies, 107-118. 
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new modes of communication which, because they cannot rely on easily-
understood linguistic forms, flirt with unintelligibility. 
Utopian discourse for these philosophers constitutes and embodies a 
response to the threat to happiness posed by a premature closure of the 
world, a closure that results from fixation on prescribed and at some 
level irrational ideas. The paramount question facing anyone who wants 
to assert the possibility of utopian imagination becomes the 
identification of a space, an imaginable potentially utopian space, and 
a time, an imaginably potentially fruitful and productive time, to 
which citizens, residents of the present, have access or might yet gain 
entree. This space and time forms an alternative to the extant or 
observable world. Some feel this space is widening in post-modern times, 
perhaps as a consequence of Derridean indefinite deferral of 
conclusiveness, of Foucauldian contention with respect to knowledge, or 
of the proliferation of interstitial subject positions. Perhaps they 
are right, and these developments are not superficial textual practices 
with restricted substantive impacts on material lives. 59 If so, the 
widening of the possibilities for utopian thinking may be the gift 
post-modernity has given to the future. That gift, if it is a gift, has 
come in the wake of some losses for those who have had to live through 
post-modern times' deconstructive throes. 
The Subject of Utopia 
One of the most widely lamented casualties of these deconstructive 
moments, as well as one of their most celebrated victories in other 
camps, has been "the subject," with or without an index like Cartesian, 
humanistic, or centered. The subject, as it appears in contemporary 
literature, is a vague term with a wide scope; in a particular context, 
59. See Huntington, Ecstatic Subjects. 
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it might embrace anything from the Kantian transcendental subject of 
knowledge to the decentered postmodern individual. This "inherent 
ambiguity of the term goes some way to explaining its popularity and 
productivity. ,,60 Its use in postmodern texts, however, almost inevitably 
excludes, or explicitly challenges, the self-centered, self-aware, 
rational and realistic subject of experience and autonomous agency 
portrayed in rationalist philosophy, modern novels and economics 
textbooks. 61 One sense, of particular relevance to a motivated reading 
of texts, is that of the grammatical subject, the substantive that 
performs the action of the verb. A subject of this kind undergoes the 
experience of something, or bears the description of a predicate, 
discursively. This grammatical and discursive subject can imply 
distinct subject positions, which readers of texts may recognize, or 
with which they may identify. From this perspective, the subject of 
utopia - as if there might be only one such subject - would be the 
substantive, and by extension, really or in imagination, the actual 
site of the experience of utopia. 
Considerations of the usage of "subject" in contemporary social 
theory typically ignore or bypass another possible sense of the term, 
one more familiar in the context of the humanities. "Subject" can be 
used as in the sense of "subject matter," the thematic aspect of human 
experience interpreted through the form and content of some work of 
60. David Macey, The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory (London: Penguin 
Books, 2000) 368-369. 
61. For an overview of positions related to the "death of the subject" in 
the social sciences and critical theory, and their implications for social 
theory, see Rosenau, ibid., 42-61; Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postrnodern 
Theory: Critical Interrogations (New York: Guilford Press, 1991) 283-294. For 
one lengthy discussion of the development of understandings of subjectivity and 
their relationship to concrete social forms, incorporating a recognition of 
their utopian moment, see Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative 
as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). 
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art. 62 This usage preserves an echo of the pre-modern philosophical 
understanding of the term as "substance," present in the world, and 
contrasted to the mental concept, or object, of that substance. The 
"subject of utopia" in this sense would designate utopia considered as 
something to discuss, to write about, or perhaps even to endeavor to 
construct. 
In the study that follows, "the subject," whether of utopia or of 
something other than utopia, will most often refer to a soft-focus 
superimposition of the discursive subject on the remnants of the kind 
of substantives mentioned in connection with suffering, who are 
protected by committees on research involving human subjects, and who 
might from time to time read the kinds of texts being discussed here. 
It takes as given that these subjects are collaborative, autopoietic 
constructs of language and practice, who make themselves, and are made 
by one another, individually and collectively, through complex and 
ongoing practices. Whether these subjects have a chance of becoming 
subjects of utopia is one of the questions utopian discourse might be 
expected to address. How that question comes to be answered in these 
writers' utopian discourse is one of the questions of this dissertation. 
The question is whether utopia can be the object of conscious 
experience. In other words, can utopia have a subject, either in the 
sense of a consciousness that knows utopia as utopia, or in the looser 
sense of a human subject living a happy life. 
Utopian Discourse in the Theatre of the Humanities 
The extended reflection on utopian discourse presented in this text 
situates itself in the larger context of the western humanities. This 
is true in spite of the "post-humanist" tenor of some of this discourse. 
62. See F. David Martin and Lee A. Jacobus, The Humanities Through the Arts, 
6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004) 35-36. 
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In particular, the problems being addressed by these theorists 
correspond to the anti- or post-humanistic tenor of the early 21st 
century. This circumstance, along with the circumstance that the text 
serves a utilitarian purpose with respect to the humanities, call for a 
few words outlining the relationship of this reflection to the context 
of the humanities. 
The images of utopia that are the central object of reflection in 
this text, including the abstract verbal ones that discourse creates, 
have specific properties of interest from the perspective of a more 
encompassing relationship to the humanities. In particular, these 
images of an "impossible place" or a topos outopos, a place that is 
nowhere, bring together considerations from different corners of the 
humanistic field. In the arrangement of these themes displayed in 
images of utopia, it is sometimes possible to discern underlying 
structural similarities and relationships among these different areas. 
As images, the images of utopia considered here immediately 
participate in the realm of art, or aesthetics, understood as a system 
or systems of representation, in particular the representation of 
beauty.63 Some utopian images are, at least arguably, presented as 
images of beauty by their authors. Considerations relevant to the 
analysis and understanding of art, particularly literary art, are 
relevant to any reflection on utopian discourse as imagistic discourse 
constructing a representation of an idea. The notion that aesthetic 
criteria are inapplicable to a consideration of texts that have been 
63. Bryan S. Turner, "Introduction," in Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque 
Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Sage 
Publications, 1994) 1-36; Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, "Introduction," 
in Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, eds., Philosophies of Art and Beauty: 
Selected Readings in Aesthetics From Plato to Heidegger (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976) xiii-xix. 
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categorized as philosophical is, moreover, challenged explicitly by 
each of these authors. 
As images that include suffering as their subject matter, in the 
form of its negation, or in the temporalized form of its having-been-
negated, this discourse demonstrates particularly clearly the 
transformation of material that takes place in the process of producing 
a particular aesthetic form. 64 This transformation characterizes the 
working-out of the artistic idea in general. It is never foreign to the 
working-out of ideas in textual form, which can be presented generally 
as a poetic practice, whether or not the final form of the text can 
qualify as poetry in the strict sense. The image that is utopia, as an 
image of suffering transformed into happiness, constitutes an initial 
and significant effort to come to terms with suffering in the concrete, 
and to imagine its resolution. While this imaginative transformation 
remains partial, questionable, and abstract from the standpoint of 
discrete and concrete subjects of suffering, it is an indispensable 
moment of any actual artistry involving suffering. 
Utopias, as images that present the form of the having-been-
overcome of suffering, participate in an ancient artistic project, that 
of making real and present, or at least visible, discernible, and 
tangible, the highest goOd. 65 These avowedly secular images of utopia 
then qualify as the descendents of early art produced in the service of 
64. The recognition of the intrinsic content of suffering in art is one of 
the central holdings of Adorno's aesthetic theory. "All that art can do is to 
grieve for the sacrifice it makes and which it itself, in its powerlessness, 
is." Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 52. 
65. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "The Philosophy of Fine Art," trans. 
F.P.B. Osmaston, in Hofstadter and Kuhns, ibid., 378-445, 388; E.H. Gombrich, 
The Story of Art (London: Phaidon Press, 2006) 37-47; James Elkins, On the 
Strange Place of Religion in Contemporary Art (London: Routledge, 2004) 5-12. 
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the sacred. Utopia qualifies as a secular treatment of a fundamentally 
religious aesthetic program. 66 
Because of the relationship of utopia, generally as image and 
specifically as image of the highest good, to the western tradition and 
in particular the Jewish tradition of aniconic monotheism, utopian 
images themselves skirt the frontiers of idolatry, on one hand, and of 
prophetic imagination and announcement on the other. The problem of 
discernment posed by the enunciation of discrepant prophetic messages, 
of how to know idolatrous false pronouncements as false and to know the 
true word emanating from the holy as true, bedevils utopian images as 
well, and poses problems for the assessment of these images. 67 The 
problems associated with the discernment of the "rational" or 
"reasonable" character of utopian imaginings relates to this problem of 
warding off idolatry. However, the problem of making a fetish of 
certain forms of rationality, which revert to irrationality and 
barbarism, arises in the context of utopian images as well. 68 
The images that are utopias embody aspirations towards epiphany as 
part of their artistic concept. They have for their material the 
concrete substance of human life; they depict its transformation as a 
formal substitute for the alteration of that substance that is 
concretely desired. The images that are utopias are situated peculiarly 
at the conjunction of various modal (must, can, could, shall, should, 
66. So the proximity of sacrifice to the aesthetic image, as referenced by 
Hullot-Kentor in his introduction to Kierkegaard: Construction of the 
Aesthetic, takes on a deeper significance. See Robert Hullot-Kentor, "Foreword: 
Critique of the Organic," Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the 
Aesthetic, trans. R. Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1989), x-xxiii. 
67. A classic presentation of the problem in Biblical literature occurs in 
Jeremiah 27-29. 
68. See Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) on the problem of rational 
irrationality, its roots in mythic religious impulses, and its relationship to 
the production of images and the reproduction of culture. 
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might, will, would, imperative, subjunctive, positive, declarative, 
interrogatory), temporal (now, once, later, sometime, never, again) and 
spatial (here, there, elsewhere) possibilities for relating being, non-
being, and becoming. The discussion of the relationship of being, non-
being, and becoming constitutes the contemporary terminology of 
epiphany - the "sudden appearance of the divine" - as the authentic 
manifestation of presence or the alchemical transformation of base 
existence into something altogether finer. 
Relevance of Utopia in the Late 20th Century 
It makes sense to focus on the work of late 20th century figures 
because the late 20th century period poses specific challenges for 
utopian discourse, on all fronts. The image character of utopian 
presentation becomes problematic. Whether a fundamentally metaphysical 
idea like utopia can continue to be advanced in a "post-metaphysical" 
age becomes questionable. The significance of the linguistic character 
of utopian representations makes utopian imagination increasingly 
vulnerable in an age in which the resistant quality of language and its 
always already constitutive character make everything done with and in 
language suspect. Ontological concerns call utopian imagination into 
question as a refuge of metaphysics. Nominalist nihilism and pseudo-
pragmatic positivism foreclose more and more avenues of access to a 
plausible consciousness of potentiality. From the standpoint of the 
possible rehabilitation of utopian discourse and a possible innervation 
of pro-utopian praxis in the contemporary period, the discourse that 
grapples with these challenges is the discourse that requires 
understanding and comment. 
Reasons for the Choice of These Thinkers 
This project has come to revolve around the work of three 
particular late-20th-century philosophers, Theodor W. Adorno, Luce 
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Irigaray, and Giorgio Agamben. These three philosophers together form a 
satisfyingly complex and striking chord based on common key concerns 
and chromatic variations in philosophical lineage, methodological 
approach, and points of focus. 
All are distinctly late modern or postmodern thinkers. This 
historical proximity is relevant for at least two reasons. They are 
acutely aware of the role of history in the formation of human 
consciousness and, beyond that, of the subconscious, the wellspring of 
desire. The idea that desire itself, the inner nature of the human 
person or individual human subject, is affected by history, both 
personal and social, is a given for these authors. Most moderns share 
this idea. It makes the discussion of utopian possibilities even more 
complicated than it already was for the early modern utopians, as 
already noted. 
All are also sensitive to and interested in the role of language in 
the process of conceptualizing the object of desire. In this regard, 
Adorno, though sometimes identified as the quintessential high 
modernist, already points towards the "linguistic turn" that so 
pervasively haunts the postmodern age. All these thinkers accept that 
consciousness is shaped and given to us in and through language. All 
also affirm that there is something that nevertheless escapes the net 
of language. They each adopt the simple but vexing stance that language 
communicates, or arises for the possibility of communicating, something 
that differs from language that ,eludes representation within it. Their 
refusal to abdicate this position unites all these thinkers, and impels 
them to their ultimately utopian positions. All are committed to the 
position that there is something people are trying to do with language 
that relates to perceiving as well as to making the world. With due 
respect for the ways language itself creates the world in which its 
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speakers and writers live, these thinkers refuse the position that what 
we have access to through ordinary language exhausts relevant reality. 
All would regard that quintessentially anti-utopian position as a form 
of collusion with fundamentally oppressive forces. All would agree that 
the human ability to imagine more desirable, even ideally desirable, 
alternatives to the present is - at least possibly and at times - a 
form of knowledge, as well as an indispensable condition of human 
freedom. 
Perhaps predictably, all of these thinkers struggle with issues of 
essentialism, its possible and necessary limits and its possible and 
desirable retention. Paul Tillich has argued that a certain irreducible 
minimum of essentialism is a requirement for utopian thinking.69 These 
thinkers endeavor to locate the liberating core of essentialism that at 
the same time escapes the imprisonment of rigid necessity, that 
exhibits possibility. All three thinkers draw in complex ways on the 
Platonic notion of the ideas. All three thinkers engage with the ghost 
of Heidegger. 7o All, as will become clear, devote significant energies 
to aesthetic themes. All their texts are marked by a use of religious 
imagery that might be surprising in the work of such resolutely secular 
thinkers. 
All three thinkers confront the basic dilemma of how much to rely 
on human desire in formulating strategies for the desirable human world, 
and in thinking about what that world would be. More precisely, perhaps, 
all three struggle with how, precisely, to rely on desire. The project 
of the negation of suffering must rely on desire. Nevertheless, desire 
is known to be unreliable and potentially treacherous thanks to its 
69. Paul Tillich, "The Political Meaning of Utopia," in Political 
Expectation (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) 137. 
70. This project will approach this troublesome Heideggerian connection 
negatively - that is, by avoidance - whenever possible. 
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historical and linguistic constitution. The degree to which and the 
ways in which it is unreliable are hidden. Moreover, every response to 
desire - reliance, suppression, repression, cultivation - has pitfalls. 
The critical question is how to proceed in a way that takes both 
dialectical moments, the one of the trust and the one of mistrust of 
desire, equally seriously. How might it be possible to desire 
something like utopia, and simultaneously to temper desire by various 
practices that also cannot simply be trusted? How, in other words, 
might it be possible to cultivate something like "wisdom" with respect 
to utopia? 
These thinkers are primarily concerned with focal projects other 
than utopia: the theorization of the relationship of the 
epistemological subject and object, the systematic interrogation of the 
androcentrism of the western philosophical paradigm, elucidating the 
root of bio-power-politics in the very notion of political sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, their projects lead them into the territory of utopian 
reflections. These reflections disclose the problematics of possibility. 
Their efforts to resolve the difficulties associated with it, and in 
the course of this resolution, to establish some reason to believe that 
there might be hope for processes that could bring about a world that 
does not yet exist, in which certain pressing problems are resolved, 
engage all three thinkers in utopian discourse. 
A critical comparison of Adorno, Agamben and Irigaray that focuses 
specifically on the utopian dimensions of their work also makes sense 
in the context of current scholarly interest on these thinkers. That 
each of these thinkers displays utopian features is well-known. That 
this utopian thinking crucially informs their projects is appreciated 
to differing degrees, but deserves to be more widely and deeply 
appreciated in each case. A comparison of these thinkers' approaches 
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and insights in thinking about the possible human world does not yet 
exist, and could be of genuine interest to scholars concerned with the 
work of each of these thinkers individually, as well as to scholars 
interested more generally in contemporary thought in the areas of 
aesthetics and religion. 
Adorno 
Adorno invokes the category of utopia explicitly. Adorno's own 
utopian thought has not attracted the full attention it deserves, and 
has not become the subject of study in its own right. The relative 
neglect of Adorno's utopian thinking among utopians may be the 
consequence of a commensurate focus on other, more accessibly utopian, 
German thinkers by scholars of utopia: Marcuse, Adorno's fellow 
Frankfurt School theorist, was for many years more accessible to 
English-speaking readers, and posed a clearer case study in utopian 
thinking, while Ernst Bloch could hardly be ignored as the central and 
influential German Marxist theorist of utopia. 71 In spite of Bloch's 
explicit and acknowledged influence on Adorno, and in spite of Adorno's 
own significant reflections on utopia and his nuanced and precise 
alternative to Marcuse, there has yet to be a dedicated focus on Adorno 
as a utopian thinker.72 
Adorno's own rhetoric is sufficiently pessimistic that early 
readers identified him more as a dismal nay-sayer than a seeker after 
hope. This, indeed, was Gillian Rose's guiding thesis in her study of 
Adorno. For Rose, Adorno is driven to the study of philosophy not 
71. Vincent Geoghegan, Utopianism and Marxism (London: Methuen, 1987); Ruth 
Levitas, ibid. 
72. Adorno himself identified Bloch's Spirit of Utopia as a lasting 
influence on his own thought. See Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative 
Dialectics (New York: The Free Press, 1977) 4. Fredric Jameson's treatments of 
Adorno's utopianism occur as an element in the context of wider reflections on 
utopian thought, or in the context of the extended treatment of Adorno's late 
thought as a whole. Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence of 
the Dialectic (London: Verso, 1990); Jameson, Archaeologies, 172-175. 
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because it offers deep and abiding hope for the future of humankind in 
desperate times, but because it is the only possibility, and because 
Adorno is looking for something that has the promise of effectiveness, 
in spite of not finding it yet. 73 This is the Adorno remembered for 
denying the possibility of poetry after Auschwitz. 
But as the brilliant and dedicated Adorno scholar Lambert 
Zuidervaart points out, this admittedly prominent side of Adorno's 
social thought is not the only one. Zuidervaart cites rhetoric like 
Adorno's stirring paean to the folly of art in the closing metaphysical 
meditations of Negative Dialectics and insists that "[iJf the ongoing 
assessment of Adorno's social philosophy does not address such passages, 
it will not truly have begun. ,,74 Zuidervaart's wide-ranging and 
comprehensive work, in fact, organizes central currents in recent 
Adornian scholarship, from Menke's efforts to read Adorno's aesthetics 
through the frame of Derridean deconstruction, through the gathering 
critiques of Adorno's views on popular culture and the limits on his 
wholesale dismissal of popular culture as oppressive, to a 
consideration of Adorno's relationship to Heidegger on one hand and 
Habermas on the other. 75 Most central for a consideration of Adorno as a 
utopian thinker, however, is Zuidervaart's assessment of the efforts to 
read Adorno as a postmetaphysical thinker and to recontextualize his 
metaphysics as a dialectic of suffering and hope, as well as his 
lengthy and (it must be suspected) theologically-motivated critique of 
73. Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of 
Theodor W. Adorno (New York: Macmillan, 1978). 
74. Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy After Adorno (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 201. Zuidervaart cites Adorno's statement 
that ~Folly is truth in the shape that human beings must accept whenever, amid 
the untrue, they do not give up truth" (Negative Dialectics 404, as translated 
by Zuidervaart) 
75. For the discussion of Derrida, see Christopher Menke, The Sovereignty of 
Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida, trans. Neil Solomon (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1998); Zuidervaart, ibid. 
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Adorno's success in combining these elements in a philosophical 
treatment of the late 20th-century situation. 76 
Zuidervaart's implicitly theological critique of Adorno's 
metaphysics points to another aspect of contemporary scholarly 
treatment of Adorno, which is less explicit in Zuidervaart, namely, the 
identification of religious themes in Adorno's work, and the difficulty 
of treating these themes. Brian O'Connor notes those, and is at pains 
to distinguish between religious rhetoric and religious commitment in 
Adorno's work. He notes that Adorno's use of religious thematics is 
made more possible by his strictly secular philosophical commitments. 77 
Rent de Vries somewhat similarly identifies Adorno as approaching the 
limits, in the context of a secular philosophy, of the boundaries of 
subject-object experience, which drives his philosophy in a theological 
direction. 78 
This latent and troublesome religious dimension in Adorno's work 
has been noted before, in particular by Susan Buck-Morss in her early 
work on Adorno's Negative Dialectic. There Buck-Morss traces the 
influence of the "early Benjamin, " which "incorporated structural 
elements from such seemingly remote sources as Jewish mysticism, 
Kantianism, Platonism, and German Romanticism," on Adorno's mature 
76. Zuidervaart, ibid., 48-76. Zuidervaart identifies one difficulty with 
Adorno's thought as his provision of a strictly "negative utopia." In this he 
echoes his contemporary critics as well, notably Siegfried Kracauer, who 
faulted him for inadequately utopian thinking. See Lorenz Jager, Adorno: A 
Political Biography, trans. Stewart Spencer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004) . 
77. Brian O'Connor, Adorno's Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the 
Possibility of Critical Rationality (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), see 
especially 165-173. 
78. Hent de Vries, Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in 
Adorno & Levinas trans. Geoffrey Hale (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2005). For de Vries, this imperative is similarly evident in the thought 
of Levinas, working with the same fundamental philosophical problem within a 
different philosophical framework, phenemenology vs. dialectics. 
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masterwork. 79 Martin Jay, however, goes further and attributes a direct 
influence of rabbinical Judaism on Adorno's later philosophy.8o From the 
standpoint of a consideration of the utopian dimensions of Adorno's 
thought, in particular, this element of his thinking becomes 
significant, as utopian theory itself is significantly thematized, at 
least in western European culture, through the symbols and texts of 
Judaism and Christianity, the thematics of the world to come and the 
City of God. 81 
More recently, a resurgence of interest in Adorno has focused most 
intently on his aesthetics and his social thought. O'Connor, one of the 
leading lights in this resurgence, attributes it to the new 
availability of more reliable texts in translation, which has led a 
rise in the popular reception of Adorno's work in the American academy. 
O'Connor stresses the transcendental form of Adorno's philosophy, and 
makes much of his affinities with, and at the same time, highly 
specific differences from, Heidegger. 82 O'Connor's analysis presents 
Adorno as addressing the same central philosophical problem as 
Heidegger - that of the structure of experience - from the 
epistemological rather than the fundamental ontological side. O'Connor 
shares Adorno's conviction that the epistemological approach succeeds, 
in the end, where Heidegger's ontological approach fails. 83 This 
conclusion is significant for an assessment of Adorno's utopian 
79. Buck-Morss, ibid., Xlll; see also S. Brent Plate, Walter Benjamin, 
Religion, and Aesthetic: Rethinking Religion Through the Arts (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), who attributes Adorno's "monadic" concept of the work of art 
to Benjamin's theologically-influenced aesthetics. 
SO. Martin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
Sl. Dorothy F. Donnelly, Patterns of Order and Utopia (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1998). 
82. O'Connor, ibid. 
83. This analysis, if correct, points to one possible source of the tensions 
between Adorno and his erstwhile professor Paul Tillich, with whom he 
nevertheless shares some significant insights and commitments, in particular 
views about the centrality of the category of expectation and the role of "the 
critique of idolatry." 
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discourse, because it suggests that Adorno's utopian thought must be 
understood as pointing towards praxological, world-trans formative 
activity oriented towards arriving at understanding, rather than under 
the rubric of a different mode of being .. 
Adorno's aesthetics is another area in which his utopian leanings 
are widely seen, but less widely analyzed. Robert Hullot-Kentor in 
particular notes the utopian contour of Adorno's thought in Aesthetic 
Theory, and links it to Adorno's sense of a clear value ordering with 
respect to aesthetic works. According to Hullot-Kentor, Adorno's vision 
of aesthetic order gives·us permission and motivation to ". act on 
the impulse to protect ourselves, or our imagination anyway, as the 
power over possibility, from what otherwise uses that power, second by 
second almost, to break in on us and to defeat that possibility. ,,84 
Agamben 
The works of Giorgio Agamben, an Italian thinker, have only 
relatively recently emerged in English. Scholarly commentaries in 
English on Agamben's work are scarce, and those that exist outside the 
periodical literature deal primarily with his later political works, 
like Homo Sacer, rather than his earlier works on aesthetics. 8s It is 
clear nevertheless that Agamben's work struggles with the same themes 
as Adorno's: the nature of the relationship between subject and object; 
the possibilities for metaphysical thinking in an allegedly post-
metaphysical era; the aesthetic and theological legacies of Benjamin 
84. Robert Hullot-Kentor, "Right Listening and a New Type of Human Being," 
in the Cambridge Companion to Adorno, ed. Tom Huhn (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 181-197, 196. 
85. See Andrew Norris ed., Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on 
Giorgio Agarnben's Homo Sacer (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005); 
Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli, eds., Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and 
Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Thomas Carl Wall, Radical 
Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). The first 
dedicated treatment of Agamben's aesthetics in English is William Watkin, The 
Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis (New York: Continuum, 2010). 
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and Heidegger; the possibility of a just politics; the contribution of 
artists and thinkers to the pursuit of that politics. Adorno's position 
vis-a-vis the linguistic turn might be questioned; Agamben's cannot be. 
Agamben's project centers on the identification of philosophy, at least 
since Plato, with the struggle to comprehend the elusive matter of the 
unnamable creative possibility that seems to lie just back of or within 
what goes by the name of language. 86 The comparison of Adorno's and 
Agamben's modernist and decidedly postmodernist approaches to the 
conceptualization of a possible world promises to be illuminating. 
Commentators who have approached Agamben's work have generally 
ignored its utopian dimensions. His treatment of sovereignty, and his 
approach to passivity, have so far attracted most attention. This is 
remarkable, however. In The Coming Community Agamben points to 
possibilities for transformation of the political realm; that he is 
attempting to work out an understanding of these possibilities that 
preserves the diversity of their singular human subjects seems beyond 
question. 87 Similarly, the persistent religious dimension of his thought, 
from his treatment of Pauline messianism in The Time That Remains to 
his invocation of Talmudic and Trinitarian thematics in the Coming 
Community, failed to generate immediate comment. This is in spite of a 
growing recognition of the phenomenon of "post-secular" thought, to 
which Agamben clearly contributes. 88 An explication of Agamben's utopian 
thinking, which proceeds in a profoundly negative and "iconoclastic" 
way, is long overdue. 
86. Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), in particular "The Thing Itself," 27-38 and 
"The Idea of Language," 39-47. 
87. Agamben, The Coming Community. 
88. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to 
the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey {Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005}; 
Philip Blond ed., Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology 




Neither Adorno nor Agarnben devote sufficient attention to gender. 
If for no other reason than the fundamental inadequacy of a 
consideration of utopia, the horizon of human possibility, that fails 
to consider the role of gender, it would be necessary to raise the 
issue of gender vis-a-vis these thinkers. Beyond that consideration, 
however, the work of Luce Irigaray bears significantly and prolifically 
on precisely the matters being considered by both Adorno and Agarnben in 
their different registers: the constitution of the subject, the 
subject-object relationship, and the implications of the structure of 
that experience for human knowledge - both of what is, and of what 
might be or become; the role of language as the mediation of this 
experience; and the possibilities for the reality, or realization, of a 
better world of human experience. Significantly, Irigaray is explicit 
in her inclusion of corporeality and desire in her work. Both of these 
dimensions are unavoidable in the work of Adorno and Agarnben as well. 
According to at least one reader, the consequences of this inclusion 
are far-reaching. "Woman becomes visible in her absence, disrupting and 
instigating the rereading of the whole discursive history of 
subjectivity."e9 That would seem to make Irigaray required reading for 
scholars interested in the utopian dimensions of thinking about the 
relationship of subject and object. 
Scholars repeatedly note Irigaray's utopianism. 90 Huntington, in 
particular, draws on Irigaray specifically as a utopian thinker, with a 
89. Simon Patrick Walter, "Situating Irigaray," in Philosophy and Desire, ed. 
Hugh J. Silverman (London: Routledge, 2000), 111-124, 111. 
90. See Whitford, ibid.; Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical 
Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law (New York: Routledge, 1991); Patricia J. 
Huntington, Ecstatic Subjects; Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, An Ethics of Dissensus: 
Postmodernity, Feminism, and the Politics of Radical Democracy (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001); Rachel Alsop, Annette Fitzsimmons, Kathleen 
Lennon and Rosalind Minsky, Theorizing Gender (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); 
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significant debt to Heidegger, and argues that Irigaray "repeats . 
two Heideggerian mistakes in attentuated form," namely, a lack of a 
dialectical approach and a perpetuation of a model of transgression as 
a "negation of what is.,,91 If she is correct, there is much to be gained 
by setting Irigaray into dialogue with Adorno in particular. 
Like Adorno and Agamben, Irigaray draws on religious and 
theological resources in her work, famously so; unlike them, she 
celebrates the possibilities of re-conceptualizing the divine "in the 
feminine gender" as an explicit dimension of her pro-utopian project. 92 
In so doing, Irigaray makes explicit the religious implications and 
involvements of utopian discourse. The religious dimensions of 
Irigaray's work are, again, commonplaces. Nevertheless, a sustained 
consideration of the relationship of her religious thought to the 
utopian content of her philosophy seems not to have been undertaken by 
scholars, who seem more likely to be interested either in Irigaray's 
possible relevance for secular politics, or for Irigaray's relationship 
to feminist theology, but not the relationship between the two. 
Critiques of Irigaray as essentialist and clandestinely 
heteronormative may require tempering. 93 More appreciative readers 
perceive Irigaray as pragmatically utopian and strategically hyperbolic 
in her extravagant claims about feminine jouissance. 94 Tina Chanter and 
Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
91. Huntington, ibid., xxx. 
92. Serene Jones, "Divining Women: Irigaray and Feminist Theologians," Yale 
French Studies 87 (1995) 42-67; Alison Ainley, "Luce Irigaray: Divine Spirit 
and Feminine Space," in Post-Secular Philosophy: Between philosophy and 
theology, ed. Phillip Blond (London: Routledge, 1998) 334-345; Morny Joy, 
Kathleen O'Grady and Judith L. Poxon, French Feminists on Religion: A Reader 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002). 
93. Alsop et al., Theorizing Gender; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
94. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation; Pheng Cheah, Elizabeth Grosz, Judith 
Butler, Drucilla Cornell, "The Future of Sexual Difference: An Interview with 
Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell," Diacritics 28:1 (Spring, 1998) 19-42; 
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Margaret Whitford, from different angles, insist that Irigaray's fabled 
essentialism is more apparent than real, an artifact of literalist 
misreading on the part of her second wave feminist critics. 95 More 
recently, Penelope Deutscher has extended this line of reading to a 
consideration of Irigaray's implications for multiculturalism, and the 
politics of diversity, concluding that Irigaray's project involves the 
effort to rethink egalitarian politics from the standpoint of 
differences rather than sameness. 96 A critical comparison of utopian 
discourse seems precisely the context in which to examine these claims 
and possibilities. 
As noted, there is arguably an irreducibly essentialist element to 
any utopian thinking, which may speak to the purpose behind Irigaray's 
apparent essentialism in treating sexual difference. 97 Nevertheless, it 
is perilously possible to misspecify the human essence that underwrites 
the arguable rationality of utopian thought. The perennial discourse 
about the possibility of man's [sic] pursuit of the good life vividly 
demonstrates the peril. Irigaray's frankly provocative work centering 
on the philosophical, linguistic, poietic, religious, and political 
implications of sexual difference counterbalances the neglect of gender 
in the work of Adorno and Agamben.98 In short, the possibilities for 
insight that emerge in bringing these deeply related and strategically 
Dorothy Leland, "Irigaray's Discourse on Feminine Desire: Literalist and 
Strategic Readings," in Philosophy and Desire, Hugh J. Silverman, ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 125-139; Alison Stone, "The Sex of Nature: A Reinterpretation 
of Irigaray's Metaphysics and Political Thought," Hypatia 18:3 (Autumn, 2003) 
60-84. 
95. Whitford, ibid.; Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's Rewriting of 
the Philosophers (New York and London: Routledge, 1995). 
96. Deutscher, ibid. 
97. Tillich, ibid. 
98. Gender is admittedly not the same category as sexual difference, and the 
conflation of the two here is a dangerous - but at least partially alert -
convenience. See Alsop et al, Theorizing Gender; Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic 
Subjects (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
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different thinkers together, focused on the practically as well as 
theoretically important horizon of utopia, are promising. 
Transcendence 
Many of the discursive themes shared by these thinkers, including 
those of utopia, religion, and art, are connected to one another by 
their relationship to the idea of transcendence. In particular, these 
themes touch on the question of whether and to what extent 
transcendence or something like it is possible and intelligible. The 
idea that people can know of and desire something that truly and 
irreducibly arises in some meaningful sense "from elsewhere" or "from 
outside" the world of everyday existence surfaces repeatedly in 
religious consciousness, in artistic endeavor, and in the utopian 
imagination. The same idea in its various guises plays a vital role for 
these thinkers. 
We might say that each thinker's work explores the question of how 
to draw the mental map of a post-metaphysical epoch in such a way that 
it could still include utopia. 99 Each of these thinkers, moreover, 
locates a similar method for this mapping, appropriate to a revised 
understanding of transcendence. This understanding takes shape in the 
course of an exploration of the uncharted territory of the concrete, 
material aspect of transcendence, impelled by an insistence that a 
space for something like transcendence must be held open, as the space 
of a possible "redemption" (Adorno), "outside" (Agamben), or creativity 
(Irigaray). In effect, these thinkers focus on re-thinking the central 
99. An apparent generic requirement for texts dealing with utopia is the 
citation of Oscar Wilde's aphorism, penned in 1891, "A map of the world that 
does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at," with or without the 
rest of the sentence: " ... for it leaves out the one country at which 
Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and 
seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias." 
Oscar Wilde, "The Soul of Man Under Socialism," in The Soul of Man Under 
Socialism and Selected Critical Prose (London: Penguin Classics, 2001) 141. 
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relationship of transcendence to immanence that structures the legacy 
of western metaphysics. 100 
Utopian discourse takes place, in this context, as a special form 
of the much older discourse on transcendence, being practiced under new 
terms and on new terrain, but with similar imperatives and impediments. 
As a result, it is subject to similar limitations. One of these is the 
requirement that whatever discourse advances as descriptions of the 
ideal not prevent a subsequent recognition of that ideal in radically 
unanticipated concrete forms. Jacoby's insight into the "iconoclastic" 
utopian tradition informed by messianic thought is relevant here. 
The prohibition on images or Bilderverbot does not address the full 
complexity of the situation facing this utopian discourse, however. 
Another element of the complex problem of representation is the problem 
of exclusion, as a linguistic and philosophical problem that is also a 
looming pragmatic ethical and political problem. Human life that 
relates to what differs from it by exclusion poses an ever-present 
threat to life generally. For Adorno and for Agarnben, both of whom 
situate themselves explicitly as "post-Auschwitz" thinkers, this ever-
present threat of exclusion is symbolized acutely by Nazi anti-Semitic 
totalitarianism and its lethal exclusion of the Jews. In Irigaray, what 
is excluded constantly takes the as-yet-unrealized form of Woman, or 
women-as-subjects; that exclusion, too, has lethal consequences, not 
alone for Woman but for Humanity and Life. The problem of exclusion, as 
well as of desire, connects by-now familiar conceptual outposts: the 
subject and the subject's relation to its object or objects; nature and 
its relationship to culture; language; death; time; space. 
100. For one discussion of the relationship of transcendence to immanence in 
western metaphysics, see Noelle Vahanian, Language, Desire, and Theology 
(London: Routledge, 2003). 
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The philosophical representation of the idea "utopia" names poses a 
difficult and delicate task. The utopian image is not only prohibited, 
it is necessary, ineluctable, and impossible. A simple non-dialectical 
avoidance of representation will not suffice, even if it could be 
sustained, which it cannot be. The feat to be performed includes the 
ineluctable discursive representation, its critical self-awareness as 
representation, its self-limitation or discipline as necessarily 
partial and erroneous, and its self-assertion, both as forthright 
critique of a dystopian and ideological context which effectively 
nullifies such critical representations, and as perspicuous insight 
into the situation's need and potential for change. The feat required 
is more precise and more challenging than Adorno's remark that the 
contemporary philosopher "must know how to wish. ,,101 It is like the tasks 
assigned to the protagonists of fairy-tales, who must find the land 
between sea and shore, for instance, or corne to the trial neither by 
night nor by day. In the case of utopian thought, the task is to 
understand the relationship of the inconceivable subject of utopian 
happiness to the unimaginable object of utopian longing. 
The Matter of Messianic Light 
Theodor W. Adorno, in the conclusion to his exilic work Minima 
Moralia, links an evocative image to the problem of utopian 
representation: 
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised [sic] 
in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as 
they would present themselves from the standpoint of 
redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world 
by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. 
Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the 
world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as 
indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the 
messianic light. 102 
101. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 407. 
102. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247. 
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Adorno's "messianic" language here does not indicate his anticipation 
of a concrete liberator, whether the Messiah awaited by pious Jews, 
Christians or Shi'ite Muslims, or the figure who, in the theological-
political words of a young Walter Benjamin, alone "consummates all 
history, in the sense that he alone redeems, completes, creates its 
relation to the Messianic. "103 For Adorno, the concrete question of 
whether that Messiah will one day arrive to usher in the redeemed world 
is explicitly beside the point. The possibility that matters is that of 
thinking what would be thought under the banner of the messianic. 104 
That banner has an unabashed metaphysical provenance. A Messiah or 
messiah can simply denote a liberator, particularly in the context of a 
national political struggle. The term "messianic" may even be extended 
to anyone or anything that effects a partial liberation or long-awaited 
reform. That looser, extended use of messianic language, however, owes 
its utility to the original development of the messianic idea within 
the context of religious tradition. The sacred narratives and popular 
elaborations, divine figures and interventions, and the expectation of 
supernatural blessings, reversals of injustice, and restoration of loss 
and damage that govern the strict usage of the term continue to color 
its metaphorical use. Metaphorical Messiahs and loosely messianic 
events may no longer have anything to do with anyone's God, and mayor 
may not accomplish the end of human history. They do, however, continue 
to have something to do with liberation, with the end of injustice and 
103. Walter Benjamin, "Theologico-Political Fragment" cited in Jacob Taubes, 
The Political Theology of Paul, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004) 70. Taubes goes on to emphasize the distance between 
Benjamin's early, earnest treatment of "the Messiah" and Adorno's standpoint in 
the passage from Minima Moralia, which Taubes identifies with German Idealist 
aestheticism. 
104. "But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the 
reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters." Adorno, Minima 
Moralia, 247. 
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the achievement of happiness and peace, and with the perfection of the 
world in which people find themselves living together as members of a 
single community. Moreover, just as the faithful of whatever religious 
tradition expected the Messiah to come from the neighborhood of the 
divine, the weaker modern "messianic" still seems to bring its new age 
from somewhere outside the closed system of this one. Messianic light 
retains a tinge of something metaphysical. 
Even loosely messianic expectation is an expectation of something 
new, something strictly speaking unexpected. Penelope Deutscher, in The 
Politics of Impossible Difference, discusses the contradiction involved 
in this expectation. On one hand, people know what to expect when they 
expect liberation or a better world. On the other, because what they 
are awaiting is something new, they cannot possibly know what to expect. 
Even when people have an idea of something like the results they hope 
to enjoy, an idea of the injustices they hope no longer to see, and so 
forth, even then they cannot have a perfectly clear and distinct idea 
of what is to be expected from radical change. This contradiction is 
what makes the situation of messianic expectation "impossible" in 
Deutscher's terms. It also differs, in her analysis, from what she 
distinguishes as "messianism," a political movement that identifies the 
messiah with a particular figure or program. Such messianism, according 
to Deutscher, instead of acknowledging its own impossibility, disavows 
it. That disavowal makes messianism dangerous, in a way that self-
consciously impossible messianic expectation is not. lOS 
Deutscher's analysis of the messianic parallels Fredric Jameson's 
assessment of the impossibility of utopian expectation in Archaeologies 
of the Future. Utopian imagination, too, faces the specific 
105. Deutscher, ibid., 105. 
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impossibility associated with the inability to imagine something that 
would amount to fundamental change. The more fundamental and complete 
the difference between the current situation and its utopian 
alternative, the less accessible that alternative becomes to 
imagination and contemplation. In fact, there is a chance that the 
present contemplating a utopian future, or the immediate context 
contemplating an alternative utopian location, cannot identify 
genuinely beneficial alternatives as pleasant or desirable. The 
predicaments facing messianic expectation and utopian imagination 
parallel one another. 
The parallel may help explain the deep affinity between these two 
strains of thought, which historically and culturally have sometimes 
coincided powerfully. Ample evidence supports the historical link 
between more traditional messianic expectation and utopian theories and 
programs, particularly in 19th century Europe .106 The utopian discourse 
of these three late 20th century philosophers is another occasion in 
which messianic language expresses utopian themes. 
Adorno is not the only one of this trio of thinkers whose thought 
sometimes takes up messianic language. Agamben engages with the 
language of the messianic explicitly and extensively, as for instance 
in his search for the possibility of "something like a messianic 
communi ty" in his analysis of the Epistle to the Romans. 107 Durantaye 
calls Agamben's enigmatic treatment of the "messianic" the central idea 
of Agamben's philosophy of potentiality. 108 While Irigaray does not 
invoke "the messianic" explicitly, her readers repeatedly spot 
messianic themes in her work. Penelope Deutscher, for instance, invokes 
106. Michael Lowy, Redemption and Utopia: Libertarian Judaism in Central 
Europe, trans. Hope Heany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 
107. Agamben, Time That Remains, 2. 
108. Durantaye, ibid., 366. 
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the notion of "the messianic" in her analysis of Irigaray's politics, 
while Margaret Whitford sees a "'messianic' Coming" along with other 
terms drawn from the language of religion coding her call for a "new 
era" in An Ethics of Sexual Difference. 109 
The loosening of messianic usage, and the parallels apparent 
between this looser usage and the classic dilemmas of utopianism, 
encourage the effort to treat this link between messianic and utopian 
discourse seriously. The language of "messianic light" not only 
resonates with the thinking of each of these thinkers, it incorporates 
common themes that bring their individual contributions to utopian 
discourse into conversation with one another. Aside from the long-
standing connection of messianic themes and utopian discourse, and 
aside from the privileged use of light as a metaphor for understanding, 
questionable as that usage is, "messianic light" has additional 
interesting properties. It is matter; it captures the material emphasis 
these thinkers share. It is SUbjective; it retains a connotation of an 
agent of the anticipated change. It is imagistic, but its image is, 
paradoxically, absent. 
The messianic light Adorno invokes is a figure for the object of 
desire that animates the philosophy, and philosophers, whose despair 
would be that of meeting the demands imposed by late modern and post-
modern dystopia. It is light that reaches a suffering world and its 
suffering inhabitants from an impossible place and time: from some 
place outside the world that is, from a time that permits entry from 
the present without being determined by its past. The continuing 
question before this study of utopian discourse is how the metaphor of 
109. Deutscher, ibid., 106; Margaret Whitford, "Irigaray, Utopia and the 
Death Drive," in Engaging with Irigaray: Feminist Philosophy and Modern 
European Thought, eds. Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, and Margaret Whitford (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 379-399, 385. 
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messianic light relates to the idea of utopia being discussed along the 
way of these writers' works. 
Plan of the Work and Key Issues 
Towards that end, the text develops ·along the following lines. 
Chapters two, three and four devote extended consideration to each of 
the thinkers under consideration. Chapter two focuses on Adorno's 
utopian discourse, with particular emphasis on his commitment to an 
unfolding of dialectical method, as well as consideration of his 
advocacy of "micrology" as a method. Chapter three turns to Irigaray's 
utopian discourse, with particular emphasis on her later work, which 
focuses on the requirements and processes of dyadic interaction and the 
cultivation of relationship between differing subjectivities, expressed 
as relations of sexual difference. Chapter four then treats Agamben's 
utopian discourse, with particular emphasis on Agamben's concept of 
messianic time and his championship of Benjamin's concept of the 
"dialectic at a standstill." 
Each of these chapters treats a restricted number of key thematic 
issues according to a single pattern of organization, which facilitates 
a final critical comparison of the different discourses. The discussion 
opens with a consideration of the specific dystopian vision that 
informs the author's overall project, and that vision's demand for a 
revision of basic concepts and a use of novel textual form. This 
discussion of dystopian vision and basic response contextualizes a 
review of the author's overall project, and prepares for a more 
detailed discussion of the treatment of utopia within it. The 
discussion then turns to a more pointed examination of the author's 
engagement with three common and structurally key issues. These are: 
the critique of language in relation to the reader as subject; the 
treatment of the subject-object problem in relation to the problem of 
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domination and the subject's potential for transformative action; and 
the representation of space and time in relation to the promise of 
utopia. 
Chapter five then does two things by way of conclusion. First, it 
spells out the critical comparisons that emerge from the discussion of 
each author's utopian discourse. This comparative exercise demonstrates 
that Adorno, Irigaray and Agamben share a discursive structure that 
incorporates prophetic elements along with elements more typical of 
philosophical truth-telling. 11o This discourse addresses itself to a 
"subject of utopian possibility" that is an available and 
transformative response to their texts. Utopian discourse of this form 
works to call into action a "subject of utopian possibility" that can 
undertake the ongoing task of utopian imagination and perhaps even 
utopian striving. The comparative focus then shifts to a consideration 
of the significance of this common structure as a form of utopian 
discourse. That discussion concludes that the prophetic elements of 
this discourse are not merely incidental to the utopian project; they 
emerge from these authors' effort to propose a source of metaphysical 
experience that is both adequate to and tenable in a radically post-
metaphysical context. Their refusal of other key elements of prophetic 
discourse, in particular the element of utopian representation, 
functions to potentiate this metaphysical content, as it works to block 
the potentially toxic effects of metaphysical images. 
110. This argument draws to an extent on Michel Foucault's typology of 
"modes of veridiction" in the ancient world. See Michel Foucault, Le courage de 
la verite: Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II: Cours au College de France 
(1983-1984), ed. Frederic Gros, A. Gallimard (Paris: Seuil, 2009) and Michel 




Theodor w. Adorno is best known as a significant, perhaps the most 
significant, theorist of the Frankfurt School. Between 1920 and his 
death in 1969 he authored works spanning metaphysical meditations to 
musicology, which run to 20 volumes of collected writings. Overshadowed 
in the US in the 1960s by his more accessible colleague Herbert Marcuse, 
the reception of his works hampered by inadequate translations, Adorno 
also became known for being a "mandarin aesthete" with an apolitically 
intellectual approach to critical theory and a bleak outlook.l More 
recently, his early and careful discussions of the materiality of 
language and his critique of phenomenology have intrigued students of 
post-structuralism and deconstruction, and Fredric Jameson has dubbed 
his particular brand of Marxism perhaps "just what we need today."2 
Despite his well-earned reputation as a pessimist, Adorno also 
qualifies as a significantly utopian thinker. His thought takes 
especially seriously the pressing need to locate and theorize the 
intellectual prerequisites for utopian consciousness. Russell Jacoby 
portrays Adorno's approach as emblematic of the "iconoclastic utopian" 
1. See Henry W. Pickford, "Preface," in Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: 
Interventions and Catchwords, translated by Henry W. Pickford (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998) vii-xii; Martin Jay, "Adorno in America," New 
German Critique No. 31 (Winter, 1984) 157-182. 
2. Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence of the Dialectic 
(London: Verso, 2007), first published 1990. See also Jay, ibid.; de Vries, 
ibid. 
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thought he champions. 3 Moreover, Adorno's utopian thought remains 
tenaciously though minimally, hopeful. Lambert Zuidervaart notes that 
Adorno's "own alternative to both traditional metaphysics and more 
recent antimetaphysics" achieves expression "in passages that juxtapose 
resolute self-criticism and impassioned hope," and insists that if "the 
ongoing assessment of Adorno's philosophy does not address such 
passages, it will not truly have begun."4 That assessment speaks to the 
depth of the utopian element discernible in Adorno's work. 
Adorno's explicit references to utopia are limited in number, but 
revealing. Adorno's well-known rejection of systems, "totality," and 
positive philosophical resolutions stems from his determination to 
safeguard the horizon of possibility required by utopian imagination; 
his overall project appears from that standpoint to have this object 
consistently in view. His work persistently traces the requirements of 
a tenable and truthful thought capable of understanding and 
articulating that possibility. The truth in the characterization of 
Adorno as a pessimistic thinker is his uncompromising delineation of 
the stringency of those requirements. The philosopher who said that 
"metaphysics must know how to wish" explicitly disdained wishful 
thinking; his self-appointed task was to see whether, and how, rigorous 
thought might arrive at or near the conclusions demanded by the "need 
in thinking. "5 
This task is made at once "the simplest of all things" and "the 
utterly impossible thing" by the problematic possibility of reflection. 
In his conclusion to Minima Moralia, Adorno insists that the 
perspective sought by thought from "messianic light" ought already to 
3. Jacoby, ibid. 
4. Lambert Zuidervaart, "Theodor W. Adorno," Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/adorno, (accessed August 3, 2007). 
5. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 407-408. 
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be available in the present as if by a simple kind of reflection, " 
because consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the 
mirror image of its opposite."6 Unfortunately, making use of that 
reflection 
. presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a 
hair's breadth, from the scope of existence, whereas we well 
know that any possible knowledge must not only be first 
wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also 
marked for this very reason, by the same distortion and 
indigence which it seeks to escape. 7 
Thus, while "[n]o light falls on men and things without reflecting 
transcendence," the problem with that indispensable and promising 
knowledge is that along with transcendence it reflects the glare of an 
inextricable involvement. 8 The self-same reflection of transcendence 
that sheds light also blinds "the eye that does not want the colors of 
the world to fade" to their source in something different from the 
known world. "The inextinguishable color comes from non-being."9 Thought 
- the reflection that might yet understand this - will only serve this 
source of transcendence when it takes its own distance, and its own 
ultimate inadequacy, seriously. 
The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for 
the sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so 
calamitously, it is delivered up to the world. Even its own 
impossibility it must at last comprehend for the sake of the 
possible. 1o 
Thus, Adorno is no utopian thinker, but his thought turns persistently 
towards utopia; ignoring his utopian aspirations distorts his work. 
Presenting this side of Adorno's thought, and drawing out its 
implications for contemporary utopian discourse, is the aim of this 
chapter. 
6. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 404. 
9. Ibid., 57. 
10. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247. 
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The discussion of Adorno that follows first reviews the dystopian 
perceptions catalogued in Adorno's work. Next, there is a brief review 
of the direction of his overall philosophical aims. This context serves 
as background for the detailed consideration of the appearance and 
place of utopian themes in that work. From this examination, the 
following sections look at Adorno's commitment to conceptual work, the 
role of textual form in its execution, his treatment of the subject-
object problem, its relationship to his critique of language, and 
finally his incorporation of space and time as arenas for the operation 
of the subject. 
The Universal Guilt Context 
Adorno may not regard the world as radically evil, as has been 
claimed. 11 His work certainly depicts the world as characterized by a 
relentlessly oppressive and totalizing, socially created reality that 
operates to suppress even imaginative resistance to it, let alone 
direct active resistance. This suppression occurs before consciousness 
even registers the possibility of such resistance. All of Adorno's work 
attests to his perception of the radically undesirable and dangerous 
quality of this increasingly ubiquitous reality. Its classic 
formulation, however, is to be found in Dialectic of Enlightenment, a 
collaboration with Max Horkheimer, and a work roughly contemporaneous 
with the more personal, and mordant, observations of his own Minima 
Moralia. 
Dialectic of Enlightenment begins with the assertion that 
enlightenment, an "advance of thought" that "has always aimed at 
11. James Gordon Finlayson, "Adorno On the Ethical and The Ineffable," 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/jgf21/research/AEI.rtf. (accessed March 1, 2010). 
J.M. Bernstein argues by contrast that Adorno identifies a "fugitive" ethical 
experience that provides glimpses of the good within an otherwise universal 
guilt context. J.M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters," has 
proved a miserable failure: the wholly enlightened earth is 
radiant with triumphant calamity. "12 In this sentiment, however, readers 
will hear a chorus of modern agreement. The paradigmatic bourgeois 
sociologist Max Weber famously identified the form of social and 
economic life that, in his reading, grew out of Protestant asceticism 
and that manifested itself in capitalist instrumental bureaucratic 
rationality in similar terms. Modernity is an inescapable structure, 
exerting "an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives 
of men [sic] as at no previous period in history. "13 Weber saw the 
United States as the epitome of the exclusive pursuit of wealth, 
"stripped of its religious and ethical meaning," and divorced from any 
serious rational justification, which was the ultimate legacy of a 
religious movement that, like all significant change in any part of an 
interpretively lived economic and social system, had its seismic impact 
on every part. 14 
Weber himself exemplified and defended the terrorizing rationality 
of the modern face of the European enlightenment in his principled 
refusal to pronounce in public the value judgments he seemed to hold 
privately. 15 In "Science as a Vocation," he insists on the ultimate 
12. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed. 
Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trasns. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 1. The work was first published in 1944, and reissued with 
substantial additions, notably a chapter by Adorno on anti-Semitism, in 1947. 
13. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated 
by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958) 181. Weber's essay 
dates originally from lectures given in 1904 and 1905, and initially appeared 
in English translation in 1930. Although final credit for the famous image of 
the "iron cage" apparently belongs to Weber's translator, Talcott Parsons, 
Weber clearly did describe the bureaucratically organized and rationally 
legitimated economic and social formation of Protestant capitalism as 
imprisoning, and as leaving little scope for ethical resistance. See Stephen A. 
Kent, "Weber, Goethe, and the Nietzschean Allusion: Capturing the Source of the 
'Iron Cage' Metaphor," Sociological Analysis 44:4 (Winter, 1983) 297-319. 
14. Weber, ibid., 182. 
15. See, for example, his conclusion to Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism: "But this brings us to the world of judgments of value and of faith, 
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irreconcilability of the separated value spheres, and draws the 
conclusion that . it is necessary to make a decisive choice" on 
the basis of value commitments about which "nothing can be said in the 
classroom. ,,16 What could be said in the classroom, however, was that 
. the genuine official. . will not engage in politics. Rather, 
he should engage in impartial 'administration'" as a matter of honor.17 
The fully "administered world," to which Adorno referred with a shudder 
appears here already in full view. 18 Its dutiful functionaries already 
can be seen to act mechanically and rationally in accordance with the 
dictates of the administrative apparatus to which they swear fealty, 
rendering ineffective if not entirely irrelevant whatever independent 
ethical reasoning they might still be capable of in such a world. 
More than one line of reasoning indicated that the extent of that 
independent ethical reasoning might be frighteningly limited. Adorno's 
"arch-enemy, Martin Heidegger," for instance, could bewail the 
increasing dominance of an alienated technology, as instrumentality and 
as human subjugation of nature, in his text on "The Question Concerning 
Technology," which appeared shortly after Dialectic of Enlightenment. 19 
There, Heidegger draws out a view of the essence of technology as a 
with which this purely historical discussion need not be burdened." Weber, 
ibid., 182. 
16. Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology Translated, edited and with an introduction by H.H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 129-156, p. 152. 
17. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology, Translated, edited and with an introduction by H.H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 77-128. Weber's 
distinction between politics and administration entailed that "The honor of the 
civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of 
the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own 
conviction. This holds even if the order appears wrong to him and if, despite 
the civil servant's remonstrances, the authority insists on the order. Without 
this moral discipline and self-denial, in the highest sense, the whole 
apparatus would fall to pieces." (p. 95) Weber, perhaps characteristically, 
does not discuss the relative merits of honor and other competing values in 
"Politics as a Vocation." 
18. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 448. 
19. Jameson, Late Marxism, 9. Jameson reminds us here that Adorno assessed 
Heidegger's philosophy as "fascist to its innermost cells." Heidegger's essay 
on technology appeared in 1954. 
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particular mode of man's relating to the world as it comes forward to 
reveal itself to man. 20 In that mode, which "enframes" or stands outside 
its objects and encounters them exclusively as items of inventory 
["standing-reserve"] for this or that presupposed task, "[man] comes to 
the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. "21 
At the same time, it seems increasingly clear to man that he 
"everywhere and always encounters only himself. "22 The extreme danger 
this situation represents makes it increasingly possible, although not 
necessary or inevitable, that human beings will utterly fail to 
encounter themselves in any other way than as items of inventory for 
pre-assigned tasks, and completely fail to encounter the world in any 
other mode of "unconcealing," leading to any other historical destiny 
for humanity and its world. 23 
Heidegger sees the power of art, as an alternative "revealing," as 
something which might heighten the ambiguity of technology and prompt 
the "rising of the saving power" in the face of it.24 His ontological 
analysis incorporates no constitutive analysis of the sociological 
arrangements under which both technology and art have so far unfolded. 
These are for him explicitly not of the essence. 25 
A radically different method leads Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno to their superficially similar, but fundamentally opposed, 
conclusions in The Dialectic of Enlightenment. For them, the apotheosis 
of what they call instrumental reason eventuates in the triumph of 
irrationality and barbarism. This reason proves in its results not 
20. Heidegger's English translator uses the term "man." In light of 
Irigaray's subsequent critique (see Ch. III, this work) the choice seems apt. 
21. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Basic 
Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: HarperPerennial, 2008) 311-341, 332. 
22. Ibid., 332. 
23. Ibid., 338-339. 
24. Ibid., 339-340. 
25. Ibid., 311. 
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other than the deepest unreason. For Horkheimer and Adorno, however, 
historical specifics are precisely of the essence. The historical 
conditions of the dialectical development of reason, and its working 
out in socially specific forms of economic and cultural relationship, 
mediate the development of this form of rationality. The situation in 
which this occurs does not spare any of its components, including every 
aspect of cultural production, and in particular cultural production 
for the masses - the commodities of the culture industries. 26 Art, 
whether in the form of popular or high culture, is no refuge. 
For Horkheimer and Adorno, the avowedly value-free science that 
Weber championed was itself deeply enmeshed in the problem. Its own 
dynamic led away from life lived according to the values that resisted 
administration, and towards others, which in practice systematically 
erected barriers to the practice of alternative values. Certain value 
positions are built in to the operations of the enlightenment 
rationality institutionalized in bourgeois capitalism and its 
supporting social formation. Within the mode of life produced by and 
under this formation, things are getting worse not just in a technical 
sense, but in a material, social, cultural, philosophical ~nd ethical 
one. The spectre that is haunting late capitalism is the spectre of an 
increasing inability to conceptualize, let alone choose in favor of, 
values that do not support the system and ideas that are not already 
sanctioned by the system. Recognizing the ultimate dysfunctionality of 
the system in its current form becomes increasingly difficult as 
alternatives to the system become more difficult to imagine. 
The separation and irreconcilability of the value spheres, 
identified by Weber, is a direct consequence of the conception of the 
26. Thus, Adorno will never simply identify art as the poiesis of the true 
into the beautiful, and certainly not in 1954. 
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Kantian autonomous rational subject according to Horkheimer's and 
Adorno's analysis. This subject is defined by its autonomy, its self-
direction. Every substantive principle that might serve to guide its 
deliberations appears to it as something externally imposed; reason 
"unmasks substantial goals as asserting the power of nature over mind 
and as curtailing its own self-legislation," and for that reason 
recognizes these substantive goals as inimical to its project of 
autonomous domination of nature. 27 "Nature" here comes to include 
everything that qualifies as "affect;" by extension, those forms of 
expression that do not take the form of "actual ideas," such as those 
found in art and religion, are regarded as incommunicably separate from 
"anything deserving the name of knowledge" both by positivist science 
and by post-Enlightenment irrationalism. 28 
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that rational progress oriented towards 
what was understood to be the mastery of nature appears not to work as 
envisioned. It turns back on itself, and produces irrationality. In 
their analysis, this has to do with the insistence on equating 
rationality with instrumentality, and the banishment of insecurity. 
Thus, what passes for rationality assumes the character of myth, 
necessity. Then, nature acquires a compulsive character. Its unexamined 
content in the form of compulsive human nature blinds ides all attempts 
to bring human activity within the scope of voluntary and discretionary, 
chosen, human ethical activity. 
Adorno's analysis of the "culture industries" further lays out 
reasons why culture fails to function as a repository of critical 
consciousness, why putative art or works of art cease to operate as 
ways to cultivate critical consciousness. In the culture industries -
27. Horkheimer and Adorno, ibid., 68. 
28. Ibid., 72. 
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paradigmatically entertainment for profit, and advertising - the artful 
images offered to the populace have a hidden agenda. They encourage 
behavior and desires that help maintain the system. They dampen or 
deaden whatever consciousness might critique or oppose it. They present 
the satisfactions that are available within the system as adequate, but 
also as infinitely subject to postponement. The offerings of the 
culture industries refresh the tired workforce, replenishing their 
exhausted labor power for another day of wage slavery. In short, 
whatever ennobling or enlightening potential culture might have been 
thought to have in an earlier time and a different place is vitiated by 
its metamorphosis into a popular culture fully integrated with and 
integral to a capitalist system ~f production for profit and commodity 
exchange. 
The analysis presented in Dialectic of Enlightenment exposes a 
world in which forces that harbored impulses towards liberation have 
taken a turn towards generalized oppression. The elements and offspring 
of rationality serve irrationality, a drive towards ftself-preservation" 
that effects the destruction of life itself. Scientific and technical 
progress has become an instrument of domination in the present. 
ftTechnological rationality reveals its political character as it 
becomes the great vehicle of better domination, creating a truly 
totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body are 
kept in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of this 
universe. "29 
Adorno's Philosophical Aim 
Adorno himself described the aim of his philosophical work as the 
effort to ftuse the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy 
29. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 18. 
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of consti tuti ve subj ecti vi ty. ,,30 In this description, the reader can 
hear the echo of a deep dissatisfaction with German philosophy's turn 
to the subject with Kant, and the inadequate salvation of the concrete 
in every proposed solution from Hegel through Husserl to Heidegger, all 
of whom come in for specific criticism in Adorno's major exposition of 
his philosophical method, Negative Dialectics. The problem is that the 
philosophical tradition has provided, so far, an inadequate account of 
the relationship of the subject and the world of objects given to the 
subject to know - including the subject itself as its own object of 
knowledge. Adorno's verdict on the effort is that "traditional 
philosophy" in "confusing itself with what it intends to interpret" has 
been an obstacle to the truth it ought to have been a vehicle to 
comprehending. 31 
Moreover, the presentation of closed systems of thought makes the 
world itself seem closed. As Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, as discussed earlier, this appearance takes 
on a determinative force through the mediation of a social system built 
on its conceptual foundation. The theory of closure aids and abets 
social practices that reproduce a world with shrinking opportunities 
for imaginative resistance and transformation. 
An anti-totalitarian concern characterizes Adorno's work generally. 
The related treatment of the relationship of the subject of 
consciousness, knowledge and truth to its concrete material object 
constitutes a deep element of his utopian discourse. In pursuing this 
central theme, his work spans a wide range of contributory problems and 
30 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, xx. It would be customary to use the term 
"project" here to designate Adorno's philosophical ouevre, but this seems wrong 
in light of Adorno's dismissive association of the word with the "jargon of 
ontology." See Theodor Adorno, "Why Still Philosophy," in Critical Models: 
Interventions and Catchwords, translated and with a preface by Henry W. 
Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 5-17, 8. 
31. Adorno, "Why Still Philosophy," 13. 
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issues. He investigates its manifestation relentlessly in particular 
social, cultural and aesthetic issues, including the relationship of 
presentation or form to content, the incorporation of social 
contradictions in works of art and the modes by which works of art, 
including music, represent or express objective tendencies and social 
contradictions and possibilities. He focuses as well on methodological 
issues, and here particularly the relationship of the preparation of 
philosophical texts to the representation of ideas. 32 
While some of his work was impelled by circumstances of his exile 
in the United States during the late 30s and 40s, even this work can be 
seen to cohere with his overall project. Looked at from outside, there 
is a critical element present in all of Adorno's work that links his 
thoughts on the culture industries, his earliest expression of his 
philosophical thought in "The Actuality of Philosophy," his work on 
Kierkegaard under the supervision of Paul Tillich, his critical social 
commentary, and his later aesthetic theory. Seen from this perspective, 
Adorno's project has to do with the theorization of a relationship 
between the thinking subject and a world that, while it changes 
historically, and while its operations also change the subject's 
experience in material and consequential ways, can be grasped through 
thought that concerns itself with truth. This thought, in turn, can 
have some impact on human activity and social prospects for change, on 
the cUltivation of a humanity that goes beyond the sheer domination of, 
and by, "nature," and that reaches for the humane and collective life 
possible to a genuinely enlightened, and therefore free, humanity. 
32. Here it is possible to see the influence of Walter Benjamin's 
theoretical discussion at the introduction to The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 
where Benjamin depicts philosophy pre-eminently as the realm of the 
representation of ideas. Walter Benjamin, ibid. 
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Adorno's project is, then, an emphatically humanistic one, in what was 
to become a "post-humanist" era. 
While Adorno's project seems abstract, his explicit commitments 
consist in a turn towards the concrete. As he says in one of the more 
impassioned and utopian passages in Negative Dialectics, the very 
consciousness of possibility that drives thinking on, through its 
distance from the content of thought, "sticks to the concrete as the 
undisfigured." Here, "thought is its servant," the "prism in which its 
color is caught. ,,33 This commitment to the concrete expresses itself in 
his tenacious methodological insistence on the possibilities inherent 
in dialectical reasoning, mobilizing dialectics in every substantive 
engagement with whatever subject matter. 34 
Adorno consistently refused to advance facile political solutions, 
frequently expressing the insight that practical political action in 
the circumstances of the day frequently played into the agenda of the 
system itself. Rather, his texts find him seeking the indispensable 
theoretical grasp of those principles which appear only in the 
particular political situation. 
While Adorno clearly refused to participate in certain political 
movements during his own time, and while this refusal became a cause 
for dissatisfaction among politically engaged colleagues and students, 
the import of his political practice seems consistent with his deeply-
held philosophical principles and commitments. These are relevant, in 
particular, for a consideration of Adorno's utopian enunciations. His 
33. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 57. 
34. Adorno's insistence on the dialectical structure of thought and of truth 
was at the center of his famous debate with Walter Benjamin over Benjamin's 
work on Baudelaire, a methodological disagreement with grave personal 
consequences on both sides. See Susan Buck-Morss, ibid.; Hannah Arendt, 
"Introduction: Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940" in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: 
Essays and Reflections, edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt, 
translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968)1-51, 10-11; Giorgio 
Agamben, "The Prince and the Frog: The Question of Method in Adorno and 
Benjamin," in Infancy and History, 117-137. 
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recurrent criticism of impassioned political activity in his own time 
hinged on his insight that it often proceeded in the absence of the 
necessary depth of thought and understanding. 35 Adorno does not insist 
that basic philosophy has political significance casually or, 
ultimately, mistakenly. Despite the frequently-noted absence of 
strategic or tactical political recommendations in Adorno's work, and 
sometimes a sense of bafflement at how his work might be "useful," his 
thought asserts its own political significance, and contains implicit 
principles for political practice. 36 
The political significance of Adorno's philosophical work and the 
political principles implicit in that work effectively assert the 
political significance, though not the actual political efficacy, of 
art in its various forms. Both art and philosophy, in different ways 
and relying on different "technical procedures," depend on the 
"consciousness of needs," which forms a portion of the truth both art 
and philosophy express. 37 Adorno's scattered but persistent references 
to religion intimate the political significance of that arena of human 
practice as well, again without presupposing the practical efficacy of 
religion. For instance, there is a moment of truth in religion, for all 
its mythic content, although the only responsible position with respect 
to religion is "an extreme ascesis" that amounts to "an extreme loyalty 
to the prohibition of images, far beyond what this once originally 
meant. ,,38 Not coincidentally Adorno's explicit leaning to the concrete, 
related to the perception of the significance of the aesthetic, makes 
35. Russell Berman, "Adorno's Politics," in Adorno: A Critical Reader, Nigel 
Gibson and Andrew Rubin eds. (London: Blackwell, 2002), 110-131; Susan Buck-
Morss, ibid. 
36. "It is incumbent upon philosophy ... to provide a refuge for freedom." 
Adorno, "Why Still Philosophy?" 11. 
37. Ibid., 14. 
38. Horkheimer and Adorno, ibid., 144; Theodor W. Adorno, "Reason and 
Revelation," in Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and 
Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 
133-l42, 142. 
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his philosophy profoundly corporeal. 39 The thought process of utopian 
reflection does not annul its object's original and ultimate connection 
to the body and bodily human life, and the relationship of art and 
religion to material and bodily life establishes their potential 
insights. 
Adorno's work maintains a tenacious hopefulness about the 
prerequisites for utopian thought, in the face of impediments that his 
work draws out with painstaking clarity. This peculiar combination of 
rigorous honesty and tenacious refusal to abandon all hope informs his 
method and style. Both method and style figure as integral parts of 
Adorno's project, rather than as incidental consequences, arguably more 
than with many other philosophers. 4o 
It may be fair to say that Adorno's project is the rescue of 
utopian possibility in the face of the objective disaster of the 20th 
century. This reading sees the philosophical groundwork accomplished in 
Negative Dialectics as the indispensable prerequisite to this rescue, 
which identifies the difficulties besetting the western philosophical 
tradition, and in particular German Idealism and its materialist 
critics, around the theory of the relationship of the subject of 
conscious contemplation to the object thereof. The dilemma posed by the 
question of whether knowledge is only possible by "the same," or 
whether knowledge of something actually different is possible, delimits 
the possibilities for utopian thinking as well. 
39. Lisa Yun Lee, Dialectics of the Body: Corporeality in the Philosophy of 
T.W. Adorno (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
40 On Adorno's specific style, see Rose, ibid., in particular chapter one, 
on style. Most commentators mention Adorno's difficult style, which poses 
issues of translation as well as understanding. See Buck-Morss, ibid.; E.B. 
Ashton, translators note, Adorno, Negative Dialectics; Robert Hullot-Kentor, 
translator's note, Adorno, Aesthetic Theory; Martin Jay, ibid. On the 
fundamental question of style, see the superb discussion in Francis-Noel Thomas 
and Mark Turner, Clear and Simple as the Truth (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994). 
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Utopia is, or perhaps more precisely would be, if it were possible 
to describe it, a state or condition of reality different from the one 
in which people find themselves or come to recognize themselves as 
thinking and acting subjects. This makes the question, of whether 
thinking can come to a knowledge of someone or some thing really 
different from its subject, one of first importance. What kind of 
knowledge of utopia, of anything like the content of utopia, can be had? 
Can this knowledge be counted as knowledge at all or would it merely be 
the projection of something lacking in the present into an imaginary 
future? The answer given bears on any conceptualization of the utopian 
state or condition. It bears as well on the possibilities for any 
eventual approach to that state. 
Adorno's efforts to rescue utopian thinking proceed via emphasis on 
exploiting chinks in the armor of an increasingly demonic understanding 
of rationality. His references to "micrological" approaches need to be 
understood in this way. He searches out tiny crevices of difference 
between one thing and another, the slight and occasional differences 
between a name and its habitually understood referent, the almost 
trivial but telling contradictions that beset definitions, formulae, 
and cultural arrangements, in order to obtain glints of light from the 
realm of the "non-identical. "41 His procedure works, if it works, 
something like prying open the lid of a box from the inside, using the 
thin logical tools at hand for the liberation of the deadened western 
imagination. It works, if it works, by turning logical precision 
against itself, demanding of its identities even more rigorous 
41. For instance, many of the fragments in Minima Moralia demonstrate that 
popular cultural equations ("love is marriage," "responsibility is hard work," 
"culture is appreciation of this particular form of art") fail. 
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correspondence, so as to expose some actual remainder of non-
correspondence, as the field of possibility.42 
The Relation of Utopia to Adorno's Work 
Adorno qualifies as a utopian thinker in the precise sense that his 
thought develops with a potential utopian outcome in view, and has as 
its aim the theorization of the prerequisites for a thought that might 
grasp the truth content of utopian ideation and practice. Utopian 
thought surfaces in Adorno's key works explicitly, and he returns again 
and again to the concept of utopia. The explicit mention of utopia 
inaugurates and concludes Negative Dialectic; it surfaces in Minima 
Moralia; it anchors Aesthetic Theory; it hovers in his exegesis of the 
work of Samuel Beckett and the modernist visual artists. More 
significantly, Adorno's texts endeavor to identify the possible spaces 
for the perception and the cognition of differences between the current 
state of the world and some alternative, and the practice of thought 
which conserves those spaces. 
The possibility of thinking outside the existing state or condition 
of the world, and the possibility of the truth of such thinking, sets 
the outer limit on the possibility of utopian thinking that carries 
hope in its train. Theorizing the possibility of precisely this 
thinking emerges as Adorno's key project, which underlies his treatment 
of the relationship of subject and object in Negative Dialectics, and 
his defense of the negativity of modern art in Aesthetic Theory, as 
well as his ironic vignettes in Minima Moralia. 
42. Adorno's concern with tautology, false copula, and the character of 
metaphor are all relevant here. If logic proceeds through the exposure of 
implications and equations, and also through the Aristotelian exclusion of 
certain simultaneous identities, the job of negative dialectical method becomes 
that of finding the ragged edges, the non-correspondences, the failures of 
these seemingly watertight identities. It depends on finding the concrete and 
precise points in which propositions of the form "x is a" or "x is y" do not 
hold. 
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The notion of utopia figures early in Adorno's philosophical 
efforts, and the relationship of reality to utopia, for better or worse, 
is a constant feature of his work. The specific understanding of utopia 
never strays far from that articulated by Marxist philosopher Ernst 
Bloch in The Spirit of Utopia, which had a profound effect on members 
of the generation that had experienced the First World War. Bloch's 
work was a pastiche of German idealism, materialism, Christian 
symbolism and references to Jesus, and mystical romanticism, all 
advanced in a lyrical, evocative prose style that defies easy analysis. 
Adorno read it as a young man and claimed it as a decisive and 
permanent influence on his intellectual life, later identifying it as 
one of the most influential books he ever read. 43 Thus utopia as a 
concept figured in Adorno's intellectual consciousness from an early 
point. Adorno's thinking continued to echo the basic picture that 
emerges from the Spirit of Utopia, with its stress on the "not-yet" and 
the openness of reality to transformation. 
Bloch's main idea is that the human being strives forward towards 
something new, not yet in existence, that captures the utopian spirit. 
This longing evinces itself in dreams, cultural fantasies, sexual 
relationships, music. Utopia as presented by Bloch has the structure of 
something that has to be brought into existence from elsewhere, from a 
place of non-being. More precisely, utopia comes from non-being of a 
special kind, because Bloch talks about utopia as if it is something 
"there" in a real sense, something that guides its own actualization. 
In this sense, utopia shares a characteristic of the Hegelian world 
spirit, but without its guarantee of ultimate self-actualization in a 
43. "I do not believe I have ever written anything without reference to it, 
either implicit or explicit." Theodor W. Adorno, Notes to Literature Vol. 2, 
trans. Shierry Weber Nicholoson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 
212. 
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cultural form. While this something does not yet characterize the 
reality in which we live, it is the reality into which we live, or 
might if we live rightly. It is not "not" in a simple sense. Its 
negative relationship with the existential present is more complicated; 
this not-yet (noch nicht) cannot be described as "existing," and yet it 
constitutes a critical element of reality. 
The notion of something that is real, and in a special sense 
existent or present, in spite of its inhabiting a space of non-being, 
is vital for Adorno's own discourse. The continuing reality of the 
possible future, the world that could be made, is the source of hope 
that some key values might be realized. On the other hand, the specific 
contours of this "not-yet" seem likely to be affected by history, both 
as past and as future. What has happened modifies and what will happen 
in the historical realm of existence affects the contours of the not-
yet as well. 
Utopia, then, shares the status of every work of art, which has to 
be wrested from this realm of non-being, created and creatively brought 
into the realm of the existent. This is one of the reasons art itself 
particularly points in the direction of utopia. Art is that 
transformative collective fabrication that has not yet been organized 
and achieved. 
Adorno's work turns on the question of how this legitimate 
imagination of an alternative situation might be secured 
philosophically - again, demonstrated as possible and defensible. His 
philosophical effort includes critical engagement with those schools of 
philosophical thought which definitively eliminate this alternative 
mode of thought; his critical project raises objections to those 
cultural formations and phenomena that conspire to do the same thing 
practically through the manipulation of popular cultural products. His 
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thought attends to the prior structures imposed on thought itself by 
its concrete situation, and seeks to find a way out of the 
predeterminations of this prior structure, this constructive situation, 
which threaten to make thinking of what it does not already contain 
strictly impossible. In this very precise sense, Adorno constitutes a 
most important utopian thinker of the late 20th century. 
The Actuality of Philosophy 
One of the best places to observe this characteristic is in 
Adorno's inaugural presentation "The Actuality of Philosophy," where he 
does not mention "utopia," but criticizes an established philosophical 
ideal, which has implications for a preliminary understanding of utopia, 
namely that of grasping the underlying rational system of reality. The 
notion that "the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality 
of the real" has to be abandoned by the would-be contemporary 
philosopher. 44 To the extent that we can use that guiding aspiration as 
an index of an earlier, philosophically-defined utopian moment, and 
that is to a large extent, then Adorno's understanding of the 
philosophical utopia, and of its relationship to the more concrete and 
popular utopia, diverges radically from that philosophical ideal. 
Already in "The Actuality of Philosophy" Adorno lays out some of 
the main themes that will structure his thought during the next three 
decades, and in which his discussion of utopia will figure. These 
include his opposition to the imposition of an alien, allegedly 
rational systemic unity upon reality, whether in a strictly conceptual 
way, or through the actual creation of such a system in the reduction 
of reality to that which can be treated within such a system; the 
objectively ascertainable inadequacy of reality to the structural 
44. Theodor W. Adorno, "The Actuality of Philosophy," in The Adorno Reader, 
Brian O'Connor editor (London: Blackwell, 2000) 23-39, 24. 
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limits of rational thought; the inherently historical, and therefore 
also changeable, character of both object and sUbject; and the need to 
focus thought and analysis on the concrete and particular. Ultimately, 
Adorno's sympathy with the concrete does not rest in the relationship 
of the particular to the universal. It would be possible to care about 
the concrete entity or situation because it is a convenient point of 
access, and because it is a microcosm or analog of a universal that is 
of greater intrinsic interest. This is not Adorno's point. If anything, 
the priority is reversed: interest in the universal is for the sake of 
the concrete, and the recognition of its irreducible truth. 
O'Connor notes that Adorno is in "The Actuality of Philosophy" most 
clear in his efforts to define the contemporary task of philosophy. 
Contemporary philosophy here would include the philosophy of 1931, but 
could encompass the early decades of the 21st century as well. Adorno 
urges the dissolution of pressing, concrete situational questions in 
illuminating interpretations which show a practical way forward into 
productive human activity. Adorno's substantively utopian political 
program is on display in "The Actuality of Philosophy." Political 
action needs a footing in ideas, and not just any ideas, but ideas that 
embody the proper, illuminating interpretation of concrete elements 
drawn from existing reality. These interpretations give insight into 
the actually existing character of the situation, and "make it possible 
to recognize the demonic elements." They annihilate the "riddle" posed 
by the juxtaposition of those elements in the experiential situation in 
the solution, their coming together in an interpretive flash that 
grasps the whole in a new way. 45 
For Adorno, the task of the philosopher is pre-eminently to shed 
light on the situation into which politics will be required to act. 
45. Adorno, "Actuality," 31. 
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More precisely it is to open up and release the light that will emanate 
from the elements themselves, once they have been placed in proper 
configuration. 
Elsewhere in the same address, he speaks of turning the ciphers 
into a text. What emerges from his discussion here is a picture of 
reality that is messy, significantly irrational and non-systemic, but 
far from entirely meaningless. This is a reality that resists all 
philosophical efforts to identify its single "engine" or central 
principle. This reality not only does not necessarily have a single 
engine or driving force, but not all of its elements and processes are 
smoothly articulated into a functional system. Adorno refuses to make 
the mistake of imputing a functionalism to a system that has not been 
observed. The scholar or interpreter of the situation cannot make such 
statements about the whole, in Adorno's view, for significantly 
intellectual reasons: it involves theorizing in advance of the data. 
We do not know enough about this fragmented, partial, obscure real 
situation to make such sweeping statements. In part, this structure of 
the real is what prevents our turning the ciphers into a text; things 
are missing - either actually, because what earlier philosophers had 
hypothesized as mechanisms of coordination are simply lacking, or 
seemingly, because we do not have the appropriate viewpoint from which 
to observe them; indeed, when it comes to the human unconscious, it may 
be that no one has this viewpoint. 
In "The Actuality of Philosophy," Adorno rejects both of two 
dominant philosophical alternatives. On one hand, he dismisses the 
systematizing efforts of the earlier German idealists and the tradition 
from which they emerge, as impossible. On the other, he deplores the 
reductionist efforts of the Vienna School and logical positivism to 
reduce the scope of philosophy to that which can be grasped by the 
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autonomous reason. The idealists reach too far; the positivists do not 
reach far enough and end by creating contradictions of a different sort. 
They fail to give an adequate account of the intelligibility of other 
consciousnesses, just as they are unable to resolve the problem of 'the 
"given," and its historically changing character. 46 
In contrast to both, Adorno advances a different philosophical 
method. "Plainly put: the idea of science (Wissenschaft) is research; 
that of philosophy is interpretation. "47 The horizon of the 
philosophical ideal Adorno describes in this discussion becomes one of 
illuminating interpretation. This is not, for Adorno, the kind of 
interpretation that seeks the hidden meaning embedded in or lodged 
obscurely behind words or figures, as if it were an arcane treasure. 
That particular exegetical enterprise would be better left to a 
different kind of interpreter. Rather, he elaborates his view of 
interpretation as the solution of "riddle figures of that which 
exists. "48 
The metaphor of the riddle becomes central to the presentation in 
"Actuality." In a riddle, a particular configuration of words and ideas 
is presented in such a way that the configuration itself creates a 
puzzle, a momentary (or more than momentary) bafflement. When we are 
given a riddle, we usually know at least something about all of the 
terms. We know the "meanings" of the individual elements; we know a 
superficial reading of the configuration. The problem is that it is 
clear that the superficial reading can't be the "right" one, if it is 
not one that makes all the individual pieces, and their relationship as 
a whole, resolve into a whole that also includes its answer. When that 
kind of reading is found, the "riddle" in a vital sense disappears; it 
46. Adorno, ibid., 30. 
47. Adorno, ibid., 31. 
48. Adorno, ibid. 
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is no longer a puzzle, a source of bafflement, but has become "one I've 
heard before." It is no longer a question, but a move to which the 
hearer knows the response. That response then prepares the ground for 
the next step, whatever that next step is. 
There is, then, something about truth which, in such a riddling 
context, will be self-validating. One index of truth will be that it 
accompanies an actual or workable resolution to the puzzle presented by 
the situation, and "negates" the question present in the intelligible 
configuration of elements. A touchstone of truth becomes, then, not its 
correspondence to particular a priori conditions, but its relationship 
to the concrete, precise demands of the situation. This recognition of 
truth on the basis of its fit with elements, consequences, and 
experience does not, however, make of truth either an arbitrary or 
"subjective" phenomenon. On the contrary, its precise attunement to the 
requirements of the available evidence, and its relationship to 
conceptual clarification of the fragmentary character of the data, make 
this understanding of the recognition of truth both objective and 
exacting. 
Adorno asserts a precise connection between his own conception of 
philosophy as interpretation and the mode of analysis in use by 
materialism. According to Adorno, "[i]nterpretation of the 
unintentional through a juxtaposition of the analytically isolated 
elements and illumination of the real by the power of such 
interpretation is the program of every authentically materialist 
knowledge ,,49 As with the solution to a "riddle," materialist 
analysis, perhaps exemplified by Marxist "unmasking" of reified 
constructs and objective social relations, throws always already 
accessible experiential evidence into suddenly more intelligible relief, 
49. Adorno, ibid., 32. 
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so that the requirements of action also become more clear, if not 
absolutely clear. Adorno's example is the Marxist analysis of the 
commodity structure. That analysis not only does not solve the 
philosophical problems posed within the Kantian framework - the "thing-
in-itself problem" - it does not even address that problem, or 
acknowledge it as important, since its aims point thought elsewhere. 
Adorno's presentation does assert that philosophers have to be 
willing to face the risk of the "dissolution of philosophy," but this 
seems disingenuous, since he earlier notes that some of the central 
problems of the philosophical tradition will be addressed under this 
new approach. ". [T]he function which the traditional philosophic 
inquiry expected from meta-historical, symbolically meaningful ideas is 
accomplished by inner-historically constituted, non-symbolic ones."so It 
is clear, however, that the outcomes Adorno seeks will not satisfy 
certain demands. There will be no deities or transcendent world spirits 
that underwrite an ultimate optimism about the trajectory of reality, 
or that guarantee the ultimate resolution of the contradictions and 
dilemmas of the real situation in a redeemed future. The disciplined 
philosophical mind will confine itself to the territory circumscribed 
by the concrete elements available to it. It will produce - manufacture 
- useful constructs, but it will not presuppose a particular outcome. 
It will seek to explain, and then check to see whether its explanations 
might offer grounds for future hope. This discipline is to prove 
exacting and uncompromising as the elements of the real situation that 
Adorno's philosophy is required to grapple with pile up historically. 
It will ultimately prevent Adorno from taking certain kinds of refuge 
in recycled theological and artistic ideas and dreams of redemption 
50. Adorno, ibid., 33. 
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whose validity seems to have been vitiated by the events of the first 
half of the 20 th century. 
It is significant that Adorno calls his presentation the 
"actuality" of philosophy, and once again, he turns to the comparison 
of materialism with his vision of a reclaimed and principled philosophy 
to make his case clear. The dialectical process whereby a riddle is 
illuminated and negated "is executed in earnestness by materialism," by 
which he means "that the answer does not remain mistakenly in the 
closed area of knowledge, but that praxis is granted to it."s1 The 
consideration of philosophically interesting problems leads to some 
change in the reality that throws the problems up for analysis, and 
this change in the reality generates new, modified problems, and so on. 
This dialectic can be understood and to a degree anticipated, but the 
program of philosophy to which its practice will give rise can, clearly, 
not be outlined in advance. It is, of necessity, a program of 
philosophy that will have to remain radically responsive to the ever-
arising concrete problems of its day. And while, as we have already 
seen, this does not mean that the knowledge of philosophical tradition, 
with its possibly meaningful "threads" of argument and insight, becomes 
superfluous, and while it does not mean that the "large" philosophical 
questions will simply no longer be addressed, it does mean that the 
matters most urgently before philosophers will change with the times in 
ways they might not have imagined heretofore. 
One way of characterizing the approach Adorno lays out in "The 
Actuality of Philosophy" is to say that it is the illumination of the 
recurrent principles or operating elements of a reality that it is not 
possible for the mind to grasp in its entirety. Nevertheless, becoming 
aware of the state of things in our local area - and by local, we might 
51. Adorno, ibid., 34. 
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mean century or contemporary world situation, not necessarily our 
village or even country - attuning ourselves to a precise, 
"micrological" understanding of that reality that leads to some 
concrete prescriptions for action, becomes the contribution of the 
serious philosopher to the urgent task of the humanity with which she 
or he shares both time and place. 52 
We might notice that Adorno already sees the entrance of "the 
separate disciplines," and particularly sociology, into the picture. 
Where Heidegger accuses the sociologist of being a burglar, Adorno 
turns the accusation on its head, embracing the burglar's occupation, 
under the dire present circumstances. When the whole of western culture 
seems more analogous to a house that is falling down around the ears of 
its residents, the burglar will at least salvage something from the 
disaster. 53 When the world is on fire, the New Leftists of some later 
decades thought, what's urgently needed is action. For Adorno, however, 
it always seemed more necessary to understand what the fire was really 
burning, perhaps even at the risk of being burned by it oneself. 
Utopia in Negative Dialectics 
Adorno in Negative Dialectics is specifically grappling with the 
pressing problem, not yet solved to his own satisfaction, of the 
relationship of the subject of such an understanding of the real to the 
objects of its understanding. Adorno's aim is to develop a solution 
different from what western philosophy has so far attempted in the 
solution of that problem. Adorno is dealing specifically with the 
structure of consciousness, or in other words, with the structure of 
rationality - and with its significant possibilities for irrationality, 
52. Adorno draws his notion of the "micrological" from Walter Benjamin, 
whose work on the origin of German tragic drama figured as his first seminar at 
the University of Frankfurt. See Brian O'Connor, ed., The Adorno Reader, 23-24. 
53. Adorno, ibid., 35. 
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which he takes fully seriously, along with that structure's disturbing 
historical contingencies, and the dawning of the awareness that the 
physical substrate of consciousness poses significant issues for 
insight into the structure of rationality as well. 
Thus, in Negative Dialectics, Adorno deals also with the subject-
object structure that has permitted western philosophers to talk about 
"transcendence" as if it were something that people understood. In fact, 
it is this structure that has permitted philosophers since the early 
Greeks to talk about "understanding" as if it were something that 
people did, and was an unproblematic tool of knowing and dealing with 
the concrete world around them. The extent to which the world around 
them was also "in" them, and to which they were also "in" the world 
around them, and the extent to which this posed dire problems for 
practical activity as well as for philosophy, was left to the late 20th 
century to appreciate more fully. 
Adorno's commitment is precisely not to give up on the ultimate 
program of philosophy, that of understanding the reality in which 
humankind finds itself. "The cognitive utopia would be to use concepts 
to unseal the non-conceptual with concepts, without making it their 
equal. ,,54 Adorno's program is still a program of conceptual 
understanding, of formulating conceptual truth about reality which will 
provide genuine understanding of and insight into that reality. The 
reality with which he is specifically concerned has become the way 
people approach an understanding of their relationship to their world, 
and the possibilities for rational understanding of that relationship, 
that is, for understanding that has a reasonable claim to have grasped 
the truth of or about that reality. 
54. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 10. 
85 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another way of saying the same thing, which emphasizes the role of 
sUbjectivity and its possible consequences, is to say as Adorno says in 
the 1966 preface to Negative Dialectics "To use the strength of the 
subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity -
this is what the author felt to be his task ever since he came to trust 
his own mental impulses. . ,,55 Along with this, as a "determining 
motive" is the wish to "transcend the official separation of pure 
philosophy and the substantive or formally scientific realm . ,,56 
Where philosophy has been seen as something that has to do with 
strictly mental phenomena, the realm of the mind as divorced from, 
separated from the world around it, and as speculative rather than 
experimental, Adorno casts it differently. Drawing on "The Actuality of 
Philosophy," we notice that Adorno is advocating experimental 
procedures for philosophers. These experimental procedures will have to 
do with precise consideration of concrete things, not just taking 
refuge in conceptual abstractions as if these will suffice for the 
method of philosophy. 
In the quest for a society fit for human beings, in the quest for 
the right world, philosophy is not irrelevant, but it will have to be 
the right kind. Famously, Negative Dialectics begins with the assertion 
" [p]hilosopy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment 
to realize it was missed. ,,57 A complex historical discourse around 
utopia is already embedded in this first line. The reference is to 
Marx's 11th thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.,,5B 
55. Ibid., 9. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid., 3. 
58. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in The German Ideology Part One with 
Selections from Parts Two and Three and Supplementary Texts, ed. C.J. Arthur 
(New York: International Publishers, 1974) 122-123, 123. 
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Marx, and even more, Engels, differentiated themselves from those who 
became, because of their allegedly less utopian approach to socialism, 
the "utopian socialists," like Fourier, Saint-Simon, Owen and Proudhon. 
Marx's "The Poverty of Philosophy" was directed against Proudhon's 
anarcho-socialism, an ellegedly utopian alternative. Nevertheless, as 
Adorno notes, "Marx and Engels were enemies of Utopia for the sake of 
its realization."s9 The role of philosophy, then, from the outset of 
Negative Dialectics, includes the rescue of the possibility of utopian 
thinking, namely, that thinking that can imagine an alternative to "the 
unspeakable world that is. ,,60 In sum, Negative Dialectics begins in 
reference to an already-existing utopian discourse, and places itself 
in a specific relation to that discourse; it stands on the side of 
maintaining the possibility both of that discourse and of the practice 
that might carry it forward. 
The idea of the utopian form as an effort to "enlarge the field of 
the possible" and explore its possible contents, going back to the 
creation of a space for imaginative exploration in the "no place" of 
Thomas More's 1516 work, is precisely that of utopia not as strictly 
impossible but rather as an exercise in distinguishing the possible 
from the utterly fantastic. 61 In this sense, philosophy has from its 
inception had something to do with utopian forms. While there can be 
dispute about whether Plato's Republic and Laws constitute "true 
utopias," either formally or substantively, there is little dispute 
that the philosophical exploration of the ideal, and the possible, in 
59. Adorno, ibid., 322. Adorno's discussion in these two pages (322-23) is 
vital for the purpose of the work as a whole, with respect to the concrete need 
for philosophy. Also note the implicit critique of Biblical religion: "More in 
line with the catastrophe that impends is the supposition of an irrational 
catastrophe in the beginning." 323. 
60. Adorno, ibid., 403. 
61. "Introduction," Utopie, http://gallica.bnf. fr/Utopie/Tl.htm, October 20, 
2008 
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the context of the actual - at least, the actual as ascertained by the 
philosopher - characterizes those works. While utopian discourse is not 
an indispensable component of philosophical discourse, it is a 
classically-established, sanctioned element. Adorno plays on this fact 
throughout Negative Dialectics, even as he turns the traditional 
foundationalist philosophical method and many traditional philosophical 
concerns against the program of traditional western, and in particular 
German idealist, philosophy. 
Adorno's explicit references to utopia in the text of Negative 
Dialectics are limited, and cluster in the introduction and the 
concluding section, "Meditations on Metaphysics," which he presents in 
the preface as a demonstrative experiment in the use of the negative 
dialectical method. 62 Nevertheless, the relationship to utopia can be 
read as providing the structure of part two, Adorno's elucidation of 
the method of Negative Dialectics, as well. First, Adorno demonstrates 
the unattainability of the cherished utopia of the traditional 
philosopher, the dream of a total philosophy.63 He implicitly raises 
utopian concerns, such as the theme of reconciliation, which haunts the 
exposition of dialectics, as the form of a refused Hegelian synthesis: 
"What tolerates nothing that is not like itself thwarts the 
reconcilement for which it mistakes itself. The violence of equality-
mongering reproduces the contradiction it eliminates.,,64 
This statement does not sound utopian at first blush. Adorno, 
however, is attempting to elucidate the relationship of consciousness 
to reality, beginning with the most general level. Similar issues arise 
at every other level of analysis as well, because this awareness of 
contradiction between something and its non-identical conceptualization 
62. Ibid., 361-408. 
63. Ibid., l3 6 . 
64. Ibid., 143. 
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is the engine of thought. Its nonidentities continue to emerge. Adorno 
is presenting an account of concrete socially-embodied reality. The 
postulate of a longed-for reconciliation - of people with one another, 
of humanity with its life, of consciousness with nature, we could 
extend possible reconciliations ad infinitum - becomes an implicitly 
utopian articulation. 65 This is further emphasized by his statement 
about the role of theory two short paragraphs later: "Those who chide 
theory anachronistic [sic] obey the tapas of dismissing, as obsolete, 
what remains painful as thwarted. ,,66 Theory is no anachronism, and what 
is thwarted by the world as it is may not simply be dismissed as 
meaningless. Defying "the world's course" that does the thwarting, and 
helping to fulfill the desires so thwarted, is precisely what theory is 
supposed to do. Once again, theory is presented as a practical 
intervention in the "world's course." Theory pries open and holds open 
the space for an intellectual apprehension of that which differs, in 
precise ways, from the official or accepted representation of the world 
in which the theory is developed. This structure, of an intellect 
oriented towards extending the possibilities of the world, is the 
paradigrnatically utopian structure as presented by Adorno. 
Then, he works through the alternatives to the articulation of a 
utopia to be desired beyond the operation of any dialectics. Dialectics 
itself is a method confined to the current situation, and to the core 
or kernel of nonidentity which lies at the very heart of the most 
traditional philosophy. "Nonidentity is the secret telas of 
65. It is important to distinguish those explicitly utopian references, and 
those references that might be construed as utopian because of the desiderata 
they contain, as does this reference to ultimate reconciliation. This statement 
seems worth including, in light of Adorno's embrace of Bloch, whose own 
identifications of utopian thinking are broadly inclusive. 
66. Ibid., 143. 
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identification. un Instead of forcing things to become identical with 
their concepts, says Adorno, we need to recognize and acknowledge ~the 
concept's longing to become identical with the thing. u68 Here Adorno 
invokes Plato's ideas, in a passage that is as lyrical as it is 
explicitly utopian: the ideas are the ~negative signs" of truth, the 
joining of pragmatism and utopianism, that live ~in the cavities 
between what things claim to be and what they are," and that point to 
the possibility of ~A" becoming ~what it is not yet. "69 The conclusion 
to this exposition of the ideas is then explicitly utopian: 
~Utopia would be above identity and above contradiction; it 
would be a togetherness of diversity. For the sake of utopia, 
identification is reflected in the linguistic use of the word 
outside of logic, in which we speak, not of identifying an 
obj ect, but of identifying with people and things. "70 
In this critically important passage, in his discussion of the concepts 
and categories of the negative dialectical method, Adorno identifies at 
a very general level the content, or rather, the criterion of the 
utopian situation he has in mind. The utopian vision, then, sketches 
the objective of the negative dialectical method or program. 
His exposition then proceeds to elaborate the method, rationale, 
and categories involved in the negative dialectical philosophical 
program: contradiction, and its rationale; in particular the category 
of negation; the position of the individual. Here we move closer, still 
implicitly, to utopian thinking once again, prefiguring something that 
will arise at the end of the section. The discussion leads into the 
category of the constellation. Finally, a discussion of the re-casting 
of the familiar concepts of essence and appearance within negative 
dialectics, and further discussion of other critical concepts finishes 
67. Ibid., 149. 
68. Ibid., 149. 
69. Ibid., 150. 
70. Ibid., 150. 
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the exposition. None of the discussion makes any explicit reference to 
utopia. Nevertheless, the exposition of the negative dialectical 
program, and the rationale for it, target a "world's course" that would 
eliminate the possibility of utopian thinking. The negative dialectical 
thinking developed by Adorno amounts to the cultivation of a form of 
thought that includes space for the idea of utopia. This space is held 
open by rejecting the (always premature) philosophical closure that is 
ardently desired by the thinking mind, but that most urgently threatens 
utopian perception. 
Physicality and Suffering 
What it means, ultimately, for negative dialectics to grant a 
preponderance of attention to objects, to give them their due, to 
resurrect the objective content of the subject, and so on, is 
ultimately to have posed one of the critical problems of humanity -
that humankind is physical existence with the potential to understand 
itself - which can also be construed as a togetherness in diversity.71 
This peculiar human structure leads Adorno instantly to a consideration, 
in this context, of the problem of suffering, and its inextinguishable 
physical moment. Phenomena of consciousness are not exclusively 
phenomena of some abstract consciousness, but are "invaded" by a 
physical moment, the physicality of pain and suffering, or of happiness. 
"A happiness blocked off from every such aspect [of sensual fulfillment] 
is no happiness."n Once more the question of utopia hovers around the 
text; the utopian impulse is precisely that towards the happiness of 
71. Though it ought to be pointed out here instantly that the categories 
"mind" and "body" themselves are subject to the criticism of abstract 
categorization that is at the heart of the dilemma Adorno is trying to take 
apart. 
72. Ibid., 202. 
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its inhabitants as the paramount question. 73 Adorno's negative 
dialectical philosophy demands a serious consideration of the physical 
moment not just of human existence but of thought itself, and of the 
necessary consideration of that physical subjectivity in the reflection 
of thought. Whatever the post-revolutionary utopia would be, 
the telos of such an organization of society would be 
to negate the physical suffering of even the least of its 
members, and to negate the internal reflexive forms of that 
suffering. By now, this negation in the interest of all can be 
realized only in a solidarity that is transparent to itself 
and all the living. ,,74 
This observation leads to a critique of the allegedly materialist anti-
utopian praxis. That praxis, epitomized by the state socialism of the 
USSR, allegedly builds on materialist dialectical philosophy. It fails 
not only to produce happiness, but to tell the truth, in an ideological 
insistence on thought being the representation of what it is thinking 
about. 
In opposition to this (anti-utopian) assertion, Adorno posits a 
different theory of the relationship between thought and thing in the 
activity of thinking: 
The materialist longing to grasp the thing aims at the 
opposite: it is only in the absence of images that the full 
object could be conceived. Such absence concurs with the 
theological ban on images. Materialism brought that ban into 
secular form by not permitting Utopia to be positively 
pictured; this is the substance of its negativity. . Its 
great desire would be the resurrection of the flesh, a desire 
utterly foreign to idealism, the realm of the absolute 
spirit. 75 
73. With this are set aside temporarily both flawed utopias, in which some 
or all the inhabitants are actually unhappy - one thinks of Brave New World, 
for instance; and also those utopias in which some, or, in the limiting case, 
one, inhabitant is miserable - so, all utopias based on slavery, as in the 
Republic, or the still-flawed postmodern utopia, open to any specific happy-
making content, that obscurely requires the meaningless misery of one, in 
Ursula K. LeGuin's "The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas." 
74. Ibid., 204. 
75. Ibid., 207. 
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In other words, the truth a genuine, as opposed to an ideological, 
materialism seeks is the substance of the material. Its transfiguration 
as an image, which could then abandon the material source, would betray 
that matter. 
Thus, this critical programmatic section of Negative Dialectics 
actually begins with utopian considerations, moves through an 
elaboration of the philosophical considerations necessary to advance 
these considerations, and ends with a statement of the criterion for 
utopia. Utopia must be imageless, and in fact, cannot be arrived at by 
means of representational thinking. The hope of negative dialectical 
critique and this program of understanding is that it might escape the 
threat of idealism, as well as the threat of materialist dogmatism, and 
outline a way to pursue utopia through its pursuit of changing 
constellations, in order to pursue a utopia that is always in danger of 
being represented to death philosophically. 
Semblance and Second Reflection in Aesthetic Theory 
While utopia itself must remain imageless, images in the form of 
artworks can render a service to utopia. The "incomparable metaphysical 
relevance of the rescue of semblance, the object of esthetics [sic]" 
lies in the way this semblance of transcendence points towards 
something other than semblance and, at the same time, other than the 
already known world. Moreover, the relationship of the philosophical 
mind to that object, which it encounters in a material existence they 
both share, and in which it can recognize the traces of a "moment of 
transcendent objectivity" in which it also shares, constitutes "the 
unobtrusive site of metaphysical possibility.,,76 This insight, 
76. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 393. Lambert Zuidervaart translates what is 
of incomparable metaphysical relevance, Adorno's "die Rettung des Scheins," 
more beautifully, and suggestively from the perspective of 'messianic light,' 
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delineated in the concluding sections of Negative Dialectics, also 
points explicitly towards the role Adorno sees for Kantian aesthetic 
categories, and prefigures the project that takes detailed shape in 
Adorno's Aesthetic Theory. 
While Adorno's complex aesthetic theory deserves lengthy and 
detailed examination in its own right, this chapter restricts itself to 
identifying three aspects of central importance to its utopian moment, 
and in particular to its address to a subject of utopian possibility.77 
Those are the way the methodology of aesthetic theory proceeds, by 
second reflection; the way the work of art reflects, and simultaneously 
fails to reflect, transcendence; and the significance of the work of 
art as an exemplar of creative praxis. Taken together, these points 
demonstrate the role the development of aesthetic theory might play in 
the cultivation of a subject of utopian possibility. 
Aesthetic theory implicitly claims to be philosophy whose object is 
art. Adorno's editors note that his intended motto for his own 
Aesthetic Theory was a quote from Friedrich Schlegel, "What is called 
the philosophy of art usually lacks one of two things: either the 
philosophy or the art. ,,78 The irony was more than casual. Adorno's 
planned introduction to the work makes clear his assessment that 
existing aesthetic theory failed to make good its promise, which is, or 
ought to be, the interpretation of the phenomenon of art, beyond the 
phenomena of individual art works, as a source of objective knowledge. 79 
From the side of philosophy, the truth content of art needs to be 
as "the redemption of illusion." Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: 
The Redemption of Illusion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). 
77. See, among others, Donald A. Burke, "Adorno's Aesthetics of 
Reconciliation: Negative Presentation of Utopia or Post-metaphysical Pipe-
Dream?" in Adorno and the Need in Thinking: New Critical Essays, eds. Donald A. 
Burke, Colin J. Campbell, Kathy Kiloh, Michael K. Palamarek and Jonathan Short 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 233-260; Finlayson, "The Work of 
Art and the Promise of Happiness"; Jameson, Late Marxism; Zuidervaart, ibid. 
78. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 366. 
79. Ibid., 359. 
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rescued from an epistemological context in which it is automatically 
dismissed as false or irrelevant due to its difference from the 
empirical world. 8o From the side of art, philosophy is to be called back 
to its footing in the effort to give voice to suffering, which is "a 
condition of all truth" and also that in which art's expression and 
form "has its substance," without which what it would be is, at present, 
unimaginable. 81 
For this task, Adorno proposes 
Kant's theory is more apposite to the contemporary situation, 
for his aesthetics attempts to bind together consciousness of 
what is necessary with consciousness that what is necessary is 
itself blocked from consciousness. It follows its course, in 
effect, blindly. 82 
The reappropriation of Kant takes place, in part, in a redeployment of 
Kantian aesthetic categories: beauty, natural beauty, art beauty, 
spirit. Of greater interest here, however, is the specific 
appropriation of this Kantian "blindness" in what Adorno calls "second 
reflection." Second reflection is the philosophical counterpart to the 
first reflection of artistic praxis. It is interpretive, but not in the 
sense of seeking the "message" of the artwork, as if the artwork were 
frankly communicative. Instead, second reflection "lays hold of the 
technical procedures, the language of the artwork in the broadest sense, 
but it aims at blindness. "83 It gropes its way backwards from the 
monadic result that is the artwork towards a comprehension of the 
problem the artwork set out to solve, the tensions it was forced to try 
to resolve, and towards an understanding of the impulse that set the 
work on its course in the direction of "the old darkness of the new. "84 
80. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 393. 
81. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 17; Aesthetic Theory, 261. 
82. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 343. 
83. Ibid., 27. 
84. Ibid. 
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This philosophical encounter with the work of art is made necessary 
by the complicated status of art itself, and is inseparable from the 
"rescue of semblance" towards which Adorno's thought strives. "Art 
awaits its own explanation," since art itself operates non-conceptually, 
blindly groping towards the expression of its own truth from the side 
of its engagement with ~he concrete. BS This explanation must make its 
way dialectically back and forth between the complicated arrangement of 
truth and falsehood embodied in the work of art. The recognition of 
this complex and, in Adorno's presentation, objective inner-artistic 
relationship leads to the second point of emphasis, the way the work of 
art reflects and fails to reflect transcendence. 
The work of art presents itself as a fact, but it is a complex fact, 
a fact with a history that does not speak directly about that history. 
What it speaks of, instead, is something that seems to be beyond or 
different from the empirical world, in that it occupies space in the 
empirical world - people can see it, hear it, feel it - but it 
registers some greater or larger difference from the way things 
actually are. The task of aesthetic theory is to grasp art's entrapment 
in concrete technical and social relations that dictate its materials 
and methods, to discern its actual technical achievements, and to 
understand beyond those specific concrete achievements the more general 
aim embodied by art. 
Art is a form of fantasy. This exposes it to disqualification as 
simply lying wish fulfillment. But" . if art has psychoanalytic 
roots, then they are the roots of fantasy in the fantasy of omnipotence. 
This fantasy includes the wish to bring about a better world. "B6 Adorno 
proposes as a reasonably exact definition of fantasy "the differential 
85. Ibid., 353. 
86. Ibid., 9. 
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of freedom in the midst of determination," discernible in the "probably 
aporetic nexus of problems" to which the artwork represents a proffered 
solution. 87 These problems, which in some real sense are all problems of 
material, incorporate the effects of the social totality and its 
contradictions, since they, too, are deeply sedimented in the artist's 
only available materials. 88 The task of aesthetic theory is to uncover 
these problems, to analyze the contradictions facing the artist and to 
understand the work of art as a response to those problems and 
contradictions. At the same time, it is to perceive the contradictory 
impulses of the artwork as the response to art's impossible predicament, 
the concrete counterpart to the impossible predicament of philosophy: 
The relation to the new is modeled on a child at the piano 
searching for a chord never previously heard. This chord, 
however, was always there; the possible combinations are 
limited and actually everything that can be played on it is 
implicitly given in the keyboard. The new is the longing for 
the new, not the new itself: That is what everything new 
suffers from. What takes itself to be utopia remains the 
negation of what exists and is obedient to it. 89 
While works of art modify the empirical world in critical ways, 
they remain fully within that world. At their most transcendent, they 
remain rooted in the matter of common life. Their illusory character, 
however, is not only a "promise of happiness" without any guarantee. It 
is also an ongoing invitation and provocation to think the thought of 
something different from the world that is. "Artworks are what they are 
able to become," and the task of aesthetic theory lies in trying to 
survey the distance between what artworks aim for and what they manage 
to achieve, by performing the redemptive task of "second reflection," 
re-reflecting what the work of art reflects in itself. 
87. Ibid., 174. 
88. For instance, F1aubert needs Emma Bovary to be married and to have a 
child. But for that reason, she must be an awful mother. 
89. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 32. 
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If aesthetic theory faces up to this task, it brings to light and 
cultivates an understanding of an aspect of the artwork that is deeply 
relevant to utopian thinking. That is the work of art's identity as a 
solution to a problem generated by the interaction of the subject with 
its world. As noted, the artist works with materials that are available 
to her, and these materials are themselves spirited, historical, social, 
political, and include the contradictions built into these materials, 
and the specific suffering they entail. The work of art is the existing 
mediation of the tensions latent in this situation; it does its best, 
if it is good art, to bring these into an internal relation, to resolve 
the tensions, to order them, to make something of them. This task, 
embodied as if complete in the work of art, is in essence also the task 
of art's audience with respect to their own problem. Art seems to 
manage, on its smaller scale, what people have yet to manage in the 
larger commission that is the creation of a cultured social whole. 
Because the work of art embodies the drive towards reconciliation, and 
because it illustrates the creative process of finding ways around the 
obstacles and through the aporias "given" to the artist, the work of 
art constitutes a space that models the kind of thinking required of 
the subject of possibility. 
The Concept of Utopia 
For Adorno, "utopia" designates most often a state or condition 
that is, at its limit, what we could call "analytically prohibited." 
That is, it would be a reconciliation of opposed, mutually exclusive 
states, conditions, or entities. However, we might need to notice here 
that the opposition, or mutual exclusion, of these states is itself 
brought about by a kind of thinking. Ideological thinking produces the 
opposition or mutual exclusion of real entities by concepts, and 
perpetuates it through and by its operations. This recognition of the 
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complicity of thought in the construction of its own delusive context 
is one of Adorno's emphatic insights. The chance to make thought non-
compliant with this delusive context is what makes the truth-seeking 
effort of philosophy worthwhile. 
The problems to which utopia will one day be required to answer, or 
will need to answer in order to be the promised utopia are not ideal 
problems. They are problems that reside in concrete material reality 
rather than in thought alone. Problems like hunger and starvation, 
disease, homelessness, material deprivations of every sort are not to 
be resolved in principle or in theory without being addressed in 
practice, at the level of specific hungry human beings, specific 
wanderers, specific sufferers. But these material problems will, it 
seems, ultimately not be resolvable without certain changes in the way 
people think about all kinds of things, including themselves and the 
world. The rehabilitation of the thinking subject is a central 
prerequisite for sustainable utopian imagination. 
SUbjectivity and Its Objective Content 
One core problem faced by the thinking subject of western 
philosophy is this subject's enmeshment in the objective world about 
which it thinks. Every subject is also an object, asserts Adorno. Not 
every object is a subject; it would presumably be a mistake to impute 
consciousness, thoughts, to everything. But every subject is also an 
object. Every subject has a material side, an existential side, a side 
along which it interacts with objective reality, and which is not 
equivalent to an interaction of ideas or thoughts. And along this side, 
the subject comes to know its world in a way, and in ways, that pose a 
challenge to the subject's mental life. 
One implication is that the rational subject of western philosophy, 
who stands apart from an objective world as an outsider and who 
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dispassionately considers that world from an uninvolved vantage point, 
is a fiction. The thinking subject, whether individual or collective -
and Adorno disdained the imputation of consciousness to a group as such 
- being also an object, is caught up in the consideration of the 
objects of the world and of thought. 9o In thinking, it is mixed with 
these objects experientially, shares something of them, is "like" them, 
although also "unlike" them, in being mediated to itself in different 
ways. Thought is an activity, but it is not an activity like building a 
house, in which one proceeds through a series of steps to a pre-
designed outcome. It is rather more like following a trail towards a 
destination that is not very well envisioned in advance, a destination 
which might or might not be clearly recognizable once reached. 
What the western philosophical tradition has treated as 
"transcendence" is shadowed by an estrangement from objective reality, 
born of this very "transcendence." This estrangement is perhaps nowhere 
better evidenced than in the Kantian treatment of the categories -
givens for the thinking mind - and the elusive "thing in itself" of the 
real world, from which, as rational and thinking beings, we are 
definitively estranged by the workings of our own minds. Adorno finds 
fault with this Kantian subject, but continues to work within a 
tradition in which the subject experiences estrangement from objective 
reality through the mediation of thought, which is a mechanism of 
estrangement, a substitution of concepts for things in themselves, 
concepts which perennially fail to become transparent, which abstract 
from the concrete particularity, and hence individuality and non-
substitutability of the various concrete conditions and situations in 
which human beings find themselves and about which they long to arrive 




at understanding. Adorno accepts the core opposition in western 
philosophical tradition between presence or immediacy and 
understanding. 91 
Understanding is necessarily conceptual; understanding and truth 
involve an ineluctable quantum of separation of subject and object. 
Adorno does not hold out the elusive grail of unmediated knowledge in a 
kind of fusion of subject with object that dissolves the separation 
between the two in a mystical way. However, he leaves himself open to 
something very close to this mode of apprehension of objective reality, 
possibly through the medium of a common recognition of mutual objective, 
material existence, a common ground of subject and object that permits 
(mediates) the knowledge and understanding sought. This is the thesis 
of Lisa Yun Lee, who notes the significance of corporeality and 
mutuality in Adorno's thought. 92 
A number of Adorno's references to utopia, then, make use of this 
by-definition-separated or by-definition-opposed concept of subject and 
object, or of thought and material reality, such that the "utopia" 
would be reconciliation, would be "to unseal the non-conceptual with 
concepts, but without making it their equal," would be to achieve a 
kind of seamless co-presence of thought or philosophical presentation 
and the body of language in which it is housed. 93 We might think of this 
91. Calling this opposition into question has been one of the central 
projects of postmodern philosophy, which since Derrida has attacked the 
opposition from the direction of a belief in a kind of presence that escapes 
and yet precedes understanding, constituting a privileged access to reality 
that the mind endeavors to mimic or attain. Rather, it seems from a Derridean 
vantage point, no such access to a reality unmediated by prior concepts exists 
at all, so that the alleged opposition between presence and understanding 
collapses into an opposition between one mode of understanding and another, one 
elaboration of a discourse of thought and another, with alleged presence 
supporting a particular appropriation by thought of what is adjudged to be a 
particular kind of reality. See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other 
Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
92. Lee, ibid. 
93. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 10. 
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as utopia as the achievement of the debarred desirable, since 
conceptual thought arises from a desire to understand objective -
outside, material, non-self - reality, a longing towards what is 
outside the self, and even to some extent what turns out also be within 
the self but unknown, overlooked and underappreciated. Utopia 
represents the accomplishment or satisfaction of that longing. 
The Myth of the Constitutive Subject 
A second core problem with the position of the subject of thought 
in the west is this subject's confusion of his or her thoughts with the 
things about which they are thought. This confusion has been extended 
in an ideological fashion, as a denial of the content of objects that 
exceeds their concepts. This denial may take the form of a nominalistic 
tendency to define a concept by the immediate reality to which it 
applies but partially, and to deny that an alternative definition or 
representation of the concept may legitimately govern its use. For 
instance, we might talk about a society of "free human beings" or a 
declaration of "human rights," and imagine that the term "freedom" is 
exhausted by the way it is implicitly defined within liberal 
democracies, or rather, those societies that go by that name and that 
can be enumerated in lists of existing polities. 
With respect to this problem, utopia takes on the appearance of 
that state or condition, that social arrangement, in which the truth of 
key concepts is realized. This realization would be the indictment of 
all partial identifications, and the vindication of insistence on the 
full specification of a particular concept. People are fully free in 
actuality, rather than in some limited way. People are actually happy, 
when they are happy, and not theoretically or necessarily so. 
"Knowledge" means what it points to in ordinary usage, not the limited 
"what passes for knowledge" that we accept as falling under that 
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concept in contemporary life as it is organized and lived under more or 
less authoritarian social arrangements. 
Adorno's metaphysical moments stress the breaking-in of happiness, 
almost shamefully, in the course of life. 94 These in-breakings forbid 
the despair that would, in itself, condemn the course of the world to 
despair. The persistent experience of something that contradicts 
conclusive despair compels a different conclusion. "All happiness is 
but a fragment of that complete happiness that men are denied, and 
denied by themselves. ,,95 Utopia, which represents the actualized realm 
of that complete happiness, thus persists in appearing as 
simultaneously outlandish or foolish, and as possible. 
Adorno's repeated references to the "image ban" or the prohibition 
of mentioning "the name" of God, drawn from his acquaintance with 
Jewish and Christian religious tradition, should probably also be read 
in the light of this understanding of utopia and redemption as holding 
open the possibility of something outside what the extant and 
historical world dictates as reasonable. Such references abound in 
Adorno's work, in particular forming the crux of his meditations on 
metaphysics at the conclusion of Negative Dialectics and arising also 
in Aesthetic Theory. His explicit references to this iconoclastic 
monotheistic tradition are what led Jacoby to use Adorno as the 
paradigmatic "iconoclastic utopian". Perhaps more important in light of 
the role of utopian conceptualization, however, might be the role of 
religious symbolism, if not religious organization or practice, in 
94. " ... the lighting up of an eye, indeed the feeble tail-wagging of a 
dog one gave a tidbit it promptly forgets, would make the ideal of nothingness 
evaporate. A thinking man's true answer to the question whether he is a 
nihilist would probably be 'Not enough' - out of callousness, perhaps, because 
of insufficient sympathy with anything that suffers." Adorno, Negative 
Dialectics, 380. 
95. Adorno, ibid., 404. 
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providing the concept of an alternative reality, something not subsumed 
under the concept of the existential. 
Robert Scharlemann has argued that Adorno's refusal of totality, 
which was consistent with his commitments as a theorist of the 
Frankfurt School, ruled out a theological consciousness. Adorno's 
friend and older contemporary Paul Tillich, on the other hand, could 
develop a systematic theological account of reality precisely because 
he accepted a concept of totality.96 Adorno's insistence on a different 
and non-totalizing understanding of reality does, however, display 
aspects of solidarity with theology. Adorno's refusal to conceptualize 
a totality insists on his perspective that human consciousness, which 
must respect its own subjective position, is not in a position to 
perceive or theorize something like a totality, but instead always 
takes wrong on its understanding of totality. Tillich, a theologian who 
took Adorno and his ideas seriously, himself acknowledged the demonic 
force of idolatry. Adorno's adamant refusal to permit the construction 
of final totalities in his philosophy points in the same rigorously 
iconoclastic direction. Adorno explicitly refuses every form of 
dogmatic consolation as a matter of principle. 97 Nevertheless, his 
ultimate insistence on "solidarity with metaphysics" proceeds from a 
commitment that his negative dialectical approach shares with the 
dogmatic traditions. It may no longer be possible to theorize 
transcendence in any of the ways the metaphysical tradition has tried; 
all have proved faulty on his analysis. But the subject of knowledge 
recognizes, truly, that its "need in thinking" is a need for something 
96. Robert P. Scharlemann, "Totality: A Philosophical and Theological 
Problem Between Tillich and the Frankfurt School," in Laval theologique et 
philosophique, 47:3 (1991) 329-341, http:id.erudit.org/iderudit/400626er, 
(accessed January 11, 2010). 
97. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 405. 
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like transcendence: the objective reality of something outside that 
subject and its prior knowledge. 98 
Conceptual Commitment as Utopian Discourse 
The line of thinking that secures the need for something that is in 
solidarity with metaphysical thinking is thought at its most rigorous 
and abstract. Adorno insists that this form of thought is the 
prerequisite for a defensible utopian imagination and, even more, any 
practice that would proceed from that imagination. His persistent 
defense of the need for philosophy attests to this profound conviction. 
What is at stake in philosophy, the effort to grasp and understand 
reality conceptually, is whether understanding will come to the aid of 
a suffering humanity or, instead, will perpetuate the domination under 
which humanity suffers. Adorno's by now famous contention that "the 
need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth" arises 
in the context of his insistence that philosophy must first of all take 
as its privileged concern what is most concrete, least conceptual, and 
then move beyond that. 99 Philosophy, by its understanding of concrete 
reality, prepares the indispensable element of "transcendence" or 
exteriority that might underwrite liberation. So Adorno's argument here 
makes thought the potential vehicle of its own, and humanity's, 
possible freedom: "What in thought goes beyond that to which it is 
bound in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge 
of the subj ect. "100 
An impending and real danger is that thought will abdicate its 
responsibility to pursue truth. Adorno is not a post-modern thinker. He 
takes truth seriously, as adequate understanding of the concrete 
situation in which the thinking subject thinks and acts, and identifies 
98. Adorno, ibid., 408. 
99. Adorno, ibid, 29. 
100. Ibid. 
105 
the quest for truth in that sense with the task of philosophy. Where 
philosophy seeks to evade the discipline of truth-seeking and truth-
telling it succumbs to ideology. Where philosophy succumbs to ideology, 
thought collaborates with an oppressive reality, representing it to 
consciousness as an irresistible and alien totality: "the subject as 
the Subject's foe."101 This danger is being realized on all sides, from 
the false equation of totalitarian statism with revolutionary praxis 
that Adorno names at the outset of Negative Dialectics to the equally 
false equation of "what is" with the defensible limit of cognition 
championed by logical positivism, to the worship of death that founds 
the jargon of authenticity, to the annihilation of thought in the 
culture industries' presentation of pure ideology as "thoughtful" and 
"thought-provoking". Against all of this, philosophy worthy of its 
calling seeks to "crash through" the "fa<;:ades" erected by "the status 
quo. "102 
Adorno's arduously cerebral and carefully linguistic philosophy at 
the same time relentlessly concerns itself with the corporeal and 
concrete. As he announces in the introduction to Negative Dialectics, 
the matters of greatest and most urgent interest to philosophy in the 
late 2011i century are "nonconceptuality, individuality, and 
particularity . . [a] matter of urgency to the concept would be what 
it fails to cover . . "103 It is precisely for this reason that the goal 
of philosophy, the "cognitive utopia" is "to use concepts to unseal the 
nonconceptual with concepts, without making it their equal. "104 
The reflection that will furnish philosophy with the critique it 
urgently requires depends upon its original and ultimate connection to 
101. Ibid., 22. 
102. Ibid., 29. 
103. Ibid., 8. 
104. Ibid., 10. 
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the body and bodily human life. Utopia will be a recovery of a valid 
and acknowledged physical, corporeal human life, human life lived in 
the body; its precondition is a way of thinking that prepares for a way 
of life that does not depend on the domination of nature. Such a way of 
thinking will constitute a significant departure from the operation of 
the instrumental reason analyzed in Dialectic of Enlightenment, and 
also from the totalizing dialectical reason of which Negative 
Dialectics is the critique. In the end, Adorno's famous abstraction and 
uncompromising intellectualism serves an understanding of subjective 
life that is indissolubly tied to its bodily experience, and to its 
desire for the satisfaction of that experience. l05 Another way to say 
this is that "the emancipation of the subject depends on its capacity 
to emancipate its object," including the object that constitutes the 
subj ect' s very body. 106 
Textual Form as Utopian Discursive Practice 
Texts are bodies. lO? The form of Adorno's texts embodies the utopian 
aspiration deeply embedded in Adorno's work. With respect to Adorno's 
utopian discourse, three elements of his textual practice require 
particular note: the use of "paratactical" textual practice, which is 
most fully realized in Aesthetic Theory; the use of precise, and for 
that reason sometimes inaccessible, language, dictated by the principle 
of the subject matter; and the use of anti-systemic forms, a tactic 
discussed most fully in "The Essay as Form." These three practices 
105. See in particular Lee, ibid., on Adorno's commitment to the integrity 
of embodied experience. 
106. Robert Hullot-Kentor,"Translator's Introduction," in Adorno, Aesthetic 
Theory, xiii. 
107. "The vilification of Cicero and even Hegel's aversion to Diderot bear 
witness to the resentment of those whom the trials of life have robbed of the 
freedom to stand tall, and who regard the body of language as sinful." Adorno, 
Negative Dialectics, 56, italics added. 
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constitute different formal aspects of utopian aspiration, according to 
interpretations provided by Adorno himself in his texts. 
Adorno makes clear in more than one text that the form of the 
philosophical text matters, not least for conveying its content. Adorno 
comments extensively on matters of presentation and rhetoric, as 
witnessed by his inclusion of sections on language in the introduction 
to Negative Dialectics and the text of The Jargon of Authenticity. 
Jargon itself was to have formed a section of Negative Dialectics, but 
in its growth according to its own concept outgrew its space in that 
work, and came to require its own housing. There, Adorno reflects at 
length on a rhetorical strategy that produces a simultaneously reverent 
and dismissive use of language to encourage the treatment of the most 
conditioned form of experience as the most primal and unconditioned. lOS A 
fragment of Minima Moralia includes cogent reflections on the 
preparation of texts that pertain to Adorno's specific textual practice. 
One paragraph in particular from this reflection, "Memento," is worth 
quoting at length. 
Properly written texts are like spiders' webs: tight, 
concentric, transparent, well-spun and firm. They draw into 
themselves all the creatures of the air. Metaphors flitting 
hastily through them become their nourishing prey. Subject 
matter comes winging towards them. The soundness of a 
conception can be judged by whether it causes one quotation to 
summon another. Where thought has opened up one cell of 
reality, it should, without violence by the subject, penetrate 
the next. It proves its relation to the object as soon as 
other objects crystallize around it. In the light that it 
casts on its chosen substance, others begin to glow. 109 
The metaphor of the spider's web leaves the reader in some doubt as 
to the identity of the spider, whether the author or the subject matter 
itself. The indication that it might be the author, the philosopher, 
gains some support from a related fragment, in which the text is 
108. Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, translated by Knut 
Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London: Routledge Classics, 2003). 
109. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 87. 
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likened to a house full of furniture, in which the author seeks to 
dwell. Nevertheless, it is clear that the text-web also emanates from 
the central constellation of ideas itself, and constitutes its 
expression or unfolding; elsewhere, Adorno insists that "the 
presentation of philosophy is not an external matter of indifference to 
it but immanent to its idea."no The spider's construction of its web, 
the philosopher's construction of a text, develop according to a 
rigorous, stringent instinct-like discipline responsive to the content 
itself. 
Robert Hullot-Kentor has identified this arachnid form of Adorno's 
posthumously published Aesthetic Theory as just such a "paratactical" 
text. III His discussion of the differences between his own recent 
translation of that work and its earlier appearance in English call 
attention to the significance of the paratactical form in relation to 
the more conventional, and presumably marketable, outline form. An 
outline, visible as chapters, headings, and helpfully short paragraphs, 
advertises a linear, progressive argument, and a systematic thrust. 
That strategy is disavowed, for better and worse, in the paratactic 
form. The paratactic form moves from one point to another in strict 
parallel with transitions and shifts in its object of analysis, 
repeating itself throughout. The form denies externally imposed system 
while affirming internal dynamics. With respect to the maintenance of 
customary relations of space and time, a paratactical text produces "a 
constantly looming sense of being caught in a vortex" due to its 
repetition, and both posits and impedes the recognition of the "virtual 
presence of the whole of the text at anyone point."lU In that sense, it 
enacts both the immanence, and the blockage, of the feasible and 
110. Ibid., 18. 
111. Hu11ot-Kentor, ibid., xiv-xix. 
112. Ibid., xvii-xviii. 
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effectively denied utopia latent in the society that produced modern 
art. 
Such paratactical texts, of which Negative Dialectics is also an 
example, perform the refusal of a philosophical system that would 
impose a false identity between an object of investigation and the 
philosophical concept through which it is investigated and understood, 
an identity that can in the end only be imposed illegitimately and 
prior to investigation. That false identity constitutes a potent weapon 
of ideology, and discourages the attentive engagement of sUbjectivity 
and objectivity from which utopic practice might be expected to arise. 
The paratactical form takes on, in the context of Adorno's work, yet 
another implicit invitation to the cultivation of utopian consciousness. 
Adorno's merely mortal readers might well exclaim that, if this is 
utopia, the easy dystopia feels preferable. The reaction arises all the 
more since the fibers of Adorno's texts are the difficult formulations 
of "precise" rather than "clich~" language. As he notes, "A writer will 
find that the more precisely, conscientiously, appropriately he 
expresses himself, the more obscure the literary result is 
thought . " since "[rJigorous formulation demands unequivocal 
comprehension, conceptual effort, to which people are deliberately 
dis encouraged . ." and only "consider understandaj;)le" what is readily 
accessible, whether or not it communicates precisely.113 He derides the 
tendency to rely on stereotyped phrasing, going as far as to caution 
against the overuse of the conjunction "but" in a dialectical text. 1l4 
And he insists on the need for patient, thoughtful selection of 
vocabulary, attentive to the ravages wrought by recent history on the 
meaning of words, and asserting that "the writer must combine the 
113. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 101. 
114. Ibid., 85. 
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tightest control in ensuring that the word refers, without sidelong 
glances, to the matter alone ,,115 This principled use of language 
accompanies his philosophical insight that the concept itself, which 
comes to material expression in language as nowhere else, is the 
terrain on which whatever reconcilement between thought and its other, 
the desire for which is Adorno's paradigm for utopian longing, is to be 
negotiated. 
What Adorno avoids on all accounts, as philosophically unwarranted, 
is systematic, linear and hierarchical textual presentation. In "The 
Essay as Form," he argues that essayistic effort of thought, which is 
preeminently anti-systemic, may be the home of philosophy in the 
contemporary period. Indeed, it constitutes a utopic practice. 
Criticism of the essay as "fragmentary and random" stems from a view 
that, illegitimately, presupposes the identity of subject and object 
which Adorno's philosophy constantly challenges, and which the essay's 
form denies. Moreover, the essay's preoccupation with "transitory" 
matters is another mark in its favor: "it points to that utopia which 
is blocked out by the classification of the world into the eternal and 
the transitory."u6 [emphasis added] 
The "traditional idea of truth" opposed by the essay is the idea 
that what is can be expressed correctly in a formula, statement, 
narrative, intellectual system of concepts. In their correspondence, 
clarity, and systematic relationship these statements and concepts are 
to act as the double of the reality they purport to understand, and the 
understanding they purport to represent. The logic on which this 
concept relies purports to make different things identical by means of 
the form of subject, object, and copula. In the context of "Trying to 
115. Ibid., 221. 
116. Theodor W. Adorno, "The Essay as Fonn," in The Adorno Reader, Brian 
O'Connor editor (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 91-111, 99. 
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Understand Endgame," Adorno asserts that Beckett exposes the ever-
present absurdity in this logic, by taking it rigorously to its final 
extreme in Hamm's last absurd insistence upon opening the window 
precisely because it is pointless to do so. If opening the window is 
pointless, then it must be opened. Logic. 
The alternative would, presumably, be to refashion understanding 
into a different kind of tool, less analytic-descriptive, more 
insightful and knowing. Statements that purport to describe always 
remain outside and divorced from the concrete reality they pride 
themselves on having captured - always without having captured the 
essential qualities of concreteness. An alternative would be that 
"cognitive utopia" that "would be to use concepts to unseal the non-
conceptual with concepts, without making it their equal."l1? The problem 
is the incommensurability between conceptual and nonconceptual, and the 
aim of philosophy in its search for truth, "that the concept can 
transcend the concept, the preparatory and concluding element, and can 
thus reach the nonconceptual" is thereby in its inception and nature 
dialectical, something that must make itself take contradictions 
seriously. 118 
The utopia "blocked out" by the division of reality into things 
eternal and things transitory is that utopia in which truth is to be 
sought in the realm of the transitory. A rejection of that division 
expresses the specific desire to make that realm of the transitory the 
eternal realm of truth and life. The essay, according to Adorno, values 
precisely those aspects of life that higher philosophy typically 
eschews, in favor of more abstract and general - i.e., livid and 
lifeless - concepts. Its form functions utopically, as it elevates the 
117. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 10. 
118. Ibid., 9. 
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micrological concerns of living authors with concrete things to the 
level of serious philosophical consideration, and constitutes a textual 
place where theory and practice almost become one. 119 
Adorno, in sum, identifies the form of philosophical texts as 
integral to the pursuit of the truth those texts explore and endeavor 
to present. Philosophical texts whose form, as a precise embodiment of 
their content, demand the reader's active engagement, are themselves an 
invitation to a particular kind of practice. The practice of reading 
such texts is not neutral; it affects the reader. This understanding of 
the active engagement of the philosopher with the reader through the 
vehicle of the philosophical text grows out of Adorno's understanding 
of language. Language, like text, is not neutral; it is deeply enmeshed 
in the content of what the subject knows. Language is also the 
indispensable tool that philosophy uses to know what it knows. For that 
reason, the subject needs to have available to it a language in which 
it is possible to think the concept of utopia. Adorno's critique of 
language addresses this issue. 
Adorno's Critique of Language 
Adorno shares with 21st century philosophers a keen appreciation for 
the role of language in the conduct of philosophy. Dialectics means 
"language as the organon of thought," and locates its hope for breaking 
through the context of apparent totality in a judicious use of language 
that aims at "a mutual approximation of thing and expression," that 
prepares the mutual approximation of thing and the thought that 
expresses. 120 Adorno's comments on language are directed with hostility 
towards contemporaneous developments that would reduce language 
exclusively to an allegedly communicative consensus, eliminating its 
119. Adorno, "The Essay as Form," 99. 
120. Ibid., 56. 
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potentially utopic naming function, as well as towards practices that 
divorce language from the truth represented by content. Both 
developments can be seen as threats of totalitarian, dystopian, closure 
of the possibility of thought's rescue of the utopian moment. Adorno's 
recurrent language about language has as an aim the conservation of 
that moment. 
The threat of totalitarianism in language arises from severing the 
original link between language and its objective content. History has 
witnessed a split between the sign function of language and the mimetic 
function, in which something in language resembles something in the 
objective world of which it speaks. The split took place long ago, but 
has become increasingly complete, with the result that scientific use 
of language views language exclusively as sign, while art (poetry) 
treats it exclusively as expressive material. Both attitudes jeopardize 
the potential, still latent in language, to mediate a relationship 
between thought and thing.121 That potential can be activated 
dialectically in the awareness of language as name and image, and in 
the accompanying effort of "determinate negation" to read all images -
including those of names, concepts - "as script," as surfaces with the 
abili ty to reveal "their social, historical, and human meaning. ,,122 Such 
scripts incorporate both truth and falsehood, but in the process of 
parsing these elements dialectically, even their moments of falsehood 
can lead on to an understanding of truth. 
This description of language owes everything to that of Walter 
Benjamin in the prologue to The Origin of German Tragic Drama. There, 
Benjamin distinguishes the communicative from the naming function of 
language. The figure of Adam in Paradise becomes the prototype for 
121. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectics of Enlightenment, 10-21. 
122. Ibid., 20. 
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language's naming function, which is a mimetic one: "Ideas are 
displayed, without intention, in the act of naming, and they have to be 
renewed in philosophical contemplation. In this renewal the primordial 
mode of apprehending words is restored."u3 Philosophy hereby acquires a 
political task, becoming the struggle over the representation of ideas; 
it also acquires a potentially transformative one, as it becomes 
responsible for seeking, and inhabiting, a realm of truth that does not 
depend simply on popular consensus or appearance. 
Adorno does not adopt this perspective uncritically; he charges 
Benjamin, too, with positing a premature identity between concepts and 
the things they conceptualize. 124 Nevertheless, Adorno's recurrent 
denunciations of nominalism and positivism acquire additional depth in 
the context of Benjamin's depiction of language. The treatment of 
language as exclusively the embodiment of ordinary usage, as containing 
nothing that is "not merely significative," as being by definition a 
system of signs, and not merely a system of signs, but a system that 
depends less on individual words than on the system of differences they 
encode, has already taken on the given and unquestionable character 
Adorno sought to oppose.125 This makes exhortations like "we cannot 
ignore the perpetual denunciation of rhetoric by nominalists to whom a 
name bears no resemblance to what it says" all but structurally 
unintelligible. 126 That unintelligibility is an index of the reality of 
the threat Adorno perceived, and which the focus on language in his 
philosophy opposed. Once again, the threat is that of the dystopian 
closing off of imaginative possibilities. 
123. Benjamin, German Tragic Drama, 37. 
124. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 53. 
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The problem with nominalism and positivism, which are linked in 
Adorno's treatment across his various texts, is that they reduce 
language to the function of describing what may be observed in the 
extant situation. They rob dialectical reasoning of its hand- and 
footholds, by eliminating one pole of the situation used by dialectics 
for its procedure, the pole of the larger meaning of a term. This is a 
serious problem, in that dialectics is the philosophical method that 
offers some hope for understanding both the current situation in which 
philosophy finds itself and locating the possible exits from that 
situation. Even more serious, however, is the effect of such a view on 
consciousness. By denying the gap between idea and thing, perceptible 
in language and its inadequacy, the participation of nature in the life 
of thought is also denied, and thereby repressed. Nature is apprehended 
exclusively as something to be dominated; thought is reduced to the 
consciousness of such a nature. Nothing else appears. The exit - the 
actual participation of nature and cognition in a common enterprise -
remains, but it is behind a curtain, and the light is out. The chances 
that a suffering humanity will find the reconciliation that original 
conjunction promises dwindle. 
A similar concern with closure, and with truth content, animates 
Adorno's critique of what he labels the jargon of authenticity. In this 
use of language, with which he charges the German existentialist 
authors of his day, the link between language and reality is broken in 
a different way. Language is not limited to describing an empirical 
situation, but used to point to a special experience that is, in 
relation to its context, manufactured. ~The empirical usability of the 
sacred ceremonial words makes both the speaker and listener believe in 
their corporeal presence," which ~is delivered ready from the factory, 
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a transcendence which is a changeling said to be the lost original. ,,127 
It is language used with a hidden intent to deceive and conceal, in the 
manner of repression, which cannot allow elements of 'particularly 
traumatic content to reach consciousness. The traumatic content 
repressed by the jargon of authenticity is the utter loss of meaning in 
contemporary existence in the late capitalist way of life. It proceeds 
by way of reverent depictions of wholesome, homey rituals that no 
longer really are performed, an exaltation of religiosity without 
doctrinal content, the deployment of old words as if they contained an 
immanent meaning immune to history. 128 
In the end, this language is the tool of a philosophy that seeks to 
link a feeling of depth and ultimate meaning to the utter 
meaninglessness of death in an irrational cause itself. The jargon 
"asserts meaning with the gesture of dignity by which Heidegger would 
like to dress up death. ,,129 This dignified gesture amounts to the 
signature of the triumph of the enlightened unreason that is the target 
of the critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment, the reduction of thought 
to self-preservation. "The worn-out principle of the self-positing of 
the ego, which proudly holds out in preserving its life at the cost of 
the others, is given a higher value by means of the death which 
extinguishes it. ,,130 What begins as a deformation of language ends in the 
worship of the power that first elicited language, death, but without 
any consolation other than posturing. 131 In the end, the problem of the 
jargon of authenticity is that it attempts to keep alive the experience 
of dignity in language, a dignity which needs to be seen for the 
decadence it always contained. "With it goes that humanity which has 
127. Adorno, Jargon of Authenticity, 4. 
128. Ibid., 7, 16, 42. 
129. Ibid., 132. 
130. Ibid., 134. 
131. Ibid., 135. 
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its basic nature not in self-reflection but in its difference from a 
suppressed animality. ,,132 
Language errs as much when it seeks to maintain that suppression, 
in the face of a situation that makes it increasingly impossible to 
maintain, as when it seeks to reduce thought to the pure reproduction 
of immediate reality. In neither case is the ideal of self-reflection, 
as the self-reflection of nature itself, glimpsed or cultivated. But 
for Adorno, this self-reflection would be the route that might lead 
towards a utopia worthy of the name. That is, this self-reflection 
might generate an ultimately messianic light. 
As an aside, Adorno's project preserves a peculiar place for and 
emphasis on the appreciation and use of metaphor. Along with Nietzsche, 
Adorno recognizes that much of what philosophers take for literal and 
precise language constitutes "a mobile army metaphors," which, in 
particular, constitute frozen social relationships.133 From Adorno's 
perspective such language may be frozen in place in ways that block out 
alternative, creative and potentially freeing cognitions. On the other 
hand, some metaphors, precisely chosen, can illuminate truths that are 
obscured by the operations of what conventional philosophy holds as 
literal language, as his stress on the element of presentation in 
philosophy, and his own judicious use of vivid metaphors, makes 
abundantly clear. 
The Subject of Utopia 
As we have seen, Adorno deals with the epistemological problem of 
the relationship of subject to object, and echoes of this problem 
132. Ibid., 136. 
133. Friedrich Nietzsche "On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense," in 
Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, edited and translated by Sander L. 
Gilman, Carole Blair and David J. Parent (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989) 246-257, 250. 
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reverberate throughout his work. 134 Adorno takes the problem of the 
relationship of "the subject" to "the object" seriously, making it 
central to his major works. That may strike post-modern readers, who 
take the death of the subject as yesterday's news, as quaint. Adorno 
himself acknowledges the inescapable vagueness of the formulation. 135 
Nevertheless Adorno treats the alienation of the subject of thought, 
in its thought, from concrete reality as both emblematic and 
constitutive of the dystopian reality of the late 20th century. The 
reversion of enlightenment to myth as a consequence of the subject's 
ignorance and heedlessness of its domination by nature in the aims of 
enlightenment itself is but one striking example. In returning to the 
problem over and over again, his effort to find ways to overcome the 
problem philosophically constitutes the utopic direction of Adorno's 
philosophy. 
The central dilemma of the sUbject-object problem is the alienation 
of the subject from its object or objects. This alienation, captured by 
the form of the concept as "the wall between thinking and the thought," 
separates the knower from what the knower knows (as that which is 
thought, its object) .136 "The thought" in this context, that miniscule 
separation, also forms the substrate of domination. It constitutes 
domination all the more as the subject remains ignorant of its 
participation in its material object, because of its own status as an 
object, and because of its own objective material composition. 
In his latest statement on the matter, Adorno wrote "If speculation 
on the state of reconciliation were permitted, neither the 
undistinguished unity of subject and object nor their antithetical 
134. See Buck-Morss, ibid.; Brian O'Connor, Adorno's Negative Dialectic. 
135. Theodor Adorno, "Subject and Object," in The Adorno Reader, edited by 
Brian O'Connor (Oxford: Blackwell, 137-151. 
136. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 15. 
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hostility would be conceivable in it;" what would be conceivable, 
instead, would be "the communication of what was distinguished," that 
is, the communication of what is distinguished as "subject" and what is 
distinguished as "object.,,137 The sentiment echoes images traced as early 
as Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which the genuine utopia, in contrast 
to Bacon's patriarchal one of the mastery of nature by mind, involves 
the synchronous reconcilement in difference of mind with its origin. 138 
This reconcilement "would be the thought of the many as no longer 
inimical, a thought that is anathema to sUbjective reason," because of 
its urge to subject everything to itself .139 
What emerges from Adorno's treatment of the relationship of subject 
to object, is that the subject itself may not finally, legitimately, be 
separated from its individual, particular human subjects, however 
epistemologically abstract or socially collective an understanding may 
be demanded during the course of philosophical investigation. These 
human subjects are the subjects of the utopia, as insufficient as 
merely individual happiness is to constitute utopia as such.14o Adorno's 
critique of Hegel culminates in his rejection of the immense distance 
of absolute spirit from its bearers, in which "the subject, the 
substrate of freedom, is so far detached from live human beings that 
its freedom in necessity can no longer profit them at all.,,141 
Adorno's allusion to the desirable philosophical condition in which 
the subject and object of knowledge actually "communicate," in which 
subject recognizes its own objectivity, and in which the object's 
participation in conceptualization becomes more transparent, has 
137. Adorno, "Subject and Object," 140. 
138. Horkheimer and Adorno, ibid., 33. 
139. Ibid., 6. 
140. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 353. 
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appealed to feminist theorists. 142 It presents a figure of reciprocity 
rare in mainstream philosophy. It shares an affinity with Irigaray's 
understanding of the need to ensure communication across the boundary 
of sexual difference, and the relationship of that line to the 
conceptualization of the line between culture and nature, of which more 
later. And it attests to the centrality of this particular basic 
structure of thought, in Adorno's philosophical discourse, to the 
matter of utopia. For Adorno, the distance between society as it is and 
the utopia that even this society might realistically strive to bring 
into being, stems from the drive towards domination that finds its 
earliest and pre-eminent expression in epistemological subjectivity, 
along with its characteristically instrumental attitude. The 
achievement of a happy, mutual relationship between thinker, thought, 
and thought-about, would require the acknowledgement on the part of 
thought of its own objectivity, or ~nature," or ~particularity," as 
well as its own enmeshment in relations of power vis-a-vis nature, its 
own status as repressed and dominated nature. Such an acknowledgement 
would be tantamount to the achievement of a form of consciousness with 
an affinity to class consciousness, based on membership in a large 
class: the class of social beings dominated by reified mind. Such a 
consciousness might, if it proceeded thoughtfully, be able to ~devote 
itself to dissolving that power. "143 Empirical signs of this devotion are 
few and fleeting. Adorno's philosophical work seems inclined towards 
encouraging their appearance. 
Paradoxically, the estrangement of subject and object that 
constitutes the problem also seems to hold the key to its solution, if 
that solution is ever to be effected. That is, the hope for a 
142. Lee, ibid.; Patricia Mills, Feminist Interpretations of Hegel 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996). 
143. Horkheimer and Adorno, ibid., 34. 
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reconcilement lies in a principled refusal to succumb to the delusion 
of identitarian ideology, to accept any substitute or sham 
reconcilement, but to hold out for its actuality, even if its actuality 
is unreachable in its fullness. This task demands of thought, of 
philosophy, an adamant refusal to work towards pre-scribed systematic 
solutions, or to impose alien thought forms on its object. A philosophy 
that would work in the direction of hope must resolutely hold its own 
concepts, the tools with which it cannot dispense, in perpetual 
suspicion, leaving them open to dialectical correction by the reality 
they endeavor to grasp.144 
Space and Time 
Adorno's utopian enunciations are directed towards preventing a 
complete totalitarian or identity-thinking closure. They search for the 
location of some discrepancy, a necessary distance, between conditions 
as they are and some alternative. The concluding section of Negative 
Dialectics, the "meditations on metaphysics," proffers "the object of 
aesthetics" as one such a place. 145 The place constituted by the 
aesthetic object is a problematic one. The promises the aesthetic 
object makes are always over-promises, without the guarantees required 
by philosophy. Nevertheless, the structure of the aesthetic object, in 
relation to the structure of the world in which it appears, acts as a 
144. This insistence embodies, in capsule form, the appropriate response to 
Nigel Gibson, who challenges Adorno's reading of Hegel, in particular around 
the function of the "absolute negative" in Hegel's system, as well as his 
reading of Marx's theory of alienated labor. The central point of departure for 
Negative Dialectics, which applies to every conceptual criticism leveled at its 
thinking, is that "objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a 
remainder" (5) and that furthering an understanding of the relationship of the 
subject to that remainder is the vital desideratum. The method of calling 
attention to Adorno's non-Hegelian-Marxist failure to understand the true 
meaning of Hegel's and Marx's concepts as challenges to the import of Negative 
Dialectics misses that point by a wide margin. See Nigel Gibson, "Rethinking an 
Old Saw: Dialectical Negativity, Utopia, and Negative Dialectic in Adorno's 
Hegelian Marxism," in Adorno: A Critical Reader, edited by Nigel Gibson and 
Andrew Rubin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) 257-291. 
145. Adorno, ibid., 
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concrete representative of an alternative to the closed context of 
immanence that mitigates against utopia. 
Adorno is careful to point out how "micrological" the potential of 
this object, or of any possible metaphysical thought that aims at 
transcendence, has become. Metaphysical possibility - which remains 
desirable for a humanity that continues to wish to revoke the suffering 
that is past as well as redeem the suffering that obtains and cancel 
whatever suffering might await in future, but the truth of which has 
become radically questionable - retreats into micrology.146 The category 
of the micrological is probably on loan from Walter Benjamin, and 
relates as well to his concept of constellations. 147 It is illustrated in 
Adorno's metaphysical speculations in two ways. One is with his 
concluding insistence that the smallest "intramundane traits" are the 
stuff of metaphysics, suggesting a focus on the most particular as the 
pre-eminently suggestive of something irreducible to identity 
thinking.l4B The other is his striking statement that small 
representational discrepancies make themselves disproportionately 
significant, as in the discrepancy between "death" and "rest" that 
constitutes the "haven of hope, the no-man's land between the border 
posts of being and nothingness" that serves as a metaphor for the 
possibility of utopic space .149 
A no-man's land is the opposite of a romantic place removed from 
day-to-day conflicts. In war, a literal no-man's land is by definition 
146. Ibid., 407-408. 
147. According to Giorgio Agamben in The Coming Community, Walter Benjamin 
was fond of a tale about the world to come in which "everything will be just as 
it is now, just a little different." Agamben, The Coming Community, 53. Novalis, 
in The Universal Sketchbook, repeats the same story with a slight variation: 
"In the world to come everything will be as it was in the former world - and 
yet it will be altogether different. The world to come is rational Chaos - the 
Chaos that has permeated itself - that is inside and outside itself - Chaos 2 or 
ao" See David Farell Krell, "Two Apothecaries: Novalis and Derrida," Studies in 
Romanticism 46:3 (Summer, 2007) 289-309, 301. 
148. Adorno, ibid., 407. 
149. Ibid., 381. 
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a contested space, fraught with lethal possibilities. In peace, it is 
marginalized and excluded, less a place that supports life than a place 
that testifies to its withdrawal. A conventional metaphorical use of 
the term emphasizes its undecidable and precarious character. ISO But 
precisely because it constitutes a place that cannot be definitively 
claimed for one side or the other, and because it belies the identity 
of socially- and politically-imposed boundaries on something that 
continues to exceed and underlie them, it constitutes the "neutral" 
territory that is always, as Louis Marin insists, the classic structure 
of utopia. ISI Despite its empty appearance, no-man's land has the right 
address. 
The hope associated with this no-man's land, as also with the 
object of aesthetics, is less directly spatial than it is temporal. It 
is the hope that something might yet happen, or rather, be made to 
happen. It is inseparable from the refusal of "absolute conclusiveness" 
in history that is the temporal consequence of the negative dialectical 
approach. IS2 The stubborn refusal of history, or something like history, 
to come to an end constitutes the temporal horizon of a utopian hope, 
though not of expectation. The possibility that something un-natural, 
un-conditioned might yet arise in the still-moving historical space or 
place is too small to label hope, but not too small to link to the 
micrology of a thought that would affirm its solidarity with 
metaphysics. What an ontological philosophy would exempt from history, 
dialectics locates within it, making history itself a place where 
something worthy of the name of metaphysics, the philosophy of 
something beyond the immediate and dystopian context of everyday life, 
150. "An area of human activity characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, or 
peril." Funk & Wagnall's Standard College Dictionary (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, 1966). 
151. Marin, ibid. 
152. Adorno, ibid., 403. 
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"may originate only with the realization of what has been thought in 
its sign. ,,153 The failure of human beings simply to be what they are and 
always have been, to go into their concept without a remainder, remains 
the source, micrological as it is, of whatever possibility of utopic 
practice, or creation, might be anticipated from Adorno's analysis. 
If hope is prohibited, as if its enunciation would be idolatrous, 
despair is prohibited all the more, particularly in the context of a 
history that still provides the concept of an outside, as the concept 
of "not yet." Despair, too, is tantamount to idolatry: it fallaciously 
" guarantees to us that the hopelessly missed things exist ... ", 
though they are not of this world. 154 This treatment of despair should 
remind us of Agamben's analysis of the medievalists' acedia, embodied 
in Durer's etching of the angel looking motionlessly into the distance, 
surrounded by forsaken toolS. 155 That image itself encodes an 
indispensable element of contemplation, and attachment to the image of 
what is contemplated. Its specific error in Adorno's context would lie 
in its attachment to a prematurely-closed form. The inability to act 
associated with acedia would be inseparable from the inability to 
relinquish the beloved image for an activity promising more substantive 
content, but without any guarantee of its ultimate form. "If rescue is 
the inmost impulse of any man's [sic] spirit, there is no hope but 
unreserved surrender: of that which is to be rescued as well as of the 
hopeful spirit. ,,156 
But if a rescue of the self along with the hope for it must be 
abandoned, the persistence of truth "along with its temporal core" 
153. Ibid., 404. 
154. Ibid., 372. 
155. Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, 
translated by Ronald L. Martinez (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993) . 
156. Adorno, ibid., 392. 
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continues to open up a place that travels along with the course of 
history.ls7 That place constitutes its ever-present, promising and as-yet 
dissatisfied companion. It cannot be the "homogeneous, empty time" of 
the Social Democratic illusion of progress derided by Walter Benjamin, 
although whether Adorno's dialectical time contains the messianic 
"Jetztzeit" described by Benjamin is not entirely certain. ISS If it does, 
it will be because "a legible constellation of things in being" had 
been read in such a way that its "elements unite to form a script" a 
script unlike that of the administered world with its repetitive 
prescribed relations and outcomes, both in the truth of its content and 
the fidelity of its form. IS9 The task of noticing, reading, copying, and 
distributing that script seems to belong to philosophy. Saying so 
constitutes the recurrent theme of Adorno's utopian discourse. 
Adorno's Reader as a Subject of Possibility 
In short, while utopia is not often the explicit topic of Adorno's 
philosophical texts, the possibility of utopian imagination is a 
constant concern of his philosophical work. Adorno persistently 
addresses his reader as a subject trying to know, and in particular, 
trying to know how to respond to the suffering that subject encounters 
in herself and her world. Adorno's address incorporates a recurrent 
critical moment that depicts the reader's context as one of deeply 
dystopian urgency, which it is the philosopher's task to display, and 
the reader's task to grasp and see clearly. The analysis of that 
situation, and of its underlying causes, comes in the form of texts 
that cannot be read and understood without adopting a significantly 
modified point of view, an altered subjective state. The language of 
157. Ibid., 371. 
158. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in 
Illuminations, edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1978) 261. 
159. Adorno, ibid., 407. 
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those texts is self-consciously language that permits, and in places 
encourages, something like metaphysical experience. This use of 
language stands in contrast to the superficially self-effacing 
operation of conventional or nominalistic language on one hand, and in 
contrast to the self-consciously mystical pretensions of "authentic" 
language on the other. 
The subject of philosophical inquiry, insofar as that subject is a 
reader of Adorno's philosophy, hereby becomes a site of the discrepancy 
between concepts and their objects in the struggle to come to an 
adequate appreciation of those texts and that language. This state of 
discrepancy is a state of possibility. The subject of that state is a 
subject in a better position to cultivate the need in thinking in the 
direction of truth, one condition of which for Adorno is, as already 
noted, the "effort to give a voice to suffering." 
That some of that suffering is the direct effect of the 
philosophical task, properly pursued, reflects the relationship of 
philosophy to truth, and the relationship of truth to its world. Only 
in a happy world could philosophy honestly be a gay science. The double 
reflection that philosophy must undertake is negative on both hands. On 
one, it must enter the confrontation with "consummate negativity" which 
"once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image of its opposite. ,,160 On 
the other, it must pursue the "redemption of illusion" in the knowledge 
of art. For Adorno, this second reflection is potentially restorative. 
"What spirit requires of subjective spirit is that spirit's own 
spontaneity. The knowledge of art means to render objectified spirit 
once again fluid through the medium of reflection. ,,161 In the fantastic 
fluidity of that reflected light, a micrological possibility might be 
160. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247. 
161. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 357. 
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realized: that of an active thought which, in affirming its solidarity 
with metaphysics, is reminiscent of something messianic, without 




Luce Irigaray has spent a lifetime pointing out the incomparable 
metaphysical relevance of sexual difference. The history of western 
thought makes it possible to recognize the object of aesthetics as the 
trace of an enigmatic other who has synthesized and reflected material 
and social reality in a complex way under the press of an impulse to 
create a better reality. The history of that same thought makes it 
possible to recognize woman as nature. That demonstrates that the 
tremendous energy and illumination that could radiate from sexual 
difference - energies that could power the discovery of "worlds more 
fecund than any known to date" - have not only not been addressed, they 
have not even been sensed. "Sexual difference is probably the issue in 
our time which could be our 'salvation' if we thought it through."l 
Irigaray's work as one of the controversial "French feminists" has 
by now spanned several prolific decades. Like Adorno, her work touches 
a wide range of concerns, from linguistics through psychoanalysis to 
philosophy. She is a practicing psychoanalyst who has expressed 
explicit appreciation for the psychoanalytic tradition and its 
therapeutic possibilities. She is a practitioner of religious 
traditions, in particular meditation based on Hinduism. She has engaged 
in political activity, notably through her work with the Italian 
1. Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. by Carolyn Burke 
and Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 5. 
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communist party. She is also, when the opportunity presents itself, an 
educator. 2 
Her work also demonstrates a similarly wide range of influences. It 
engages central theoretical insights of psychoanalysis, with which she 
takes issue but which she also appropriates at significant junctures. 
It draws on linguistics, including Irigaray's own original research in 
this area. And it famously displays the fruit of her "fling with the 
philosophers," from Plato through Levinas and Derrida. 3 Nietzsche and 
Heidegger in particular have become the conversation partners of full-
length dedicated philosophical treatments in Irigaray's characteristic 
mimetic style. 4 In comparison with the depth and breadth of the 
influences and import of her work, the focus of this chapter, which 
devotes most of its attention to three of Irigaray's recent texts, 
seems narrow. 
Irigaray's reputation as a controversial theorist grew following 
the publication of Speculum de l'autre femme (Speculum of the Other 
Woman), an event to which she also owed her dismissal from the 
University of Vincennes. In that work, she stated that she was working 
to develop the appropriate objective context for an investigation of 
feminine subjectivity, a topic which has formed her perennial interest. 
Irigaray's early work remains integral to her larger intellectual 
objectives. Nevertheless, this chapter focuses attention on three more 
recent works, I love to you (J'aime a toil, The Way of Love (La Voie de 
l'amour), and Sharing the World. These texts include both the critical 
and utopian elements identified by Margaret Whitford in her analysis of 
2. Luce Irigaray, Teaching, ed. by Luce Irigaray with Mary Green (New York: 
Continuum, 2008). 
3. Irigaray, This Sex, 150. 
4. See Luce Irigaray, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Gillian C. 
Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) and Luce Irigaray, L'oubli de 
L'air Chez Martin Heidegger (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1983). 
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Irigaray's early writings, but lean more heavily toward the utopian 
than the critical side. s The focus on these texts in particular permits 
discussion both of Irigaray's interactions with Hegel, which are most 
on display in I Love to You, and her interactions with the Heidegger of 
"On the Way to Language" and "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" which are 
explicit in the construction of The Way of Love and Sharing the World. 
Irigaray may be best known for the frequent label of "essentialism" 
that has accompanied her indefatigable emphasis on sexual difference. 
In spite of an alleged dissipation of the essentialism-anti-
essentialism tensions associated with discussion of Irigaray's work in 
recent years, this theme remains one of the most accessible handles by 
which Irigaray's work is grasped in casual conversation. 6 Since the 
question of sexual difference colors the chapter that follows, the 
question about essentialism poses itself accordingly. But the emphasis 
here will fall to a much greater degree on the way Irigaray deploys 
language of sexual difference as she interacts with Heidegger on the 
development of language and its role in the generation of culture. That 
is, the emphasis is on her effort to develop a paradigm of conversation 
between two. This effort goes beyond the paradigm of "amorous exchange" 
to which Margaret Whitford's analysis points, extending that exchange 
to include interactions that are something different from what is 
commonly called "amorous," although no less cognizant of sexual 
difference. This exchange still takes place along a way Irigaray 
characterizes with the word "love," the way of which she describes as 
5. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine. 
6. Alison Stone, "The Sex of Nature: A Reinterpretation of Irigary's 
Metaphysics and Political Thought," Hypatia 18:3 (Autumn, 2003) 60-84. 
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illuminated with a light that radiates from and returns to an intimate 
source. 7 
The chapter glances at the objectives of Irigaray's work as a whole, 
and then proceeds to consider her use of utopian themes, primarily as 
they appear in three recent works: I love to you, The Way of Love, and 
Sharing the World. Then, it considers how Irigaray's use of utopian 
elements incorporates the devices also seen in Adorno, in particular 
the emphasis on textual practice, a dedicated treatment of a form of 
the subject-object relation, an emphasis on the problem of language, 
and her specific treatment of space and time and their trans formative 
possibilities. Overall, it argues that Irigaray responds to what she 
identifies as the foreclosure of properly feminine subjectivity, which 
has so far barred the coming-into-existence of what she designates as 
"Woman-as-Subject," by addressing and discursively constructing "Woman" 
as a subject of utopian possibility in a world that has not yet 
realized the trans formative possibilities implicit in sexual difference. 
Because sexual difference both characterizes the material world, and 
has as yet not been recognized in the construction of the cultural 
world, the unrecognized possibilities of sexual difference radiate a 
messianic light. 
Dystopian Repression and Response 
It has not been easy for Irigaray's readers to understand what she 
is trying to do. It has not even always been clear that she had a 
philosophical project. The first serious interpreter of Irigaray as a 
philosopher, Margaret Whitford, acknowledged "it has taken me a long 
time to understand her" while also concluding that Irigaray is 
"committed to 'the work of the universal' and to the centrality of 
7. Luce Irigaray, The Way of Love, trans. Heidi Bostic and Stephen P1uhacek 
(London: Continuum, 2002), 174. 
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ethics." Whitford summarizes Irigaray's overall project as the effort 
"to intervene as a woman . . in the discourse of philosophy".8 Judith 
Butler has explicitly discussed her initially dismissive response to 
Irigaray's approach, only later to realize that her project involved 
"this strange practice of reading, one in which she was reading texts 
that she was not authorized to read, . and that she would read them 
anyway." Such a project was clearly "a feminist critical practice" with 
some edifying potential. 9 
Irigaray herself, in an answer to a question about the status of 
her text Speculum, described herself as 
. trying, as I have already indicated, to go back through 
the masculine imaginary, to interpret the way it has reduced 
us to silence, to muteness or mimicry, and I am attempting, 
from that starting-point and at the same time, to (re)discover 
a possible space for the feminine imaginary.Io 
Irigaray's statement indicates her use of the three-fold Lacanian 
division of the objective world into real, imaginary and symbolic. That 
acceptance places Irigaray, as we have already noted, within a project 
that draws on the psychoanalytic tradition, taking Freudian and 
Lacanian categories seriously while also taking issue with them. Her 
use of, and ambivalent loyalty to, the intellectual framework of 
psychoanalysis, specifically Lacanian psychoanalysis, testifies to the 
persistently therapeutic dimension of her work, which manifests itself 
in her textual as well as her psychoanalytic practice. 
Although she emphasizes the impact of her work on the "imaginary," 
her work also addresses the "symbolic" register. Irigaray has been 
described as being "invested in rewriting the symbolic as a way of 
8. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, 4, 13. Whitford's use of "the 
universal" indicates a human concern not restricted to the interest of a single 
gender. 
9. Cheah, Grosz, Butler, and Cornell, ibid., 19. 
10. Irigaray, This Sex, 162-3. Note that in this statement, "us" mayor may 
not be read as referring to "women". 
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changing the social and political situation of women and initiating a 
culture of sexual difference."n Elsewhere, she labels the phallic, 
which marks the boundary for Lacan between the imaginary and the 
symbolic, "tantamount to the seriousness of meaning," something her 
project contests. In particular, and in a reversal of Adorno's explicit 
objective of securing the conditions of possibility for the thought of 
"truth," understood as a giving voice to suffering, Irigaray says the 
"speaking of truth constitutes the prohibition on woman's pleasure, and 
thus on the sexual relation. ,,12 
Irigaray's refusal of "truth" here does not indicate either a 
contempt for honesty, nor her determined opposition to the objectives 
advanced by Adorno. Adorno's use of the word "truth" indicates a desire 
to go beyond the constraints imposed by its conventional association 
with the adequacy of language. Irigaray's use of the word "truth" in 
this context refers precisely to the way those constraints themselves 
are made absolute and binding on the users of language. Adorno develops 
a standard of truth that seeks to dislodge a premature identification 
or adequation of concept and presumed object of conceptualization, 
finding in that identification an illegitimate closure and denial of 
remainders and non-identities. Similarly, Irigaray struggles here to 
express a consciousness of the radical excess of objective and concrete 
reality with respect to the language and conceptual apparatus available 
for expressing its intellection. The "truth" Irigaray opposes in this 
context, then, amounts to what Adorno opposes, on similar grounds, as 
"identity thinking." 
It might be more precise to identify the objectives on which 
Irigaray's work converges as avoiding the articulation of a new 
11. Krzysztof Ziarek, "Proximities: Irigaray and Heideger on Difference," 
Continental Philosophy Review 33:2 (April, 2000), 133-158, 134. 
12. Irigaray, This Sex, 163; italics in original. 
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symbolic, which would presumably replace the current phallogocentric 
one. A single, unitary symbolic will not resolve the problem she 
perceives and struggles to bring to her readers' awareness. For 
Irigaray, the one symbolic within which humanity now operates, which 
represses both the characteristic meanings of the feminine and the 
masculine, is problematic because it excludes recognition of the 
intrinsic sexual differentiation of the human. The inability to accept 
and cultivate difference then makes impossible a cultivation of the 
internally-differentiated human, and a passage from nature to culture, 
that draws on the full range of human possibilities. For Irigaray, 
"culture" as something authentically human has not yet emerged in human 
life; "culture" as something other than what is opposed to a "nature" 
equated with a "feminine" that has been constructed by the exclusion of 
the possibility of a feminine sUbjectivity is something that human 
beings have yet to begin to create. 
In spite of their shared opposition to forms of "identity 
thinking," Irigaray's philosophical objectives differ significantly 
from Adorno's. Her efforts focus consistently on the role of sexual 
difference and sexuate possibilities as the source of something like 
metaphysical experience. Where Adorno sees a micrological and fugitive 
site of discrepancy, Irigaray detects a vast, unexplored territory with 
the riches to create an alternative to the language and syntax of 
"truth" that suppresses women's reality, sexual plea~ure, the sexual 
relation, and the cultivation of human culture on the basis of human 
nature in its fullness. Irigaray pursues this quest for the objective 
conditions of a changed form of thinking and communication that would 
include a revised human subjectivity, a human subjectivity that would 
be internally diverse, in something like dialogue with the philosophers 
of the western philosophical tradition, but in particular with Plato, 
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Levinas, and Heidegger. The rehabilitation of psychoanalytic constructs, 
the rethinking of the unconscious, and its relation to language, 
remains a significant part of her work. 
One way to present Irigaray's efforts might be to say that she 
psychoanalyzes the philosophers, while interrogating the philosophical 
presuppositions and implications of psychoanalysis. As she says in 
response to a question about her use of Freudian theory, whatever 
"challenge" her critique offers is not designed to "return to a pre-
critical attitude toward psychoanalysis" or to deny its therapeutic 
effectiveness, but to show that "if Freudian theory indeed contributes 
what is needed to upset the philosophic order of discourse, the theory 
remains paradoxically subject to that discourse where the definition of 
sexual difference is concerned.,,13 She poses over and over again the 
question of how to retain the insights of psychoanalysis that promote a 
liberating understanding of human subjectivity, while opening the 
repressive structure of the psychoanalytic system to its excluded 
content. 
One element of this project has been a conscious reconstruction and 
creation of scenes of origin that recognize sexually differentiated 
subject positions. An example here is Irigaray's insistence on the 
importance of the mother-daughter relation. 14 Such scenes of origin 
offer a contrast to the single oedipal scene offered by traditional 
psychoanalytic narrative, through which a non-sexually-differentiated 
humanity passes to produce, according to the classic account, a 
humanity distinguished as Same and Other-of-the-Same. Irigaray's 
appreciative but critical engagement with Freud and Lacan impels her to 
search for ways to intervene in practices of thought that become 
13. Irigaray, This Sex, 72. 
14. See "Love of Same, Love of Other" in Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual 
Difference, 97-115. 
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embodied in congealed spirit prior to consciousness and language. IS That 
recognition suggests that at least one aspect of Irigaray's work is 
therapeutic, a kind of couples counseling for the western cultural 
relationship. 
At the same time, the psychoanalytic framework itself requires 
intervention, as indicated by Irigaray's lengthy critique of its 
philosophical presuppositions in Speculum. A corresponding element of 
Irigaray's project is the renovation of psychoanalysis to open up the 
space for the articulation of a subjectivity excluded by the terms of 
the system of subjects and sUbjectivities. In this work, Irigaray both 
draws on Lacan, for a non-humanist, psychoanalytic account of the human 
subject and its incomplete constitution by reason and consciousness, 
and deconstructs Lacanian discourse by questioning the unconscious 
identification of the unconscious with woman or women by virtue of 
women's enforced silence. Women, who have not been allowed to speak for 
themselves within the space of theory, and who have often been 
prevented from vocally entering the places of general human discourse, 
become identified with the unconscious in the official and even the 
Lacanian psychoanalytic account. Another aspect of Irigaray's project 
involves the restoration of a voice to women as subjects - even if, as 
Grosz suggests, it requires the mime of a hysterical voice to effect 
that reinsertion of voice. 16 
Philosophically, Irigaray engages with a long list of western 
philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle through Deleuze and Levinas. 
However, as Patricia Huntington notes, "Twentieth-century Continental 
philosophy proceeds by way of a love-hate affair with Heidegger," and 
Irigaray's participation in that menage is evident from her earliest 
15. Luce Irigaray, Sharing the World (New York: Continuum, 200B) xii. 
16. Grosz, Lacan: A Feminist Introduction. 
137 
------------------------------------
work, as in her acceptance of Heidegger's adage that "each age has one 
issue to think through, and one only.,,17 One of her texts, L'Oubli de 
l'air chez Martin Heidegger, is dedicated to a close reading and 
mimetic treatment of Heidegger's philosophy. Her two most recent works, 
The Way of Love and Sharing the World, both explicitly depart from 
Heidegger's "On the Way to Language," with substantial considerations 
of "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" and "The Question Concerning 
Technology. ,,18 Irigaray sometimes refers to Heidegger as "the 
philosopher," ironically casting herself in the role of Thomas Aquinas 
vis-a-vis Aristotle, and leaving her readers to wonder who occupies the 
position of Augustine. Nevertheless, as she makes clear in her 
introduction to Sharing the World, she finds the philosopher's stance 
wanting, and dangerously so. A chronic preoccupation with the same, a 
fixation on a single subject to the exclusion of other subjects, and a 
consequent failure to allow others to exist as others deforms his 
ontology. That approach requires others to be integrated into a 
"shared" world that is less a "shared" world than it is commonly or 
even imperialistically imposed on all its subjects, without regard for 
their differing subjectivities. 19 Irigaray's ongoing engagement with 
Heidegger needs to be understood as the struggle to rehabilitate and 
rearchitect a framework for co-habitation of a world; for a kind of 
"building, dwelling, and thinking" together that has yet to acquire its 
proper ground. 
Irigaray's commentators repeatedly identify her project as utopian. 
As part of this utopianism, Irigaray develops a "new poetics" of 
17. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 5. 
18. Irigaray, L'Oubli de l'air chez Martin; Irigaray, The Way of Love; 
Irigaray, Sharing the World. For discussions of Irigaray's relationship to 
Heidegger, see especially Chanter, Ethics of Eros; Huntington, Ecstatic 
Subjects; Krzysztof Ziarek, ibid. 
19. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 136. 
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indispensable utopian imagination. This explicitly poetic dimension of 
her work involves her work in aesthetics, without constituting a 
distinct, fully developed aesthetic theory.2o Her work has inspired 
artists, and in particular architects, for this reason. 21 Similarly, 
while not a theologian, her work incorporates an extensive and often 
favorable treatment of religious themes. She takes seriously a need for 
religious symbols of the feminine as an aspect of the effort to 
construct a feminine imaginary, and has given classic religious texts, 
in particular the texts of female mystics, extended consideration. 22 
Utopia in Irigaray's Work 
Since Margaret Whitford's early, careful analysis of Irigaray's 
early important texts, scholars have recognized that a particular 
utopian vision plays a profound role in Irigaray's work as a whole. 
Whitford assigned Irigaray to the visionary utopian "strand" of 1970s 
and '80s feminist theory. Irigaray does not offer a detailed 
"blueprint" vision of utopia, she does not quite fit Jacoby's model, 
either. Whitford sees her "myths and utopias~ presented as evocative 
glimpses throughout her work as "attempts to construct new fictions" 
that promote change in a world that requires transformation. 23 
A Utopian Ethical Vision 
Irigaray's utopian direction is perhaps most explicitly on display 
throughout the text of An Ethics of Sexual Difference. This text 
assembles lectures given at Erasmus University in Rotterdam in 1982, 
under the title "The Ethics of the Passions." Both the location and the 
20. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 5; Whitford, Philosophy in the 
Feminine; Huntington, Ecstatic Subjects; Drucilla Cornell, Transformations: 
Recollective Imagination and Sexual Difference (New York: Routledge, 1993); Ewa 
Plonowska Ziarek, Ethics of Dissensus; Hilary Robinson, Reading Art, Reading 
Irigaray: The Politics of Art by Women (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). 
21. Robinson, ibid.; Peg Rawes, Irigaray for Architects (New York: Routledge, 
2007) . 
22. Of particular note is the section of Speculum titled "La Mysterique," an 
extended reading of texts of feminine mystics. 
23. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, 19, 170. ' 
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rubric of the lectures seems significant with respect to the text's 
explicit utopianism. Erasmus was the designated recipient of Thomas 
More's text of Utopia. The "passions" are etymologically those 
experiences humans suffer, and in Irigaray's treatment, even such 
seemingly positive experiences as wonder and joy are shown to entail 
their share of suffering. These lectures can be read as an extended 
utopian reflection constructed around the utopian space opened and 
created by a "sensible transcendental" of which "we would be the 
mediators and bridges. ,,24 
Irigaray's concept of a "sensible transcendental" attaches to what 
she identifies as a tangible site for something like metaphysical 
experience. The experience of a discernible difference, like that of 
sexual difference, across which people can discern unknown but 
communicable otherness, combines the paradigmatic elements of the 
experiential and the transcendent. Her address makes her readers 
responsible for developing the forms of revelation called for by this 
communion, casting them in the role of the recipients, or even 
enunciators, of the word from beyond. In this sense, her writing 
addresses a prophetic subject of possibility who speaks on behalf of a 
not-yet subject. 
The reflection that constitutes Ethics of Sexual Difference begins 
with the announcement of a "horizon of worlds more fecund than any 
known to date" implicit in thinking through the philosophical issue of 
sexual difference. That reference brings to mind the polarity of Old 
and New Worlds which More's utopia neutralized. It concludes with her 
elaboration of the indispensable contribution of "flesh" to a creative 
and radically unsubstitutable touch in the context of "The Fecundity of 
the Caress," a touch which lies "on the horizon of a story" that 
24. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 129. 
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precedes the subject, and in which she describes pleasure itself as an 
architectural material. 25 The journey from horizon to horizon takes the 
reader on a whirlwind tour of western philosophy, from Plato's 
Symposium through Descartes and Spinoza to Hegel, Heidegger, and 
Merleau-Ponty. 
What is at stake in the world that might yet be glimpsed by 
thinking through the philosophical issue of sexual difference is 
precisely the "horizon" of "a world for women" which has not yet been 
built. The basic conditions, of language, thought, and political 
economy, for developing a recognition of the transcendent possibility 
of that world have yet to be developed; the linguistic, philosophical, 
and political-economic conditions that obtain operate continuously to 
take away "the vertical dimension . . . from female becoming. ,,26 That is, 
the development of female subjectivity is not described as naturally 
entailing an orientation towards the heavens, and is not encouraged to 
adopt that orientation. 
The potential builders of this not-yet-world that would include 
such a vertical dimension will need "an intuition of the infinite" that 
supports a "love of other" rather than, as has been more traditional, a 
hatred of other. 27 This intuition, whether of God or of a subject 
appropriately open to a complex form of becoming, calls for a renewed 
symbol, a call that raises intense resistance. Her simultaneous 
proposal and disqualification of "sexual difference" as a "living 
symbol" demonstrates that sexual difference fails as a symbol in the 
first instance because it functions as literal language. 28 To the extent 
. 
it functions symbolically, it functions in ways already pre-scribed by 
25. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference,S, 214-217. 
26. Ibid., 108-109. 
27. Ibid., 112. 
28. Ibid., 113. 
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the discourse that operates to block the imagination and construction 
of the fecund new world. That discursive situation informs other claims, 
including her identification of women's traditional "immediate" 
relationship with nature (as revered in romanticism) or with God (as in 
the examples of female mystics), and illuminates other suggestions in 
Ethics, such as the "mucous" of the interior of the body, or the 
potential "caress" of its exterior. 
Irigaray's discussion builds on her early development of a reading 
of Diotima in the Symposium that perceives a complex dialectical 
movement between here, beyond, and the two poles of whatever 
dialectical encounter. The internally polarized "third term" or 
mediating path, which in the Symposium is occupied by love, changes the 
oppositional character of the more familiar Hegelian dialectic. It 
constitutes a dynamic relation between the poles of the dialectical 
engagement. On Irigaray's reading, this incipient dialectic comes to be 
superseded by a less complicated, more oppositional understanding that 
comes to privilege an incorporeal contemplation of beauty, separated 
from its character as "sensible transcendental," by the end of the 
Symposium. 29 
Nevertheless, if Plato's readers can trust Socrates' report - not a 
small if - they can discern and consider Diotima's dialectic, since it 
is on display throughout the entire discourse. The way of love 
described by Diotima permits the undoing and opening up of all 
seemingly binary oppositions. That way permits a continuous movement 
between "here" and "beyond," a reverse as well as a forward motion, and 
a dynamic presence that does not seem to presuppose a closed 
ontological substance. After all, this way is a "way," a form of 
29. Ibid., 20-33. For a critique of Irigaray's reading of the Symposium, see 
Andrea Nye, "The Hidden Host: Irigaray and Diotima at Plato's Symposium," 
Hypatia 33:3 (Winter, 1989) 45-61. 
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relation, not a UthingH to be grasped and possessed. In fact, this way 
of love is precisely the way of philosophy, the way to wisdom and to 
apprehension of what is good and beautiful. It is also a uneutralH and 
thus UutopicH way between two opposing poles. Whether it works as a 
neutral ground from which to produce a closed and static utopian vision, 
or an open and dynamic one, seems to depend on who does the mapping. 
Irigaray calls particular attention to the exchange between 
Socrates and Diotima around the question of whether Eros is a ugreat 
God. H The exchange provides an example of Diotima's method, and 
illustrates Socrates' will to tie things up in a closed, binary context 
of judgment. Moreover, the question of the identity of the God who 
underwrites the way of love remains relevant throughout Irigaray's 
Ethics, and she returns to the question more than once. She reminds her 
listeners and readers of Heidegger's insistence that uonly a god can 
save us nowH as she suggests that a usensible transcendental H will come 
into being as a mediation UbetweenH the two poles of an internally-
differentiated UweH whose relation would bring this dynamic bridge into 
being. 3o Later, as she begins to address the uLove of the OtherH 
explicitly, she places the task of the love of the other into the 
religious frame of a divine appearance in the flesh: 
Does parousia correspond to the expectation of a future not 
only as a utopia or a destiny but also as a here and now, the 
willed construction of a bridge in the present between the 
past and the future? . Would crossing through the neuter 
- the space-time of remission of the polemic? - set up the 
return or reappearance of God or of the other? Why 
should this theology or theologality of hope remain a utopia? 
Not an inscription in the flesh. An atopia. 31 
30. That is, in implicit opposition to Heidegger, the bridge does not 
construct the two sides of the mediated relation. Irigaray suggests, rather, 
that the sides, however many, in and by their relation bring about the bridge. 
Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 128-129. 
31. Ibid., 147. 
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That is, it seems that the only dream of presence that has been 
permitted to western thought has been one that presupposes the absence 
of a place for its taking place, a presupposition implicit in the "ou" 
or emphatic "not" of u-topia. Why might this place not possibly take 
place in the here and now, in the place already occupied by the 
material of flesh and blood? Maybe the NO-place of utopia is just the 
so-far non-place of something that is possible but that humanity has so 
far been without: a-topia, without place, a deprivation or denial of 
place. 32 
In this passage she invokes once again Diotima's dialectical bridge, 
already established as a bridge named "eros," which mediates time (here 
and now, beyond) as well as dialectical polarities. Now the bridge is 
set between a present and a utopian beyond, and the approach to the 
utopian beyond is linked both to the image of religious transcendence 
and that of the transcendence of the other in the flesh. The problem 
with this possibility is that the conditions for its philosophical 
reception are not yet prepared, as she indicates in her readings of 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. The western anticipation of a divine 
parousia continues to be developed in a willful refusal of recognition 
to the bridge of the flesh. One consequence is that the understanding 
of God so developed is separated from the sense of bliss in touch, and 
"will always be thought of as a god who touches in suffering but not in 
joy or bliss.,,33 This suffering is the very suffering the utopia 
suggested in Ethics would challenge. 
Throughout this text, Irigaray is drawing out the implications of a 
"way" that remains dynamically accessible both backwards and forwards, 
32. In the sense that a-phasia is a loss of speech, in a context of the 
possibility of speech, or an-hydrous refers to something that makes do without 
water on a watery planet. 
33. Ibid., 162. Irigaray's statement is made in the context of her reading 
of Merleau-Ponty. Elsewhere she challenges its generality. 
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from "here" to "beyond," perhaps a "beyond" that moves in more than one 
temporal direction, and uses the device of a "God" or god, who is a 
counterpart of an other as subject, to designate the "beyond" of this 
way. Involved throughout, most clear in her discussion of Merleau-Ponty, 
is the "invisibility" or "blind spot" constituted by the maternal, 
incarnate matrix in its relationship to philosophy, and in particular 
the disappearance of the mother's daughters. 
Her discussion of color in her extended response to Merleau-Ponty 
calls to mind Adorno's use of the metaphor of color, a color that 
emanates from non-being, which it is the task of philosophy to mediate. 
Adorno's metaphor is closer to Irigaray's understanding of the dynamics 
of color, which for her emanates from a source that has persistently 
been suppressed in the history of western philosophy, but, ineffably, 
remains available to in-corporation in philosophy, generally 
unconsciously and in the manner of exclusion, and that needs to be made 
conscious. This making conscious would constitute a way towards freedom 
and represent utopic practice. 
In short, An Ethics of Sexual Difference develops a complex, 
immanent set of suggestions about utopia, utopic practice, and the 
relationship of philosophy to that practice. It promotes that practice, 
less as a foolhardy "utopia" than as a possible becoming with 
trans formative potential, particularly in a dire technological context. 
It lays out Irigaray's specific understanding of dialectical 
relationship, which continues to appear in her later work, and 
indicates some of the significance she assigns to this utopic dialectic 
with respect to space-time. It introduces the significance she assigns 
to the notions of "way" and "philosophy." In particular, it indicates 
the origin of the "way of love" she describes Diotima as advocating, 
and Socrates limiting in a way that imposes premature closure, on which 
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she will reflect at length in her text The Way of Love. It elucidates 
her concept of the "sensible transcendental" that underlies her 
treatment of the "beyond" to be cultivated between sexually different 
subjects. It introduces her term "flesh," which differs micrologically 
from "the body," and· which functions as the subsistence of a network of 
non-fungible intersubjective relations with ethical implications. 34 
The relations Irigaray depicts as utopian she also depicts as 
pleasurable, although the precise nature of the pleasure associated 
with these relations is not examined. The concluding discussion of 
pleasure counterbalances remarks by Socrates about happiness, and its 
source, in the discussion of the Symposium. However, in I love to you, 
Irigaray reiterates the utopian impulse to happiness in a distinctly 
concrete treatment. 
Happiness must be built by us here and now on earth, where we 
live, a happiness comprising a carnal, sensible and spiritual 
dimension in the love between women and men, woman and man, 
which cannot be subordinated to reproduction, to the 
acquisition or accumulation of property, to a hypothetical 
human or divine authority. The realization of happiness in us 
and between us is our primary cultural obligation. 35 
Love's Negative Dialectical Labor 
In I Love to You, Irigaray goes on record against the utopian 
designation, insisting that she is " a political militant for the 
impossible, which is not to say a utopian. Rather, I want what is yet 
to be as the only possibility of a future. "36 Rather than a "utopian" 
program and practice, a program oriented towards an unreachable ideal 
in relation to which its actual objectives always represent a falling-
short, Irigaray writes in favor of a political practice that aims at 
objectives now considered impossible as the only practical political 
34. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 217. 
35. Luce Irigaray, I love to you, translated by Alison Martin (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 15. 
36. Ibid., 10. 
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program. The subtitle of the work, "Sketch for a Felicity in History," 
underscores her treatment of the "happiness" at which she aims as a 
material, historical objective. Treating I Love to You as a text that 
constructs a representation of utopia remains permissible as long as it 
is permissible to treat "happiness," and its determinate possibility, 
as a focus for utopian discourse. 
With some confidence that it is, Irigaray's description of the 
shape of the felicity in history towards which her thought moves 
outlines what this argument would categorize as a utopia grounded in a 
specific form of communication or "communion" that would involve: 
. a new economy of existence or being which is neither 
that of mastery nor that of slavery but rather of exchange 
with no preconstituted object - vital exchange, cultural 
exchange, of words, gestures, etc., an exchange thus able to 
communicate at times, to commune . . . beyond any exchange of 
objects. What we would be dealing with, then, is the 
establishment of another era of civilization, or of culture, 
in which the exchange of objects, and most particularly of 
women, would no longer form the basis for the constitution of 
a cultural order. 37 
This description is explicitly and directly a commentary on Levi-
Strauss's analysis of culture as the exchange of women, and also 
constitutes a repudiation of the culture built around the exchange of 
commodities criticized by Marx in his long philosophical and political 
critique of Hegel and of the philosophers' reserved efforts to 
understand rather than change the world. The main text, set between a 
prologue and epilogue that combine personal and conceptual resources 
for its reading, sets out from a comment on Marx's avoidance of the 
original problem of man's exploitation of woman and the sexed division 
of labor. This avoidance, the origin of which she in turn locates in 
Hegel's philosophy, and its treatment of love as labor, she identifies 
as her focus. I Love t,o You then becomes a terse, condensed critique of 
37. Ibid., 45. 
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Hegel's dialectical account of the development of civil society and its 
fruit in spiritual self-awareness, and the development of an 
alternative "double" dialectical program that accomplishes a 
correspondingly more adequate, and more consistently negative, approach 
to the cultivation of the passage from nature to culture. 
I Love to You here shares a limited structural similarity with 
Adorno's far longer Negative Dialectics. Irigaray's text echoes 
Adorno's initial invocation of Marx, and his inaugural announcement of 
the objective of the work as a return to philosophical investigation in 
the wake of an inadequate working-out of the historical materialist 
demand. Irigaray's extended engagement with Hegel and the development 
of a dialectical project that will hinge on something she terms "the 
labor of the negative" emerges as another similarity. This labor of the 
negative elaborates the "way of love" she discerned in Diotima's 
discourse from the Symposium, the dialectical exchange that proceeds by 
way of an ongoing relation-in-distinction of dialectically engaged 
positions. Here, the "negative" stems from the determinate negation of 
a presumptive human totality constructed around man's subjectivity that 
is provided by woman's subjectivity, and vice versa. 
For Irigaray, this always already available negative resides in 
sexual difference. The implications of sexual difference for Hegel's 
dialectic entail an opening up of Hegelian totalities that serve as the 
identities on which Hegel's dialectical moves pivot. Hegel's version of 
natural immediacy is an illusion; the assumption of a sexed subject 
implies an always partial and incomplete, rather than full 
identification with nature. The negation of that false identity is "not 
a real negative, even if it is mortification" and the thinking that 
proceeds from it is a dreamy pseudo-thinking that "has had to unfold 
over centuries in a sort of somnambulism" without even becoming real 
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thinking yet. On the other hand, the self-limiting potential of an 
internally differentiated nature would permit man [sic] "to postulate 
the infinite without an anti-natural labor of the negative," not having 
to deny an already-constituted "whole" to make possible some form of 
becoming. 38 
At every point of her argument, she deploys the self-limiting, 
participative nature of sexual difference to deconstruct Hegelian 
totalities, and to challenge the violence and domination implicit in 
Hegelian negations. The mutually limiting poles of sexual difference 
are not opposites; they are differences. They do not synthesize in a 
mutual negation that might be called "neuter," like the allegedly 
neuter citizen of the sovereign state, which turns out to be Man, the 
Same, writ large. Rather, the recognition that founds a collective that 
can be designated "we" in a precise way, that incorporates a relation 
of communication between different subjects, "is constituted by 
subjects irreducible one to the other, each one to the others, and thus 
capable of communicating out of freedom and necessity. Speech 
between replaces instinctual attraction or the attraction of 
simili tude. ,,39 
I Love to You makes this communicative "we," at least symbolic of 
the place from which the felicity possible in history can be 
constructed, if not concretely constitutive of it. Significantly, "we" 
has the linguistic form of a universal, but in enunciation always 
refers to a particular constellation of subjects in being. 4o The 
structure of the we-relation incorporates the "double dialectic" of a 
38. Ibid., 40-41. 
39. Ibid., 104. 
40. This form, that of the "shifter," is common to all the personal pronouns. 
For a relevant discussion of how personal pronouns mediate universal concepts 
and concrete subjects of enunciation, see Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, 
trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991) 19-26. 
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relation of sexual difference across and through a bi-directional 
trajectory of cultural mediation. For Irigaray, the space figured by 
the relationship of indirection re-forms and makes appropriable a 
recognition between different sUbjectivities that was always already 
available, but not actualized. The "we" becomes a place where sexed 
differences in the use of language, which have been a focus of 
1rigaray's research, become the media of a different form of 
communication, an exchange of words that departs from the pattern of an 
exchange of objects, and begins to take on the contours of an exchange 
of subjectivities. Drawing on both Hindu and Christian religious 
symbolism, she presents a compressed description of tantric practice, 
and a "non-patriarchal interpretation of the Annunciation," as symbols 
for such exchanges and their capacity for the cultivation of 
transcendence within history and culture. 41 
"This we still has no place." 42 The construction of a place for 
this we of a felicitous exchange that does not involve the exchange of 
objects entails a political as well as a linguistic and philosophical 
program. Linguistically, the task may be sustained by developing a 
relationship of "indirection," space, between the terms of the 
dialectic: "I love to you," a syntax of indirect objectivation that 
supports inter-subjectivity, rather than "I love you," a syntax of an 
objectification that has historically spelled the denial of the other's 
subj ecti vi ty. 43 Here the term "obj ecti vation" struggles to communicate 
discourse in which an object position does not automatically coincide 
with a loss of ,subjectivity, unlike the "objectification" with which 
everyone is all too familiar. 
41. Ibid., 138-141. 
42. Ibid., 48. 
43. Irigaray, Ibid., 109-113. 
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Politically, Irigaray's concrete recommendations strike many of her 
readers as distinctly dystopian, as she advocates granting "women and 
men rights corresponding to the reality of their respective needs."44 
This program produces dismay even among those who are favorably 
disposed to reading Irigaray's obsessive emphasis on sexual difference 
as capable of reconciliation with the concrete political and social 
needs of subjects whose articulation of difference belies the adequacy 
of the man-woman relation. 45 It illustrates the potential slippage 
between her uses of sexual difference. Sexual difference in Irigaray's 
work can be a symbol that figures a site for human intersubjectivity 
and transcendence, a site with the potential to challenge established 
exclusions and foreclosures. Sexual difference may also be used as an 
available framework for a practical political program, which mayor may 
not challenge such exclusions and foreclosures. The question is whether 
a utopia imagined under the influence of Irigaray's discourse makes use 
of, or demands, a particular kind of dwelling in sexual difference, and 
whether this habitation of sexual difference permits, or actively 
demands, participation in prescribed forms of heterosexual 
intersubjective exchange. That question is not resolved, but raised yet 
again, in Irigaray's later texts, On the Way to Love and Sharing the 
World. 
Sharing an Intersubjective World by Way of Love 
In the remarks that conclude the text of I love to you, Irigaray 
develops an image of history as something that could be articulated 
"between two," in a process that preserves a vital, creative space of 
non-identical relation. This space would be secured by the mutual 
44. Ibid., 132. 
45. See in particular Cheah, Grosz, Butler, and Cornell, ibid.; Penelope 
Deutscher, Mary Beth Mader and Alison Stone, Critical Exchange, differences: a 
journal of feminist cultural studies 19:3 (Fall, 2008) 126-157. 
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recognition of an irreducible difference between the participating 
subjectivities. The history built in this way would be a felicitous one, 
which in other contexts might be labeled "utopian": 
We can construct a History on the basis of an interiority 
without power. We need to be two for this task, a man and a 
woman. Two indefinitely, weaving relations between nature and 
culture, the universe and society.46 
What follows this affirmation is a lyric, or hypnotic, paragraph on 
"Air, that which brings us together and separates us" and "which gives 
us forms from within and from without." 47 These could ideally be 
aesthetic forms that are simultaneously forms of address and auto-
poietic works of art. 
The notion that an intersubjective context in which trans formative 
intersubjective relations modeled on amorous exchange require "a man 
and a woman" cannot possibly strike all of Irigaray's readers as 
"utopian." That problem calls for further consideration, though not yet 
here. Here her reference to "an interiority without power" requires 
attention. In describing the site of a cultivation of this envisioned 
interiority without power, Irigaray constructs what can be read as a 
utopian condition. In her account, this cultivation takes place in the 
operation of a dynamic, dialectical and discursive intersubjective 
relation. This construction process receives its most explicit 
development in the recent texts The Way of Love (La Voie d'amour, ,2002) 
and Sharing the World (2008). These texts constitute repetitions or 
iterations, with variations and extensions, of Irigaray's appreciative, 
appropriative, and passionately critical response to Heidegger, 
especially the Heidegger of On the Way to Language. 48 They elaborate a 
46. Irigaray, I love to you, 148. 
47. Ibid., 149. 
48. Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971). This text includes essays initially 
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common and clearly utopian scene which takes shape as an explicit and 
critical alternative to its dystopian counterpart. 
The texts' formal structure is remarkably similar. Both are 
arranged dynamically along stages of a journey from a subject position 
through an encounter with a differing subjectivity and towards 
reconstitution of an exterior and interior world affected by that 
encounter. Differences in sequence and timing highlight differences in 
emphasis between the two texts, as well as a progression of thematic 
treatment. The treatment of sexual difference, in particular, undergoes 
some modulation between the earlier and later texts. So, in The Way of 
Love, the movement from self to other is compressed, and readers' last 
image of the differentiated subjects is of their suspension in a space 
between two, poised to reconstitute the world; in Sharing the World, 
the journey expands, with more text-time devoted to its initial stages, 
and to the consequences of the return trip. 
Both texts elaborate the dynamic, potentially utopic, scenography 
that could underwrite the cultivation of an interiority without power. 
This scene begins with a differentiated - in the first place, sexually 
or sexuately differentiated - human subjectivity; moves into encounter 
with and relation to a sensibly transcendent other; then returns to 
self and the possible creation or co-creation of a world that sustains 
its differentiated separateness in relation. Irigaray calls attention 
to the utopian possibilities and the dystopian threats related to this 
unfolding scene. The author's role becomes something like that of a 
guide on a tour of the imaginary. Both texts locate the clearing of 
this place of utopian possibility in a transformed relation to language. 
The transformation is made possible by a recognition of irreducible 
collected in Heidegger's Unterwegs zur Sprache. See in particular The Way of 
Love, note, xxi-xxii. 
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subjective difference, a difference that escapes such traditional forms 
for understanding as binary opposition or Collapse into 
undifferentiated neutrality.49 
What can be discerned through these texts is an adamant opposition 
to the closed systemic understanding of language that Heideggerian 
philosophy and Lacanian psychology collaborate in designing. This 
"airless" world crammed with language that leaves no space for 
difference or differing with respect to the matter of language is a 
function of the philosopher's presuppositions. 50 As Irigaray notes" [tj 0 
claim that nothing would be there where the word is lacking means to 
deny the existence of the other and of that which remains unspeakable 
where two worlds join together. ,,51 When the philosophy that understands 
the world people encounter as a function of the language people use to 
encounter it joins forces with a psychology that forecloses any 
possible articulation of the interiority and specific desire of woman, 
the two engineer a house of language that is less a prison-house than 
an abattoir for woman-as-subject. 52 Challenging this particular 
totalitarian possibility is at the heart of the way not yet taken to 
language being scouted by Irigaray in these texts. 
The alternative way emanates from the possibility of a language 
which "favors the act of speech in the present, and not a language 
already existing and codified."~ Such language is explicitly not 
language as the lifeless corpus of a simply pre-existing system of 
fixed meanings. It is instead language as a living - therefore 
49. For instance, understandings that reduce woman to "other-of-the-same," 
or to an accident of an essentially single humanity. 
50. For instance, the view adopted from Aristotle that language points to a 
universal human relationship with matter or matters. See Martin Heidegger, "The 
Way to Language," in Basic Writings, 40l. 
51. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 5. The "claim" is Heidegger's in On the Way 
to Language. 
52. Abattoir, standard French for slaughterhouse, is also slang for a house 
of prostitution. 
53. Way of Love., ix. 
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transformable as well as trans formative - matter. A way of language 
like this can be explored beginning with a situation in which "[e]ach 
sUbjectivity . . has before it a source of words foreign to that in 
which it dwells.,,54 This confrontation of a subjectivity, in a context 
of sexual difference, is probably most easily read as an evocation of 
amorous exchange. At times, however, it also evokes the confrontation 
and communicative task of mother and child, which in Irigaray's 
presentation is ineluctably either a mother-daughter or mother-son 
relation, in infancy. 55 This "foreign source" would properly prompt a 
recognition of a possibility of a different relation to language and 
meaning than that perhaps presupposed by the subject. Cultivating the 
possibility inherent in this situation requires "entering into a new 
epoch or language . . in which saying is no longer constituted in an 
ecstatic - ek-static - manner with respect to the real and its 
becoming. ,,56 
Instead, in this new relation to language, in which "no word is yet 
available, no 'object' constituted" and yet in which "there is not 
nothing," the subject may be "on the way to regions of the encounter 
with oneself, and with the other" that beckon beyond "the obstruction 
produced by speech itself and its silences not yet attentive to such 
dimensions. ,,57 Here, the utopian "not yet" of the new epoch or era of 
language is a double one: the new language is "not yet" language, it 
54. Sharing the World, 6. 
55. For instance, Irigaray explicitly calls out the sexually-differentiated 
structure of the mother-child situation at the outset of Sharing the World. "To 
cultivate the relations with the one who brought you into the world does not 
involve the same elements for those who are the same as her or different from 
her - that is, for a female or a male subject." Lacan's solution of interposing 
the "paternal law" between the ill-theorized early infantile relations "evades 
the problem by repressing it." See Sharing the World, 3. Giorgio Agamben 
reminds readers that the meaning of "infancy" is literally to be without speech 
- though precisely not without the capacity to experience language. Giorgio 
Agamben, Infancy and History: An Essay on the Destruction of Experience, trans. 
Liz Heron (London: Verso, 2007) 54. 
56. Ibid., 16. 
57. Way of Love, 44. 
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does not exist as a pre-scriptive system of names and corresponding 
objects, and the old language is "not yet" undone as language, though 
it could yet be. An attentiveness to its silences and spaces amounts to 
an attentiveness to already-existing possibilities latent in what is 
unsaid if not always unable to be said in its particular vocabulary, 
grammar and syntax. 
Heidegger's treatment of language as a "house" or "dwelling" for 
being fails as a treatment of the language Irigaray imagines here. This 
language, which might support the co-construction of a world that does 
not yet exist - a more nearly utopian world - offers very little 
shelter. The subject "finds himself in every instant unsheltered by the 
crossroads where the other waits for him, and by a springing forth of 
meaning unknown to him. "58 The linguistic demands of using language to 
"succeed in transforming what happens, from within or without, into 
saying" are rigorous. 59 However, failing at this task destroys the 
possibility of the intersubjective relation. Succeeding requires 
relinquishing language as a fixed abode, and embracing the continuous 
re-invention of language, and the preservation of space, silence, 
"air," through which an intersubjective "proximity" can be cultivated 
that does not regress to a denial of difference. 6o 
Irigaray's imagination likewise challenges Benjamin's depiction -
and by extension, Adorno's - of a language of pure names as utopically 
paradisiacal. In Benjamin's treatment, a language of names rather than 
signs represents a language not yet alienated from, because still one 
with, the substance it means. This dream of Adamic language as the 
language of the utopia that achieves "substance in cognition," Irigaray 
renders as a nightmare. For Irigaray, "[d]enomination results from a 
58. Way of Love, 58. 
59. Ibid., 64. 
60. Ibid., 67. 
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mastery, even if it lets the thing or the other be thanks to the name 
gi ven to them. ,,61 Denominative language still brings the other into 
"one's own" world, bypassing the effort to build a shared world, that 
constitutes a place of meeting between different worlds. The evidently 
utopian possibility for Irigaray is not a reversion to a language of 
names in perfect communion with their concepts that would correspond to 
the "reconciliation" envisioned by Adorno. Instead, Irigaray advances 
the dream of a new, not-yet-invented language that lies somewhere 
between "a concerted denomination" - a language of names - and "word-
cries manifesting a simple affect," - a purely animal communication of 
feeling - that would constitute "indirect ways of advancing" into 
mutually intelligible relationship.62 This still imaginary language of 
inter-subjective exchange preserves, according to Irigaray, the 
intrinsic mobility or temporality of things.63 
Silence and listening are indispensable to the creation of this new 
linguistic mediation of intersubjectivity. Silence constitutes a 
gesture of welcome, a willingness to make a place for a meaning that 
cannot be shared, because it belongs to someone else. This welcoming 
silence resonates with the utopian "not yet," in that it "requires an 
availability for that which has not yet occurred. ,,64 In elaborating this 
silent welcoming, Irigaray contrasts the gesture of welcome that is 
silence with a more traditional form of hospitality, the room reserved 
for some one who might yet arrive and need shelter. This form of 
welcome, presumably better than no welcome at all, nevertheless fails 
to respond to the particularity of the other whose "call" provokes the 
subjective response. It is too generic. Moreover, as a pre-arranged 
6l. Ibid. , 48. 
62. Ibid. , 58. 
63. Ibid. , 62. 
64. Sharing: the World. , 18. 
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empty space, it leaves the welcomer's world unaffected. The potentially 
transformative call of the particular other calls for a kind of silence 
that involves silencing - making silent - already existing meanings. A 
"guest room" made available in a generic way does not answer the 
requirement; the response to the call of the particular other with whom 
new language will need to be made requires clearing out an already-
filled space. That is, it requires discarding or setting aside already 
existing meanings, concepts, understandings. e 
The need for silence does not end with welcome. It continues 
throughout encounter, facilitating a dynamic process of withdrawal, 
approach, renewed encounter, recognition or memory and change on the 
part of the participants and within their relation, and re-constitution 
of the participating subjectivities. The key to this dynamic is "the 
silence of a not-yet-come-to-pass" which underwrites are-imagination 
of the classically utopian picture of the reconciliation of nature and 
culture. 66 
Irigaray retains the analytic polarity of nature and culture, while 
seeking to re-map its relationship to sexually differentiated 
subjectivities. The differing subjectivities of man and woman each have 
their specific relationships with nature, as well as with culture. An 
archetypal example of this sexually differentiated relationship is the 
relationship to the maternal body, which differs for woman and for man, 
as between a relationship to "being like me" and "being different from 
me." The silence of the not-yet-come-to-pass holds open and un-pre-
scripted "the place always to be re-articulated between nature and 
culture, between letting be and constructing" and "necessitates 
65. Ibid., 19-24. 
66. Way of Love, 126. 
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implementing a temporality until now unknown.,,67 This novel temporality 
mediates a dialectical becoming of an inter-subjective relation between 
two differently dialectical intra-subjectively becoming subjects. 
Irigaray's view of welcome and encounter comes with ontological 
implications, already elaborated in The Way of Love. The new era of 
linguistic and relational spaciousness constructs a place for fertile 
relationships across difference. The "groundless ground" woven by this 
relation challenges the sufficiency of the ground composed simply of 
all of being, apart from the differentiated relations of beings. 
Irigaray's critique of the more familiar formulation notes first that 
it willfully denies the experientially primordial intersubjective 
relation with the mother. She speculates that this denial masks an even 
more fundamental denial, the denial of other subjective worlds that 
challenge the wholeness of the subject's own. 68 In every case, what 
makes way and space for a potentially utopian relation is the 
acknowledgement of particularity - not being "all" - that is a possible, 
and ethical, response to a different subjectivity. 
In fact, Irigaray locates the danger of essentialism, so often 
attributed to her recurrent stress on sexual difference, in the 
avoidance of that difference and its possible implications. 
I discovered that, in fact, we cannot be - "etre" (Being) 
without falling back into a simple substance, outside of a 
being in relation with an other of sexual difference. In such 
a relation, which undoes any fixed essence, or substance, we 
can have access to our own human Being. I could say: to an 
existence which would not be a simple passivity, notably with 
regard to the construction of space, time, and the relation 
with the other(s). Such a human 'Being' is always in becoming 
even if it exists, or ought to exist, in every instant. 69 
As always for Irigaray, the initial condition of possibility for a 
more desirable alternative - i.e., the initial condition of utopian 
67. Ibid. 
68. Way of Love, 72-77. 
69. Ibid., xiii. 
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possibility - is irreducible difference, "beginning with the other of 
sexuate difference. ,,70 The irreducibly different subject sets a bound to 
"my" world, provides an external source of transcendence, and demands a 
corresponding interior transcendence from me. As she depicts the 
potential rewards of cultivating the intersubjective relation of 
irreducible difference, she reaches for lyric prose. This relation 
engenders a soul that is more than empty space, that comes into being 
in and through relation with an original matrix. It permits the 
celebration of "the feast of love . . gathering together the mortal 
and the divine, the earthly and the celestial in an encounter where 
giving and receiving are exchanged in the elation of the present.,,71 It 
"is also a way to escape the nihilism threatening our tradition as well 
as its critique" by "being faithful to a different truth from the one, 
dependent on a supra-sensible absolute, that has both exiled us from 
ourselves and separated us from one another.,,72 Irigaray uses archetypal 
imaginary relations, mother-child, lover-beloved, pious contemplative-
God to locate the utopian opening in its usual place, but hanging by a 
different thread. The mother-child relationship no longer represents an 
idyll of reconciliation with nature, but the original intersubjective 
studio; the creative impetus in that relationship proceeds from 
irreducible difference. The lover-beloved relationship does not begin 
and end in ecstatic communion, but requires the safeguarding of baroque 
thresholds and separate rooms or worlds. The pious contemplative may 
need to be taught to sense the transcendent in the earthen vessels that 
his neighbors, maybe even "the women at prayer," offer in their 
70. Sharing the World, 135. 
71. Ibid., 13l. 
72. Sharing the World, 135. 
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irreducible difference from him, less superficial and identical than he 
has yet divined. 73 
The utopian moment this discourse summons does not, however, arise 
exclusively in the elaboration of a transformed intersubjectivity. It 
has at least as much to do with the transformation of the intra-
subjective construction process, the engendering of new possibilities 
for interiority. Hence arises the importance of the "return to self" 
and the processes of "self-affection" along this way.74 Hence, also, 
arises the importance of an other who facilitates such a return, who 
challenges and cultivates the different, rather than an other who 
prohibits the return, or who simply reflects the subject statically. An 
indispensable interiority is constructed discursively and dialectically, 
from the groundless ground of the intersubjective relationship, albeit 
not without the participation of something already present, even if 
not-yet-called. The description of the intra-subjective consequences of 
the inter-subjective encounter elicits some of Irigaray's most 
intensely utopian prose. She describes here, literally, a process of 
inspiration: it depends on "air" or "breath" and activates something 
beyond sense already present in the bounded subject, but not yet active. 
In the aftermath of the encounter, this interior, or perhaps 
interiorized, different other stimulates a response of and by a 
dimension of the self which was "not yet," a latent dimension of the 
subject's own explicitly real potentiality.75 
The opportunity for an inspiration of this kind requires 
preparation, in particular the preparation of a "return," a way back to 
the self from the encounter with difference. Irigaray's emphasis on the 
73. Cf. Stefan George, "Entrtlckung." 
74. See in particular Irigaray's discussion of the moyen-passif as a 
linguistic form indicating intra-subjective, auto-affective process. Way of 
Love, xiv-xv. 
75. Sharing the World, 48-50. 
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threshold, something that requires building, preparation, that opens 
both ways, outward toward another, and inward toward the self, 
something that might connect to a path towards the other, that signals 
an opening to the other, but that also represents indispensable 
boundary conditions, preservation of the possibility of an interior 
place and a time for withdrawal from encounter, sterns from the 
requirements of subjectivity itself. Far from constituting an eternally 
given, a priori, essence, these irreducibly different sUbjectivities 
remain subject to becoming from their inception. Building the 
threshold precedes the development of full interiority, and makes it 
possible. For there to be a "between-two," with its possibilities, 
there also has to be a one and another, with theirs. 
Irigaray offers a model of relationship between two differing 
subjects who are themselves made, both self-made and other-made, 
differently, in the encounter. This relationship could, or would, in 
her view, constitute a "micro-culture" that "can become the leaven for 
a universal culture that keeps alive the energy of each one as well as 
that of the relation between the one and the other. "?6 The "leaven" of a 
new quality of interpersonal relationship generates its own ethical 
boundaries, organically, from the dual dialectical movement of the 
related parties' dual "return to oneself" and "opening to the other." 
In a dialectic not frozen in language or in pre-determined and 
immutable cultural forms, the restraints imposed by each one on 
"oneself" out of respect for the integrity of the other constitute 
"moving boundaries" for a "restrained flowering" of each.?? 
"Between the two is thus preserved a becoming that is still to be 
elaborated - for the one, for the other and for their relations. It is 
76. Sharing the World, 57. 
77. Ibid. 
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a sort of always virginal space safeguarded through the attention that 
each one accords to the other in their transcendent alterity."78 That is, 
the space "between-two" remains a perpetually open, as yet untouched, 
as yet unmet, space of and for possibility. Her subjects-becoming-in-
relation require proximity. The kind of proximity they require would be 
unthinkable in a closed or "total" relational or metaphysical context. 
Proximity in a closed context reduces every meeting subsequent to the 
first to a re-meeting. A second encounter would always take place on 
the same terrain, a terrain that is now being gone "over," or "over 
again." The temporal dimens~on becomes particularly important, then, as 
the incorporation of this temporal dimension, which remains open to a 
becoming that is not closed off but remains open-ended, permits 
encounters always to be on new "ground," or in new "space-time," 
Diotima's double dialectic, which can only in one sense be designated 
as a re-encounter, but must necessarily be at the same time a new or 
species of first encounter, the next encounter, and the next encounter 
being always, for Irigaray, in this analysis, a preservation of "always 
virginal space." 
The complex arrangement of thresholds, double dialectical inter-
and intra-subjective movements, newly articulated temporalities, airy 
shared worlds and spaces of withdrawal into self all issue, all along 
the way, in that most utopian of affects, happiness. Happiness in this 
context will explicitly be a transformation of "our essential disquiet 
and unhappiness" in the context of "the uncultivated, inhuman, unhappy, 
and 'fallen' . character of our intersubjective relations. "79 The 
desire for happiness in this context is dismissed "by most adults as an 
adolescent dream," perhaps because the cultivation of the imagination, 
78. Ibid., 6l. 
79. Sharing the World, 75. 
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and in particular the "transcendental" imagination, has not been 
adequately undertaken. 8o Irigaray's characterization of philosophy as 
the way of love is an explicit response to a specific constellation of 
suffering, perhaps worth quoting at length: 
Whoever knows the gathering together into the most intimate 
only through suffering, does not know the illuminating grace 
of love. This also, thanks to another light than that 
cultivated by our metaphysics, opens a place of resource and 
of meditative gathering. It implies, it is true, the ability 
to let be as much as to make. And the acceptance of a sharing 
between shadow and light. 81 
The construction of something that can be read as utopian in these 
texts rarely touches on the question of suffering. But the 
transformative processes proposed, in their deeply poietic and auto-
poietic effect, have the "transubstantiation" of the matter of 
suffering as their explicit aim. 82 
In that connection, Irigaray turns as does Adorno to the image of 
transcendental light. This "other light" that enters and enlightens, 
"notably through desire," does not simply emanate from the other whom a 
subject might identify as the object of desire. Seeking to merge, or 
merging, with that object in a quest for complete illumination would be 
futile. 83 The light seems to emanate less from a univocally-defined 
subjective or objective location as from the relation, and the 
attraction that arises from it. The embodiment of attraction in action 
causes the encounter to "brighten.,,84 The Way of Love concludes with a 
meditation on light that radiates imperceptibly within the encounter of 
different subjects, taking on the form of affects like peace or joy, or 
being formed into touch, which then has the ability to impress both 
80. Ibid. , 55. 
81. Way of Love, 173. 
82. Ibid. 
83. Sharing: the World, 129-130. 
84. Ibid. , 52. 
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self and other. 8s Philosophy becomes less the prism in which the color 
of this light is caught, as the way along which its force is felt. 
Features of Irigaray's Utopian Scene 
Several features of Irigaray's evocative construction of a utopian 
scene link her work with that of Adorno and Agamben. First, the 
possibility of the utopian lies in a shift in basic theory, to be 
explored and promoted through her writings. What is utopian in 
Irigaray's work is ultimately a conceptual matter. Second, this 
conceptual matter demands a specific textual practice that makes her 
work extraordinarily difficult to receive, even for those women or men 
or other readers who might otherwise be most inclined to value it, if 
not especially for those. Third, her utopian construction involves a 
rethinking of the subject-object relationship. Specifically, Irigaray's 
utopian emanates from her re-specification of the subject-object 
relationship as a sUbject-subject relationship. Fourth, this 
alternative intersubjective paradigm calls forth a special treatment of 
language, which forms another element of Irigaray's utopian scene. 
Finally, this utopian scene requires an imaginative modification of the 
customary organization of time and space. 
Theory as Praxis 
Like Adorno, Irigaray presents her work of re-conceptualization of 
sexual difference, and its connections with basic philosophical 
questions, as directly practical. Her work constitutes philosophy 
undertaken as praxis, as practical activity. The active and 
interventionist quality of her work responds to what she has identified 
as the conceptual foundation of women's political disadvantage. The 
fundamental conceptual and symbolic contours of western thought and 
language, which she analyzes in detail in Speculum, produce the 
85. Way of Love, 174. 
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exclusion of woman from western thought and language. The "aporia of 
discourse as to the female sex" imposes the requirement of passing 
"through the master discourse: the one that prescribes, in the last 
analysis, the organization of language," which is philosophy, on the 
way to a possible solution. s6 The aim of Speculum, in Irigaray's words, 
"is to construct an objectivity that facilitates a dialectic proper to 
the female subject," which is "both a philosophical and a political 
task."S7 
The central philosophical and practical problem for Irigaray, 
beginning with Speculum, has been the exclusion of the very idea of the 
possibility of the objectivity of woman-as-subject by and from this 
dominant discourse, and all of the cultural products derived from it. 
Practical political approaches that address the consequences of this 
exclusion for women - violence against women, for instance, or inequity 
in the workplace - run up against this exclusion from language and 
intelligibility, and are forced to re-enact the possible subject 
positions that continue to exclude "woman" from subjectivity. The 
central problem of the exclusion of woman's subjectivity can only be 
solved conceptually. The quest for a solution must proceed by means of 
a demonstration rather than a direct statement of the problem. It 
entails efforts to invent new symbols, ones that can appear in the 
existing symbolic, whose content is sufficiently unspecified, ambiguous, 
and non-phallic to support the development of alternative 
significations. 
Sexual difference constitutes a utopic horizon. But approaching 
that horizon, making it "work," is a matter of learning a new way of 
86. Luce Irigaray, This Sex, 149. 
87. Irigaray, I Love to You, 62. 
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thinking. "A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of 
sexual difference is to take place."88 
One index of the difficulties associated with this fundamental 
reconceptualization is the storm of controversy that surrounded the 
publication of Speculum, and the debates around Irigaray's 
"essentialism. "89 Her project has met with a troubled reception 
precisely among readers who might otherwise be favorably inclined to 
accept the premise that the dominant phallogocentric or "homm(o)sexual" 
discourse of western philosophy since Plato systematically and 
systemically practices a compulsory exclusion of woman-as-subject, and 
exports that exclusion to such influential auxiliary discourses as 
science and psychoanalysis. The trouble stems from the perception that 
her language of "woman" reinscribes a pre-discursive, essential and 
prescriptive nature in the female body, read in a traditional and 
uncritically morphological way. That is, when Irigaray says something 
like "The wedding between man and woman realizes the reign of spirit. 
Without it, there is no spirit," she sounds like she might be able to 
make common cause with the crusaders against gay marriage. 90 This 
seeming reinscription sounds suspiciously like an opportunity to 
reinforce the ideological assignment of a long list of "feminine" 
predicates to that essentially feminine nature. Irigaray's adamant 
insistence in Speculum that the construction of femininity to date has 
proceeded under the blueprint of an exclusively masculine SUbjectivity 
that has usurped the status of "human subjectivity" remains easy to 
forget in the face of this language. Irigaray's language of the 
relationship of "woman and man, man and woman" sounds suspiciously like 
88. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 6. 
89. For a thorough review of this literature, see Whitford, Philosophy in 
the Feminine; Chanter, Ethics of Eros. 
90. Irigaray, I Love to You, 147. 
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an acceptance of compulsory heterosexuality or at least 
heteronormativity. How queer sexualities and desire are supposed to 
articulate with Irigaray's project and language is not immediately 
obvious; to the extent that Irigaray locates hope for change in the 
irreducible difference between woman and man, she seems to deny the 
liberating potential of queer relationships. As a consequence, 
Irigaray's efforts to redesign an "objectivity" that facilitates 
woman's specific subjectivity seem to misfire at their most critical 
point of potential reception. 
Mimesis, Poiesis, Hypnosis 
The alleged confusion over Irigaray's actual purposes and meanings 
is exacerbated by the specific textual practices her project and method 
of rereading and reconceptualizing demand in the context of complete 
exclusion of woman-as-subject. Irigaray's texts are notoriously 
difficult to read. Their difficulties differ from those presented by 
Adorno on one hand and Agamben on the other, although they arise for 
similar reasons. In effect, Irigaray's texts are always already written 
in a foreign language, a language that has not yet been invented. Their 
purpose, which is integral to her central project, is to compose 
objective conditions for the development of a woman's subjectivity that 
has not yet been cultivated. Their task is to make use of existing 
language, but to use it as from a different subjective point of origin, 
to create a different objective horizon of interpretation. The devices 
she has adopted to accomplish this nearly impossible task are 
constitutive of the actual construction of the utopian in and more 
importantly by her work. These devices include her much-discussed 
mimesis, efforts in the direction of a "new poetics," and what could be 
called the hypnotic element of this new poetics. 
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Irigaray's mimetic practice has generated comment in the 
Ii terature. 91 As Irigaray herself says, "The tool is not a feminine 
attribute. But woman may re-utilize its marks on her, in her.,,92 So, her 
texts mime the language and subject-position of the hysterical 
analysand in relation to psychoanalysis, or the language of the 
"philosopher's wife" or lover in relation to philosophy. Transformative 
discourse takes these "marks" and reverse engineers the blueprints 
according to which they were made, along with the models of reality 
that made them so seemingly well-designed, and simultaneously so 
damaging to actual women. Irigaray presents this particular form of 
mimesis as the only textual strategy available under the circumstances 
of the dominant discourse for someone with her project. 93 
Irigaray has called for "a new poetics" as well, which goes beyond 
the mimetic. 94 "Poetic language" may permit the cultivation of the 
specific "energy" proper to the coming into relation of sexually 
different subjects. 95 This "cultivation" is particularly desirable in 
Irigaray's presentation, since it would amount to the creation of an 
inclusively ethical human culture. The new poetic language Irigaray 
recommends, however, cannot simply reproduce the existing forms, 
associated with the phallogocentric symbolic order. In that order, 
metaphors, especially metaphors of the feminine, especially as analyzed 
according to a Lacanian account, inevitably work as displacements of 
the always already excluded, unrepresentable, and unintelligible 
"feminine subjectivity." Simply producing new images does not amount to 
the new poetics Irigaray speaks of here, even though new images may be 
91. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, 70-74; Grosz, Lacan: A Feminist 
Introduction. 
92. Irigaray, This Sex, 150. 
93. Ibid., 136-137, 150-151. 
94. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference,S. 
95. Irigaray, Way of Love, 136. 
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necessary as "placeholders."96 Instead, this new poetics involves a 
special role of silence that dismantles or disqualifies older poetic 
forms. 97 It involves fewer nouns and more verbs, more attuned to the 
linguistic function of "modulation," whether of affect, mood, or tense. 
It is less economical, no longer involving an exchange of objects, but 
more revealing, an exchange of different selves. 98 This new poetics then 
comes to be a genuine poiesis, creation from nothing, and a double 
auto-poiesis, a collaborative creation from a nothingness "which is not 
nothing" into and over the space of non-identity that lies between the 
two different subjectivities, the weaving of a "groundless ground. "99 
What this poetics works with is matter, and it highlights the 
materiality of language, pre-eminently poetic language: gestures, 
voices, touch. The creation it effects includes civil engineering or 
architecture as well as textile arts; it constructs "bridges," "paths," 
"approaches" as it effects the mediation of interiorities that remain 
inviolately in relation. 100 
Irigaray's descriptions of this language that has not yet come into 
being are indeed lyrical, but they are, for all that, descriptive. They 
indicate the character of the desirable new poetics she envisions and 
encourages. Whether they enact it is less obvious, since they remain 
constrained by existing textual and symbolic forms. On the other hand, 
Irigaray's constructions of utopian scenes, her description of the new 
poetics enacted within those utopian scenes, are certainly aimed at 
cultivating in her readers the desire to participate in such scenes. 
Some readers describe Irigaray's texts as "poetic," but "hypnotic" 
might be a more precise designation. 
96. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, 71. 
97. Irigaray, Way of Love, 44. 
98. Ibid., 58-62. 
99. Ibid., 174, 72. 
100. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 46-61, 128-130. 
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The purpose of the hypnotic is to relay suggestions from the 
desiring conscious to the unconscious. Hypnotic suggestion arranges 
available symbols and elements of an imaginary constellation in a way 
that bypasses the censorship mechanisms of the conscious, with its 
vigilant super-ego, and makes new scripts available to the unconscious 
with which to organize its wish-fulfilling aims. Hypnosis might be 
indicated in a therapeutic context in which, as Irigaray notes, the 
subject in question suffers from an obsessive-compulsive projection 
which is impervious to rational dissuasion " . . because this 
projection of a world comes before any representation, judgement [sic], 
indeed any conscious feeling, it cannot be questioned in a rational 
way. ,,101 A text that would have the potential to intervene in that 
subject's tautological system would need to find a way to operate 
simultaneously within and beyond that system. 
Irigaray's descriptions in The Way of Love of the oneiric bliss of 
a yet-to-be-created intersubjectivity, achieved by means of a language 
that does not encode pre-scribed meanings, qualifies as such a hypnotic 
device. That description barely operates on a conscious level. The 
language she describes here fails as "language," within the present 
linguistic system; it is non-language, signs without system or agreed-
upon signification. It addresses itself instead to the unconscious 
reception of uncoupled connotations of "language:" communication and 
communion, expression and impression, contact, wondering and 
understanding. It seeks to stimulate an imagination of, and the 
creative desire for, something for which the word language no longer 
quite fits. 
A final element of Irigaray's "new poetics," or hypnotics, is the 
multi-vocal status of her texts. Irigaray's texts are self-consciously 
101. Irigaray, Sharing the World, xii. 
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multi-vocal, in Bakhtin's terminology, heteroglossic. For Bakhtin, 
poetic language strips away the heteroglossia present in actual life 
and presents it in reconfigured aspects, creatively bringing about new 
syntheses of the existing heteroglossia, under a unitary poetic 
umbrella. That analysis, however, remains within the system of 
exclusively masculine sUbjectivity that is the object of Irigaray's 
cri tique and textual practice. 102 For Irigaray, the "poetic" function is 
to create the objective horizon for the development of feminine 
sUbjectivity as sUbjectivity. Her "new poetics" seeks to insert and 
make audible the heteroglossic feminine. 
These elements of Irigaray's texts work towards representing, not 
the utopian itself, but the conditions of possibility for the utopian. 
They concern themselves with describing the operation of these 
conditions as desirable in themselves, in contrast to the undesirably 
singular, exclusive context of a single, always masculine, subjectivity 
that prevails at present. For Irigaray, as for Adorno, an element of 
her discursive construction of the utopian possibility is a 
respecification of the relationship of the subject and object of 
knowledge. 
Woman-as-Subject as a Condition for Utopia 
"Irigaray is a kind of cultural prophet," says Margaret Whitford. 
As such, she diagnoses the exposure of western society to a coming 
conflagration based on its repression of woman-as-subject. Her 
discussion of three "epochs," including the concluding epoch of the 
"spirit and the bride," resonates with a theological sensibility.103 The 
subjectivity that would support such a "parousia" remains to be 
"cultivated." Announcing the cultivation of this subjectivity, which is 
102. Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination, 296-298. 




woman's subjectivity, is, for Whitford, Irigaray's prophetic task. The 
construction of a world that overcomes the specific forms of suffering 
brought into being by the exclusively masculine subjectivity that has 
dominated western thought and life since the Greeks depends on the 
creation of a renewed subjectivity for woman. Irigaray's readers 
encounter her call for this renewed SUbjectivity. 
Irigaray invokes a phenomenon that has not yet corne into being, the 
"not yet" constituting the operative term of utopian possibility. In I 
Love to You, she is insistent that there are as yet no models of 
"female identity" since woman's identity as subject has not been 
cultivated. The "universal" that would sustain a relation of "we," two 
distinct, non-identical particularities, has not yet corne into being. l04 
The "we" relation itself, which would perform the CUltivation of the 
appropriate subjectivities, rests on unanswered questions: "How to 
unite two temporalities, two subjects, in a lasting way?,,105 Ultimately, 
the questions that two differing subjectivities will address to one 
another amounts to "Who are you?" and "would remain latent between man 
and woman, irreducible as they are to one another. ,,106 But this form of 
intersubjective relation has not yet been cultivated. 
"We cannot go along with any of that anymore. ,,107 In other words, 
there are concrete practical possibilities for the cultivation of a 
changed relation of man and woman, a different engagement of language, 
a renunciation of "what has previously been called the love between man 
and woman" that includes everything so far thought of as natural along 
with everything so far thought of as cultural. lOB If these opportunities 
are taken, if the quality of listening Irigaray describes takes place, 
104. Irigaray, I Love to You, 44, 48. 
105. Ibid., 111. 
106. Ibid., 139. 
107. Ibid., 147. 
108. Ibid. 
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if occasions for the development of two distinct subjectivities are 
allowed to become productive of individual subjects as well as of 
fecund relationships between them, it would contribute to the 
construction of the "we" that would actually be in a position to 
develop a new form of political life. The different subjects, along 
with their relationship, and the collective subject to which they 
contribute, all appear in this discussion to be produced discursively 
and temporally. They are subjectivities brought into being by their own 
activity in interaction with the activity of other subjects-in-becoming. 
While these subjects would, under favorable conditions, come into 
being in some relationship to what is "inside" them, the - utopian -
goal would be for them to avoid reproducing the subjectivities that 
have always already come into being on the ground of woman's exclusion. 
Those subjectivities, as already noted, are distorted in the case of 
"man" and officially absent and unintelligible in the case of "woman."109 
Irigaray does not propose a political program to bring about a utopian 
situation. The political proposals she has made have been directed 
towards the creation of objective conditions that could facilitate the 
development of communicative exchanges between and among women, toward 
the objective of the development of a self-consciousness of woman's 
subjectivity. 110 
Since Irigaray's approach to the existence of "woman" was described 
by Margaret Whitford as "strategic essentialism," her procedures have 
been widely discussed under that rubric. As Maggie Berg has noted, 
however, "strategic essentialism" is a less helpful terminology than it 
109. The trace of Adorno's non-identical asserts itself here, since the 
emergence of a text like Speculum attests to the already-existing possibility 
of the development of a sUbjectivity that at least permits a recognition of the 
conditions of possibility for a not-yet-cultivated woman's SUbjectivity. 
llO. See however Drucilla Cornell's critique of "sexed civil rights." Cheah 
et al., ibid. 
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seems. III It can all too readily suggest that Irigaray primarily operates 
by assigning content to the term "woman" in accordance with some 
essential model of woman's nature, for the strategic purpose of having 
a way to talk about woman. While there is some truth to this 
description, Irigaray is more often involved in reminding her readers 
that woman's subjectivity is "not yet" accessible, "not yet" met, "not 
yet" cultivated as a passage from nature to culture, "not yet" 
something that has contributed to the development of a shared world. 
This makes perfect sense, in her framework, since the basic discursive 
conditions for the development of the discursive subject that could 
occupy the position of woman-as-subject have not yet been cultivated. 
Those discursive conditions would have to make a place for that 
cultivation. This means, in turn, that they would be are-designed 
architecture of the always already operative exclusively masculine 
phallogocentric symbolic order that is the problem Irigaray's efforts 
have been addressing all along. 
Her point with respect to the cultivation of the subjects of sexual 
difference is that the discursive possibilities for such are-designed 
architecture, a calling into question of assumptions, a putting in 
place of objective conditions for the development of woman's subject 
identity, is all possible. In fact, it is more than possible; it is 
urgently necessary, in light of the disaster that is being cultivated 
in the name of exclusively masculine culture and its deadly projection 
of a horizon for being. The sensible transcendental could save humanity 
from impending disaster, but first we have to conceive of it, and make 
it. Irigaray's discourse is directed entirely to preparations for that 
111. Maggie Berg, "Contradictions": Poststructuralism and Feminism, Signs 
7:1 (Autumn, 1991) 50-70. 
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"strange advent," which is also a possibly spatio-temporally present, 
not simply utopian, "parousia.,,112 
Pursuit of Unalienated Language 
The ultimate utopian possibility of the advent of woman-as-subject 
is also, for Irigaray, the advent of a new, less alienated human 
language. The alienation of language stems from the denial and 
repression of sexual difference, and in particular of the woman beyond 
the maternal, which forces Man and Woman to use a single language. That 
language does not serve the subjectivity of Woman, because it does not 
contain symbols for her relationship to her own origin, or to herself. 
Irigaray sometimes describes this language barrier as one of "pre-
constituted" language, in contrast to language that more effectively 
mediates "fecund" intersubjective communication. Such renewed language 
communicates more than "a meaning in some way closed," and thereby 
secures the "becoming" of the relation between two developing 
subjectivities. 113 She is under no illusions that this language would be 
easily developed. She recognizes that it pushes the definitions of 
language so far developed within the discursive regimes of the western 
tradition to their breaking point. This language cannot constitute a 
fixed system of signs in Saussure's sense, it cannot function as a 
medium of exchange as Levi-Strauss would understand it, it will not 
secure a stable relationship between symbols and their assigned 
contents by means of a governing metaphor according to Lacan's analysis, 
it cannot be a "shelter" or "house" for being along Heideggerian lines. 
The communicative language she envisions, which would be adequate to 
woman's concern with "the relation between two," would have to be 
constantly renegotiable with respect to meanings, and would require 
112. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 19, 147. 
113. Irigaray, Way of Love, 24-25. 
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sensible rather than simply conceptual points of contact. It could not 
"consist of something other than the invention of a speaking 
appropriate only to those who are speaking to each other, at the moment 
when they are speaking to each other.,,114 She plays on the Heideggerian 
distinction between speaking and saying in developing an idea of a 
saying that would amount to the practice of the new poetics she calls 
for in Ethics of Sexual Difference. This new poetics recognizes the 
material, physical character of saying, even one involving words, but 
also one responsive to the inadequacy of words. 
This modified relationship to language necessarily produces a more 
fluid lexicon and a more fluid relationship of lexical terms to 
meanings. Its precondition is a "double syntax" that departs from the 
single syntax of the selfsame symbolic order that now prevails, and 
that "makes woman's 'self-affection' possible.,,115 The need for woman's 
self-affection, that is, for woman's recursive impact on her own 
experience, is integral to Irigaray's perception of sUbjectivity as 
discursive and developmental. If woman cannot "touch" herself 
linguistically, she cannot develop as subject in discourse that takes 
her distinct, separate reality into account. Instead, she is eternally 
separated from that real, and is at best, officially, constructed as a 
non-subject through the operation of the single, phallogocentric syntax 
that rather carefully covers up the traces of the possibility of a 
subjectivity different from its own. 
The problem of language for Irigaray is not the same as for Adorno. 
The problem is not that language as a physical marker of meaning fails 
to achieve identity with what it denotes, and so fails as a medium of 
absolute knowledge. For Irigaray, the problem arises prior to the 
114. Ibid., 27. 
115. Irigaray, This Sex, 132. 
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recognition of inadequacy of language, which comes to be attributed to 
the "body of language," its participation in a "nature" that is 
obsessively feminized and repressed. It resides in the 
incommensurability of the two subjectivities that need to come to 
expression, self-awareness, and intersubjective relationship through 
language. Nevertheless, she recognizes the problematic Adorno 
identifies, and spins it out in relation to Heidegger's bias in favor 
of the word, the logos. Where Heidegger wants to accord priority to the 
word, Irigary - here, a congenial companion for Adorno -- "would think 
rather . . about the secret of the thing, or of the other, of their 
resistance to the logoS.,,116 For Irigaray, as for Adorno, a specific 
quality of encounter with "the thing" or "the other," with "the 
concrete," can challenge the adequacy of existing language and concepts. 
The ultimate wellspring of Irigaray's utopian possibility is that of a 
real that is communicable, and that can communicate its resistance to 
its own exclusion from language. 
Adorno, however, sees the figure of unalienated language in 
something like Benjamin's Adamic "names," at one with their objects. 
Irigaray treats "naming" as a threat, equivalent to a closed context of 
language. This closed context of language is part of the apparatus that 
excludes woman's subjectivity. This is one of the points where 
Irigaray's relentless reference to sexual difference hits pay dirt. 
What would have induced anyone to have seen in the text of Genesis 2, 
in which the Man Adam names Woman without any explicit recognition of 
her subjectivity, on the basis of an interior identity with Man ("bone 
of my bones and flesh of my flesh") a paradigm for an unalienated use 
of language? Irigaray could counter with the text of Genesis 3 as .the 
immediately available illustration of where such naming practices end 
116. I~igaray, Way of Love, 29. 
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up: expulsion from paradise and the inscription of patriarchy in 
society and language. 
There are two issues with this picture of language for Irigaray. 
One is the familiar problem of who decides what a word, a phrase, a 
sentence means, and how that decision comes to be reached. The other is 
the presumption of the adequacy of a static word to continue to 
function in a context of becoming. The imposition of language itself 
suggests that what it refers to is a never-changing context of meaning. 
Irigaray's utopian discourse depends on recognizing that words may 
mean different things to different people, in particular as an 
illustrative example to men and women; that they may register different 
experience, and that communicating this difference in experience may 
become important. Reducing everything to a single common experience, 
which may in the end not be common at all, does some violence to the 
possibility of genuine communication and the production of something 
new. So Irigaray is concerned to hold open the possibility of 
encountering something or someone different. She connects the problem 
of gender to the problem of the divine-human relationship, another 
significant area of attempts at communication across a line of 
difference. These two lines of difference stand for each other, engage 
in sympathetic resonance, reflect one another, such that the inability 
to imagine the transcendent female stands for the inability to 
negotiate both divine-human difference and mutual transcendence, and 
the inability to negotiate gender difference. 
Moreover, language for Irigaray is physical, and is the physical 
trace of something more elementally constitutive of the proximity that 
needs to be built and cultivated between the two of sexual difference. 
At the heart of her intense disagreement about language with Heidegger 
in The Way of Love is what she reads as Heidegger's removal of language 
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from "its carnal touching" in a way that is always already dystopian. 
"No more not-yet-manifested, still-to-come animating the quest" and 
eliminating the possibility of becoming a subject who is not simply a 
reflection of the always already constituted world that is always 
already known in and by this language. 117 Heidegger's approach, with 
which she disagrees, would make the "language" of poetic language more 
determinative than the "poetry," and to foreclose the possibility of 
the new poetics she advocates. 
Irigaray's emphasis on the physical dimension of language links her 
reflections on language to Adorno's and points towards Agamben's. For 
all of these thinkers the physical dimension of language, often 
overlooked, is critically important. The physical dimension of language 
comes to be a place where the ineradicable involvement of what might be 
called matter, nature, or bodily life in every effort and instrument by 
which people undertake the formation of that matter comes to awareness, 
albeit with some initial difficulty. That involvement, in turn, 
constitutes the ineradicable trace of what refuses to stop demanding 
utopia. 
Admittedly, sometimes that demand is silent. For Irigaray, silence 
is an integral component of language and of speech, and a particularly 
fertile one. Her project from its first manifestation in Speculum has 
sought to render audible the meanings that inhabit the spaces and 
silences of dominant discourse. The execution of this difficult project 
is one aspect of what is termed here Irigaray's utopian discourse, a 
discourse that represents utopian possibility as present in the 
appearance of impossibility itself. Another use of silence, however, 
emerges in Sharing the World. This use is more directly productive of 
utopian imagination. It depends upon the way silence constitutes a 
117. Ibid., 34. 
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welcoming of what has not yet occurred or been understood. This 
welcoming amounts to a direct aOcceptance of what has been identified 
here as utopian possibility, encountered in the unknown. Speaking or 
saying would close the door to this possibility, by labeling and 
forming it before it emerged. The [utopian] welcoming with which 
Irigaray concerns herself here "requires an availability for that which 
has not yet occurred, an ability and a wanting to open ourselves to the 
unknown, to that which is still unfamiliar to us and, in a sense, will 
always remain unfamiliar."uB An initial silence and listening, rather 
than finished language, that forms a desire for an encounter with 
difference that can also be an encounter with self, emerges as an 
indispensable element of the apparatus of the language that promises 
the human possibility on behalf of which Irigaray writes. This 
possibility deserves to be recognized, according to the criteria 
advanced here, as utopian. 
Treatment of Space and Time 
The practice of language Irigaray advocates has a distinctive 
relationship both to space and to time, or in Irigaray's terms, 
"temporality." Irigaray's talk about new ways of relating space and 
time is part of her representation of the possibility generated in the 
relation of sexual difference. She portrays the "space between two" as 
the site of a new, utopic form of exchange. This exchange is not barter: 
it is not the trade of objects for other objects; it is an exchange of 
interiorities, and an articulation of temporalities. Irigaray 
recognizes as "the western paradigm" an understanding of space and time, 
in relation to subjectivity and objectivity, one in which "[t]ime 
becomes the interiority of the subject itself, and space, its 
118. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 18. 
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exteriority.,,119 The exchange of temporalities she envisages is, then, an 
exchange of interiorities, of subjectivities, which are non-identical, 
non-hierarchical, and also located "outside" one another. That is, they 
are transcendent vis-a-vis one another, without being supra-sensible or 
necessarily incommunicable. In this place of exchange, which is a place 
of possibility, a new cultivation of the human movement from nature to 
culture can take place. 
The western paradigmatic understanding of space and time is not the 
problem. That paradigm becomes problematic in the context of the 
exclusively masculine subject .120 Irigaray's images for the problem it 
becomes are images of closure: space curves in on itself; it makes for 
an unavoidable "harm" in moving from one epoch to another, since time 
itself has congealed in this space. 121 The exclusive subject projects, 
the spirit congeals, the world closes spatially, and exteriorized space 
can no longer keep pace with the temporality of the interior. It 
becomes oppressive. This scenario is Irigaray's version of the 
sociological paradigm of alienation, the activity of human beings 
coming to appear to them as alien, almost natural forces beyond their 
control. 
The space so created fails to allow adequate or appropriate room 
for wonder, the first of all the passions. Wonder could provide for a 
creative relation to what might be new, not yet contained in the known 
- conceptualized - world. Instead, "[t]he passions have either been 
repressed, stifled, or reduced, or reserved for God. Sometimes a space 
for wonder is left to works of art. But it is never found to reside in 
this locus: between man and woman. ,,122 Securing a space for wonder in 
119. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 7. 
120. Irigaray, Sharing: the World, ix. 
12l. Ibid. 
122. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 13. 
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this place of difference, where "each sex, body, and flesh" will need 
to inhabit in a shared or articulated way, requires a change in the 
relationship of time to space, according to Irigaray. In particular, it 
"presupposes a memory of the past, a hope for the future, memory 
bridging the present and disconcerting the mirror symmetry that 
annihilates the difference of identity. ,,123 In other words, space must be 
made into a "housing" or safeguarding of non-identical temporalities, 
temporalities that can communicate and influence one another. This is a 
change from a conception of space as a stage for a univocal time. 
"Perhaps we are passing through an era when time must redeploy space? 
A new morning of and for the world?,,124 
Irigaray's treatment of time, of "temporality", has become 
increasingly central to her understanding of the cultivation of the 
in~ersubjective relationship in recent work. This relationship is 
paradigmatically between man and woman, but by extension between the 
subjects of enunciation: between "you" and "I," between "us," even 
between "I" and "he" or "she."u5 The constituents of any "us" or "we" 
each need both their proper subjectivity, recognized as such, and the 
objectivity proper to this sUbjectivity. That objectivity would not be 
identical to one that has been assigned to one or the other 
differentiated subject, whether on the grounds of conventional readings 
of physical morphology or for some other reason, by the culture, 
tradition, language, perception, narrative in which the subjects come 
to be. In The Way of Love she discusses this "temporality" specifically 
as a commentary on the balance of "making" and "letting be" that is 
required in a genuinely intersubjective relationship between two 
different subjects, neither of whom can be reduced to an instance of 
123. Ibid., 18. 
124. Ibid. 
125. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 102. 
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"the same." In the imagined relationship, "a temporality, which the 
sovereignty of technology endangers, can be reconstituted."u6 
The destruction of temporality in technique or technology, 
predictably, sterns from a systemic exclusion of sexual difference. In 
the technological situation, technique or technology treats something 
as an object for the exclusive purposes of a subject understood to be 
both singular and exclusive. The subject encounters every object of 
knowledge as something at his disposal, available for the purposes of 
an activity of making that is predetermined by the thoughts, purposes, 
or projects of this subject. This making takes place without a limit, 
other than that set by the selfsame subject's projected horizon; there 
is no "return to self" in this creative activity and, above all, no 
return to self understood as a subject in relation with another subject. 
In this context, the application of technique or technology - techne -
becomes exclusively a form of domination which "destroys temporality 
because it is no longer structured by a subject. ,,127 
The temporality that would be structured by the human subject, the 
temporality that would represent a real mediation of nature and culture, 
would necessarily be a temporality created or fabricated between the 
two subjectivities that make up humanity, the open universe of the 
human subject. This temporality then stands in implicit contrast with 
one that is, for instance, governed by the linear life story of a 
single subject, including that of an overarching collective History. 
The creation of an alternative temporality does not - presumably -
cancel the operation of historical conditions in or on the constitution 
of individual subjects. Irigaray does, however, seem to be suggesting 
that such subjects could develop an intersubjectivity that transforms 
126. Irigaray, Way of Love, 125. 
127. Ibid., 126. 
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the operation of history. The relationship between two different 
subjects, especially sexually different subjects, would not be reduced 
to instances of the same on either side. Instead, they would be 
encountered in their irreducible difference. That irreducible 
difference is governed by the temporality of the "unfolding of 
history," or the "playing out of pre-established conditions," or even 
the unfolding of a script presented in any existing philosophical text 
(e.g., a Hegelian script of recognition, or a Heideggerian script of 
going out of oneself and returning to oneself). Two such irreducibly 
different subjects establish between themselves a singular temporality 
governed by a "duration . . . of which human consciousness is the 
artisan," the material for which is two distinct pasts, presents, 
futural hopes, and the future which represents that which has not yet 
become between them. 
Irigaray's "artisanal" picture of intersubjective temporalities in 
relation stems from her understanding of the development of 
subjectivity itself. These distinct subjects are temporal. What they 
"are" is time. But the temp-oral-ity of the one is not identical to the 
temp-oral-ity of the other. These two differing temp-oral-ities have to 
enter into relationship, externally in the coordinated making of a 
world in which the two may share, and internally in the auto-poietic 
making of an interior world "appropriate" to the reality of each. The 
making of this interior space or place follows the encounter with the 
differing subject. The construction of the world, and the construction 
of the interiority that can open on the world, happens in a way "back 
to front." The world precedes the development of the subject's 
interiority. The articulation of different temporalities occurs as 
these temporalities emerge, through their relationship to one another, 
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and to the world they construct between them. They are temporalities 
that have "not yet" come into being. 
Irigaray's "woman-as-subject" appears, in this sense, as an almost 
messianic figure. That is, her emergence as a concrete, real subject 
would initiate the promising possibilities for genuinely 
intersubjective relations that make up Irigaray's utopian scenes. The 
arrival of the Irigarayan woman-as-subject would mark a form of 
salvation for a way of life that is destroying itself and its human 
practitioners. The preconditions for that arrival exist now. In fact, 
they have always already existed; they have been systematically denied, 
suppressed, or repressed. They can, however, be cultivated; the 
wretched state of the present world demonstrates that they need to be 
cultivated. 
The fruits of whatever politics that might be developed in this 
idyllic intersubjective context would presumably ripen in the future. 
Utopia appears in Irigaray's impressionistic account as the consequence 
of future people in future intersubjective relations, towards which 
activity in the present could contribute. She provides some desiderata, 
which people in the present might embrace. The development of the 
objectivity, and subjectivity, appropriate to authentic human culture 
is work to be undertaken. Irigaray's descriptions lead her readers to 
imagine it could be a pleasant task on the whole, difficult as it may 
prove to be because of its radical difference from accustomed, 
fundamental, habits and practices of mind and behavior. 
Unresolved Questions 
What is absent from Irigaray's scenarios is any sense of continuing 
conflict, and how that might affect the unfolding of the development of 
subjectivity between-two. Irigaray's work does not address, though it 
may be argued that it performs, the cultivation of the wish or the will, 
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the desire, to undertake the needed cultivations she describes. As 
Patricia Huntington has observed, Irigaray, like Heidegger, 
incorporates a significant element of voluntarism in her ethical 
recommendations. That is, she does not adequately address the question 
of what promotes, encourages, or prepares the way for ethical 
cooperation with the insights of her analysis. 12B 
This reliance on present voluntarism is an undeniable weakness in 
her work. If, to adopt Margaret Whitford's metaphor, Irigaray does 
indeed act as a contemporary prophet, her later work may have more in 
common with street-corner preaching than with critically targeted 
evangelism. Practically speaking, this approach may not be the best way 
to cultivate the collective energies for which the development of a 
renewed subjectivity calls. It seems to fly in the face of her own 
account of the development of subjectivity, the recognition that 
objective features of how human beings live, talk, and think, related 
to concrete conditions of existence, deeply affect the interior 
architecture of the subject of any potential praxis. 
Irigaray's critiques of the phallogocentric order indicate that she 
is aware that the smoothly functioning, respectfully intersubjective 
co-creation of a shared world lived in proximity with the other-as-
subject has not been the direction in which human culture has developed 
so far. Nevertheless, her account seems to assume reasonably good will 
all around, though inarguably bad exegesis in some quarters. Her 
scenarios do not extend to those cases in which a subject-in-the-making 
runs up against an inability to listen, a misguided effort to close the 
128. "Her work abstractly leaps from a limited textual practice aimed 
largely at consciousness raising and rejuvenation of an autonomous social 
desire to a material specification of needs. It rests upon a flawed premise 
that an abstact textual practice suffices to establish ethical humility among 
women who occupy axes of power relative to one another." Huntington, Ecstatic 
Subjects, 250. 
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context prematurely, as represented by Heidegger's insistence that 
there is "nothing" where words are missing. Irigaray does not discuss 
what might happen, in her model, when one meets up with a blind and 
indifferent other, or a naughty and flighty other, or with an other who 
has cultivated the aesthetics of cruelty, or engineered the perfection 
of destruction. If utopia is blocked off by possibility, these are some 
of the possibilities that have blocked its way in times past, continue 
to block the way today, and appear to be well-provisioned to continue 
to stand in the doorways and block up the halls in the future. 
With that in mind, whether Irigaray's analyses constitute a 
compelling macropolitical analysis remains open to question. She 
proffers the hopeful vision that the cultivation of these qualitatively 
different human relationships at the level of between-two will have a 
cumulative, "leavening" impact on the larger cultural formation, 
"possibly at the level of the family and community. "129 This vision, in 
its broad outlines, is not new; it has been the hopeful vision of 
religious communities and religious teaching for a long time: change 
the self, change the world. 
Irigaray's key change, from "the self" to the "sexuately different 
selves," may face prospects for change substantially similar to those 
encountered by those other programs of thought and practice. That 
dystopian complaint, however, probably does not disqualify Irigaray's 
fundamental point. On her analysis, an unchanged humanity - a humanity 
unleavened in the way Irigaray suggests - will be incapable of creating 
a remarkably new kind of political world. Her task has been to point 
out the direction in which the possibility of such a new kind of world-
creation might lie, and how that direction might be approached. The 
129. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 59. 
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task of working out the divinity in the details of the approach itself 
she has left as an exercise for her readers. 
Like Adorno, then, Irigaray appears as a creator of a discourse 
that calls for a specific conceptual and practical change in its 
readers. She speaks as if in a dream about a way of life that might be 
being lived, in another space and time different from, yet remarkably 
similar to, the one in which her readers find themselves. She seeks to 
awaken a desire for that way of life, and to point in the direction of 
the practices - conceptual, linguistic, interpersonal - that would 
cultivate subjectivities with the ability to dream these dreams more 
lucidly, with more precision and determination. Her texts, too, call to 
and act to equip a subject of [utopian] possibility. 
Irigaray presents the task of becoming this subject as the 
indispensable work of art that each human must undertake, on pain of 
"losing its humanity." In her conclusion to The Way of Love, she 
describes this material and aesthetic task as one that verges on 
something that has always been assigned to religion: 
Surpassing the matter that [the human] is in view of its 
nullification should not be a human's undertaking, but rather 
transforming this matter so far as to make it a work of art, 
to transubstantiate it into a more subtle, spiritual, even 
divine, matter. To illuminate it so that it enlightens he, or 
she, who gazes upon it, who contemplates it. l3O 
That as-yet-unrealized subject would genuinely, if obscurely, radiate 
what might even be a messianic light. 





Giorgio Agamben is a theorist given to recurrent motifs. Many of 
these are well-known, among them bare life, the structure of an 
exception, profanation, and potentiality. Another of these recurrent 
motifs is the halo. In The Corning Community, Agamben presents St. 
Thomas Aquinas' treatment of the halo as an inessential but significant 
supplement to blessedness. The halo signals an intelligible 
particularity within a universal condition, marking a "zone in which 
possibility and reality, potentiality and actuality, become 
indistinguishable," and figures "the tiny displacement that every thing 
must accomplish in the messianic world."l In The Idea of Prose, the 
image of the halo serves, similarly, to evoke something nearly 
ineffable, but at the same time completely visible or communicable, 
albeit outside of language. The singular nearness disclosed in the 
image of the halo is evoked more linguistically in Agamben's conclusion 
to The Time That Remains. There, it is the messianic word of faith that 
"bears witness to what, unexpressed and insignificant, remains in use 
forever near the word.,,2 Agamben's halos, it would seem, glow with 
messianic light. 
1. Agarnben, The Corning Community, 56. According to a rabbinic story, the 
messianic world will differ from this world by only a tiny displacement. 
2. Agarnben, The Time That Remains, 137. 
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Showing how the messianic light of the halo discloses utopian 
discourse in Agamben's texts is the central task of this chapter. It 
demonstrates that Agamben's writing, like that of Adorno and Irigaray, 
appeals to a subject of utopian possibility. Agamben's writing does 
this by addressing itself to readers who are themselves bearers of an 
almost metaphysical potentiality. The model of subjectivity he advances 
differs significantly from that of the rational subject of the 
humanities; for that reason, on Agamben's analysis, it is positioned to 
challenge the pervasive nihilism of contemporary culture. 
This thesis may not be met with universal agreement. Agamben has 
most frequently been identified as a thinker of "passivity."3 He has 
also been identified as a utopian thinker in the pejorative sense; Mark 
Mazower portrays his thought as radical political despair leading to an 
embrace of a purely passive "dream of ultimate redemption, some new 
'beautiful life.,"4 Alternatively, Carlo Salzani has countered such 
criticisms by assessing Agamben's efforts in The Coming Community as 
radically anti-utopian. 5 
Sustained consideration of Giorgio Agamben's utopian discourse has 
not been the central matter in studies of his thought. Giorgio Agamben 
is "famous," and controversial, but that fame and controversy have come 
primarily as a consequence of the pUblication of his challenging Homo 
3. See in particular Wall, ibid. 
4. Antonio Negri, "The Ripe Fruit of Redemption," trans. Arianna Bove, 
Generation Online, http://www.generation-online.org/t/negriagamben.htm. May 24, 
2010, a translation of "Il frutto maturo della redenzione," Il Manifesto (Rome) 
July 26, 2003, 21; Andreas Kalyvas, "The Sovereign Weaver: Beyond the Camp," in 
Andrew Norris, ed., Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio 
Agamben's Homo Sacer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Mark Mazower, 
"Foucault, Agamben: Theory and the Nazis," boundary 2 35:11 (Spring, 2008) 23-
34, 34. 
5. Carlo Salzani, "Quodlibet: Giorgio Agamben's Anti-utopia," a paper 
presented to the 9th International Conference of the Utopian Studies Society, 3-
5 July, 2008, University of Limerick. 
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Sacer series. 6 Some but not all of this critique has focused on the 
extreme claims Agamben makes about the structure of contemporary 
politics and political institutions. His assertions about the 
fundamentally totalitarian and punitive structure of western 
biopolitics - the concentration camp is the "new biopolitical nomos of 
the planet," and "[t]oday it is not the City but rather the camp that 
is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West" - provoke outrage 
at many points of the political spectrum. 7 He has been charged with 
opportunism, sensationalism, arid illegitimate aestheticism in linking 
the horror of the Nazi death camps to paradigmatic western state 
politics. 8 
His reputation for a despairing, fatally utopian or political-
theological political passivity seems to be fed most directly by his 
implicit rejection of political strategies that make control of the 
state an objective. 9 Instead, Agamben paints a picture of the 
contemporary state as an institution that is lethal down to its 
original conceptual foundations. Making any use of an institution as 
intrinsically inimical to life as the biopolitical state would call for 
its profound rethinking and retooling, and may even then be inadvisable. 
6. Durantaye, ibid., 7-11. The titles in the Homo Sacer series include Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, State of Exception, Remnants of Ausc~z: 
The Witness and the Archive, and The Power and the Glory. Early critical works 
on Agarnben in English focused primarily on this aspect of his work, including 
Norris, ed., ibid., Calarco and DeCaroli, ibid., and the Winter, 2008 issue of 
South Atlantic Quarterly dedicated to Agarnben's work. Catherine Mills's 
comprehensive introduction was the first work in English to focus on Agamben 
and include his earlier literary and aesthetic work. See Catherine Mills, ibid. 
7. Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo 
Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 
45; Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) 181. 
8. See Durantaye, 213-214, 217-219; Dominick LaCapra, "Approaching Limit 
Events: Siting Agarnben" in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life, eds. Matthew 
Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) 126-162, 
J.M. Bernstein, "Bare Life, Bearing Witness: Auschwitz and the Pornography of 
Horror" Parallax 10 (Winter, 2004) 2-16; Antonio Negri, "The Discreet Taste of 
the Dialectic," in Calarco and DeCaroli, 109-125. 
9. Slavoj Zizek, In Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008), 338. 
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The challenge Agamben's work poses to the repertoire of political forms 
and strategies may be another reason for his reputation as a political 
quietist. That reputation itself is an index of the difficulties 
involved in imagining a politics oriented otherwise than towards the 
state and its sovereignty. 
The focus here is on showing that Agamben's work in fact 
aiticulates what could reasonably be called a utopian assessment and 
plan, and so constitutes utopian discourse. As will become clear, 
Agamben avoids explicitly utopian language. Instead, he issues repeated 
calls for bringing dystopian situations to an end. Politics needs to 
"put an end to the civil war that divides the peoples and the cities of 
the Earth;" humans need to understand the structure and operation of 
the "anthropological machine" that distinguishes animal and man [sic] 
"so that we might, eventually, be able to stop them;" "we" must succeed 
in understanding how we ourselves can accept self-absorbed inattention 
to omnipresent cruelty and horror as "human," and put an end to that 
practice, or "there will never be hope."lo The hope he pursues is that 
which yields the concrete possibility for a common human life with an 
immunity to totalitarian capture. 
Agamben is not only famous and controversial, he is prolific. Each 
of his many books is individually trim, though not strictly speaking 
concise, and repetitive. Catherine Mills has called "Agamben's 
amvre . . a complex recursive exercise" that is less a system than "a 
densely interconnected conceptual web."ll In fact, Agamben's work as a 
whole constitutes something like the "paratactic text" that was 
Adorno's textual ambition, in which the enunciations lie, severally and 
10. Agamben, Means Without End, 35; The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin 
Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 38; Remnants of Auschwitz: 
The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 
2002) 26. 
11. Mills, ibid., 2. 
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collectively, equidistant from the center and relate to it as the 
radial threads of a spider's web. That is, Agamben seems to have 
extended Adorno's model for a single text to multiple works. 
The paratactic or radial quality of Agamben's texts, or text, poses 
a challenge for consideration of the utopian dimension of that work. 
Although a case might be made that all of this work bears on the 
central question of utopia, a detailed consideration of Agamben's 
entire work would exceed the scope of this study. This chapter will not 
attempt to reproduce the recent studies that deal critically with 
Agamben's entire oeuvre in general. 12 Too restricted a consideration, 
however, will not do justice to those recurrent themes that are vital 
to understanding the utopian trajectory of Agamben's work. This chapter 
strives to pursue a middle way. It presents a more extended 
consideration of those works whose utopian dimension lies closest to 
the surface, and treats the background of those utopian dimensions by a 
judicious consideration of Agamben's other relevant texts as the issues 
they address arise in the analysis. 
Because Agamben has written so much, readers may appreciate a 
rationale for the choice of texts to be considered in most detail here. 
This study has focused most centrally on The Coming Community, The Time 
That Remains, and The Open. The Coming Community and The Time That 
Remains are the full-length texts that deal most directly with issues 
of desirable or in Agamben's terms "messianic" community, its 
relationship to the transformation of the subject, and the 
understanding of space and time relevant to the production and life of 
such a community. A third text, The Open, is especially significant for 
the purposes of this study because it deals specifically with the 
structure of the human subject in contrast to animal nature. The 
12. See Mills, ibid.; Durantaye, ibid. 
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reconciliation of the human with nature is one thematization of utopian 
hope. 13 From this perspective, The Open is directly, thematically 
relevant to utopia. Furthermore, this text includes Agamben's most 
explicit treatment of gender. This makes The Open of particular 
interest both with respect to the general question of utopia, and to 
the specific question of the relationship of Agamben's utopian 
discourse to that of Irigaray. 
Th~s focus explicitly treats as secondary those texts of Agamben's 
that have made him so famous and controversial in recent years. Readers 
who are familiar with those texts will still find much to recognize 
here, however. Agamben's characteristic insights and preoccupations 
emerge everywhere in his work. So, for instance, divisions of divisions, 
the structure of an exception, or the construct of a critical 
experimentum linguae continue to playa significant role in the texts 
considered here. 
The goal here is to demonstrate the connection of these 
characteristic preoccupations to utopian concerns. The chapter 
approaches this task as follows. The first section discusses the 
dystopian or "nihilist" situation against which Agamben's philosophical 
project unfolds. The second section summarizes Agamben's expansive 
philosophical project, through a discussion of key concepts. The role 
of utopian content in that project receives additional attention in the 
third section. Finally, individual sections discuss the way Agamben 
uses textual form and the approach he takes to language, his unique 
13. Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of 
Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Richard Wolin, 
"Utopia, Mimesis, and Reconciliation: A Redemptive Critique of Adorno's 
Aesthetic Theory" Representations 32(Autumn, 1990) 33-49; Martin Ludtke and Ted 
R. Weeks, "The Utopian Motif is Suspended: Conversation with Leo Lowenthal" New 
German Critique No. 38 (Spring-Summer, 1986) 105-111. 
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treatment of the subject, and his construction of space and time as 
part of the construction of the subject of utopian possibility. 
A Preliminary Note on Gender 
Giorgio Agamben presents to some readers the dismal and dismaying 
picture of a living philosopher who deals explicitly with ideas that 
are profoundly engendered without ever articulating an explicit concern 
with gender. Nichole Miller exemplifies the approach taken by other 
feminist critics, in taking Agamben to task for the gender-blindness of 
his reading of one of the Lays of Marie de France in Homo Sacer, 
despite the relevance of gender for the concrete characterization of 
the sacred man (or woman) .14 Catherine Mills notes similar concerns with 
Agamben's androcentric language and myopic inattention to the 
engendered content of key areas of his work, and goes on to raise the 
question of whether Agamben's very conceptual framework makes it 
meaningless to raise and pursue questions of gender and other forms of 
difference. 15 
Other readers with feminist sensitivities and commitments discern 
in Agamben's thought potentials for addressing splits and exclusions 
deeply embedded in the western philosophical tradition. The most recent 
case in point is Ewa Ziarek, who reads Agamben explicitly through a 
lens constructed.by Irigaray, and who recognizes in his discussion of 
potential and sUbjectivity a way through the exclusion of woman-as-
14. Nichole E. Miller, "The Sexual Politics of Pain: Hannah Arendt Meets 
Shakespeare's Shrew," Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory 7:2 (Spring, 
2006) 18-32; see also Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky, "Homo Sacer, das blosse Leben 
und das Lager Anmerkungen zu einem erneuten Versuch einer Kritik der Gewalt," 
Die Philosophin, No. 25 (2002), 95-114; Penelope Deutscher, "The Inversion of 
Exceptionaity: Foucault, Agamben, and 'Reproductive Rights,'" South Atlantic 
Quarterly 107:1 (Winter, 2008) 55-70. 
15. Mills, Agamben, 115; Catherine Mills, "Playing with Law: Agamben and 
Derrida on Post-Juridical Justice," South Atlantic Quarterly 107:1 (Winter, 
2008) 15-36. 
196 
subject from language. 16 The approach taken here is most in tune with 
Ziarek's reading. Agamben's writing and insights are not "feminist," 
but this chapter argues, in contrast to Mills, that feminist thinkers 
can make good use of them. 
In this connection, readers need to know that Agamben's English 
translators have unanimously translated Agamben's l'uomo as man, 
without discussion. So, for instance, Agamben's Italian work L'aperto: 
l'uomo e l'animale, which is in German, Das Offene. Der Mensch und das 
Tier, greets its readers in English as The Open: Man and Animal. 
Given the concerns already noted by Irigaray about the 
disappearance of Woman, the need to incorporate into philosophy a 
sensible transcendental that stems from recognition of the two-ness of 
humanity, and the presence of transcendental boundaries that affect 
both language and dwelling between human genders, it is not possible to 
believe that this usage is simply insignificant. We will need to pay 
attention to those places and ways that this feature of language, both 
original and in translation, brings with it certain presuppositions or 
occlusions that operate in the thinking presented here. It seems 
unlikely to be a coincidence, for instance, that in Agamben's textual 
world, where "man" contrasts with "animal," becomes "sacer," has 
language or lives politically, "the woman" appears, when she does, in 
advertising and pornography.l? Or that her appearance invariably signals 
utopia. 
16. Ewa P1onowska Ziarek, "Feminine 'I can': On Possibility and Praxis in 
Agamben's Work," Theory and Event 13.1 (2010) Project MUSE, University of 
Louisville Library, Louisville, KY, http://muse.jhu.echo.1ouisville.edu/, 
(accessed March 28, 2010). 
17. See e.g., Agamben, "Dim Stockings," The Coming Community, 47-50; Giorgio 
Agamben, "The Idea of Communism," Idea of Prose, trans. Michael Sullivan and 
Sam Whitsutt (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995) 73-75. 
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Dystopian Vision - Spectacular Society 
Agarnben claims repeatedly that contemporary humanity is undergoing 
a trial of nihilism. This problem of nihilism finds expression first of 
all in art, reveals itself most profoundly in the metaphysics of 
language, and ultimately concerns ethical and political life. Is Agarnben 
sees this present nihilistic situation largely through the lens 
provided by the Situationist International and in particular by Guy 
Debord's assessment in The Society of the Spectacle. I9 He conveys his 
explicit agreement with Debord in Means Without Ends, calling Debord's 
books "the clearest and most severe analysis of the miseries and 
slavery" of "the society of the spectacle in which we live. ,,20 Agarnben 
extends Debord's critique with his assessment of the roots of 
contemporary nihilism in western culture and society, in particular in 
the text of Language and Death; Agamben sees this nihilism played out 
in the lethal versions of contemporary biopolitics that are the central 
concern of his Homo Sacer books. 
Guy Debord's analysis of "the society of the spectacle" raises the 
definitive challenge to hopes that culture might provide a base for 
critical consciousness and awareness, independent of late capitalist 
relations of production. Debord's text describes a situation in which 
all cultural channels of communication tend to reproduce an alienated 
mode of consciousness beguiled by the commodity and its spectacular 
appearance, and correspondingly incapable of perceiving that which 
"does not appear." His analysis dovetails with Adorno's and 
18. Agamben, The Man Without Content, 102; Language and Death; "Marginal 
Notes on Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle," Means Without End, 73-
89. 
19. Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(New York: Zone Books, 1995); "Comments on the Society of the Spectacle," trans. 
NOTBORED!, http://www.notbored.org/commentaires.html (accessed December 9, 
2009) . 
20. Agamben, Means Without End, 73. 
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Horkheimer's account in Dialectic of Enlightenment, bringing their 
assessment of the culture industries into the late 20th century. The 
picture Debord presents of reality being rendered culturally and 
politically ineffective by being rendered inapparent echoes Irigaray's 
analysis of the position of woman in Speculum, as well. 
Debord deploys a number of epithets in an effort to communicate the 
reality of the spectacle. "The spectacle is capital accumulated to the 
point where it becomes image." It is "money for contemplation only." It 
is "a permanent opium war waged to make it impossible to distinguish 
goods from commodities . ." and an "augmented survival" from genuine 
satisfaction. 21 Ultimately, the spectacle is a life-size, three-
dimensional, animated, ideological representation of "the social 
totality" which corresponds to and reinforces the self-evident 
appearance of the form of alienated production and consumption in the 
world produced by the operation of late capitalism and its history. 
That representation occludes both the possibility of achieving an 
alternative form of life, and the possibility of the different form of 
human consciousness that would be interested in the pursuit of such an 
alternative. 
Debord includes in his remarks a lengthy discussion of time, and 
the relationship to time, as part of the progress of the spectacle. 
According to Debord, capitalism subordinates traditional cyclical, 
mythic time to the uniform, linear time of the production process; this 
linear time becomes the specific time of the spectacle, in which images 
are consumed, and in which the image of time itself as something to 
consume is endlessly re-displayed. 22 He further identifies the 
transformation of time as one of the areas in which any resistance must 
21. Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 24, 33, 30. 
22. Ibid., 53. 
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intervene. In asserting the demand ~to live the historical time that it 
creates, the proletariat discovers the simple, unforgettable core of 
its revolutionary project."D 
However, contemporary resistance cannot assume outmoded historical 
forms, such as that of the militant working class party. The integrated 
spectacle makes resistance appear either easy, or counterproductive. 
Resistance appears to be a matter of buying a progressive form of some 
commodity, like free-range eggs or fair-trade coffee; alternatively, it 
appears to be a matter of shredding the entire social and economic 
fabric, hardly a prescription for negating suffering. Genuine options 
for critical consciousness seem to vanish, along with visible 
alternatives to existing social organization. 
The spectacle poses a stringent challenge to utopian imagination. 
In 1967, Debord was capable of articulating a covert anti-spectacular 
sentiment, saying that ~a critique capable of surpassing the spectacle 
must know how to bide its time. "24 Two decades later, observing what he 
termed the ~integrated spectacle," Debord described a society already 
in the grip of an ever-wider, totalizing closure of alternatives for 
thought and action: 
The empty debate on the spectacle -- that is, on the 
activities of the world's owners -- is thus organized by the 
spectacle itself: everything is said about the extensive means 
at its disposal, to ensure that nothing is said about their 
extensi ve deployment. 25 
This prevailing situation seems in some sense intentional. Debord 
characterizes it as ~ambitious," and says ~the greatest ambition of the 
integrated spectacular is still that secret agents become 
revolutionaries, and that revolutionaries become secret agents. "26 In 
23. Ibid., 43. 
24. Ibid., 220. 
25. Debord, Comments, III. 
26. Ibid., IV 
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other words, its ambition is to confound and render futile at the level 
of revolutionary consciousness any activities associated with 
revolutionary aims. Within the feverish and conspiratorial picture of 
society painted here, the spectacle aims to control all activities of 
direct resistance to its totality. This direct control, and therefore a 
priori nullification, of resistance constitutes yet another step in the 
progress of rationalized unreason analyzed in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. 
At the same time, the spectacle asserts its official immunity to 
critique. "All crimes and offenses are effectively social. But of all 
social crimes, none must be seen as worse than the impertinent 
pretension to still want to change something in this society . ,,27 
Moreover, Debord points out that even those who want to challenge the 
dominance of the spectacle will, perforce, use its "syntax" and 
"vocabulary." His meaning here seems to follow a familiar logic of 
visible resistance. Protest movements are said to become successful 
when they gain media recognition, visibility, and have their demands, 
aims, and rationales disseminated by media channels. Successful protest 
means appearing. But success, understood as visibility and credibility, 
must be bestowed by and within a system that bestows visibility and 
credibility precisely, in Debord's analysis, upon statements and images 
that are taken out of context, de-contextualized, manipulated, and used 
as the substance of lies. 28 When efforts to resist, or to pursue change, 
find themselves unable to pursue their aims in any way other than one 
which reinforces existing social relations and forces, then people 
experience their dealings with the spectacle as dealings with reality 
27. Ibid., IX. 
28. The classic spectacular analysis of spectacular resistance is David J. 
Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 
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itself. What appears as reality is an effective absence of 
opportunities for resistance to the way things are [in the spectacle], 
along with opportunities for alternative imagination, and alternative 
praxis. 
The spectacle functions as a mode of legitimation by presupposition, 
precluding debate or decision on a range of fundamental questions. 29 
Many consequential administrative decisions have been made in advance. 
The managers and decision makers who execute them are absolved of 
responsibility for the consequences of actions they take with a sense 
of having no alternative, as they put specific economic policies into 
place, take concrete production and process decisions, and ignore the 
value judgments implicit in what appear to be straightforward 
mathematical calculations. Rationality, defined "in use" as what 
supports the strategic objectives of the corporation, justifies 
technicized business practice. Corporate strategic objectives always, 
whether or not stated in the mission statement, include making profits 
and "being responsible to the shareholders," a fiction that guides 
decision making whether or not its results prove effective in the 
longer run. 30 The system that develops on the grounds of these 
presuppositions acquires the unchangeable and unquestionable appearance 
once reserved for "nature." 
The fact that alternatives are available, at least logically,. and 
that whatever can be done also can not be done, if not always vice 
versa, remains officially and generally inapparent. If there are faint 
shadows of hope, they are the actual, though obscure, deficiencies of 
this total situation itself. For instance, as Debord points out in his 
29. Ibid., XII. 
30. For example, decisions justified in this fashion may prove mistaken and 
costly even from this narrow standpoint, without calling the compulsory logic 
into question more generally. 
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Comments, "To this list of the triumphs of power we should, however, 
add one result which has proved negative for it: a State, in which one 
has durably installed a great deficit of historical knowledge so as to 
manage it, can no longer be governed strategically."n The spectacle 
appears to function with machine-like regularity and conspiratorial 
efficacy. Its actual invulnerability at any particular point of 
articulation or operation is, however, more an empirical and practical 
than an abstract theoretical question. 
To Debord's analysis of the society of the spectacle, Agamben adds 
his own radical political analysis, which centers on the structure of 
sovereignty and the state of exception, as well as on his reflections 
on the negativity inherent in linguistic being. Something the society 
of the spectacle presupposes, but which needs to be understood 
alongside Debord's analysis, is what Agamben in his political works 
identifies as the "state of exception." Echoing Walter Benjamin, 
Agamben agrees that "today, the state of exception has become the 
rule." For insight, he has turned to the thinking of Carl Schmitt, 
political theorist of the National Socialist party, whose "decisionist" 
political theory provided the theoretical justification for the Nazi 
takeover of the German state through the implementation of a state of 
exception which lasted for the duration of the Nazi regime. Agamben's 
analysis here underlies his depiction of the camp as the nomos of the 
modern" the more or less permanent localization of this state of 
exception, as a concomitant to the stabilization of a sovereignty 
abstractly located in "the people," concretely exercised by "the State" 
and its permanent police force, and exercised over that "bare life" 
that is, through whatever mechanism, shorn of the contingent 
identifications that offer it only spectacular protection. 
31. Debord, Comments, VII. 
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This dystopian political and social situation rests on the negative 
foundation of western ontology. According to Agamben, that negativity 
is established philosophically in every component of western tradition: 
the dialectical (represented by Hegel), the phenomenological 
(represented by Heidegger), and the aestheticist (represented by stil 
novo poetics). In the analysis of the link between the Voice, the 
subject, and the subject's identification as the "taking place of 
language in the Voice," this negative foundation shows itself for the 
emptiness it is. Agamben's delineation of this insight constitutes the 
substance of his text Language and Death. The challenge Agamben sees as 
before contemporary humanity is to interpret this ineluctable 
negativity in a way that overcomes its nihilism and lethality. 
Agamben's Theoretical Project 
Agamben's work as a whole builds on and advances this critique of 
contemporary culture, ethics and politics. His vision entails a 
sweeping condemnation of contemporary life, and implies that the core 
institutions of western society need to be re-imagined from the 
foundations up. Nevertheless, Agamben's work does not exude an 
atmosphere of pessimism. The recurrent note of determined hope is 
supplied by a principle expressed by Holderlin, that "near the danger 
grows the saving cure." When the situation is most dire, the seeds of 
its own dynamic reversal may already be germinating, although the 
seedlings may be visible only to a keen analytic eye. 32 So, for instance, 
Agamben writes almost optimistically in "Marginal Notes on Commentaries 
on the Society of the Spectacle" that despite the spectacle's 
destructive violence it "still contains something like a positive 
32. Holderlin's line occurs near the beginning of "PatInos," and recurs in 
Agamben's work. For a discussion of its use by Heidegger, Arendt, Horkheimer 
and Adorno, particularly in the context of aesthetics, see Durantaye, Giorgio 
Agamben, 40-43. Its universal validity seems questionable at best. 
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possibility - and it is our task to use this possibility against it."33 
Similarly, in Infancy and History, he writes that the "destruction of 
experience" that besets the people of the present day is less to be 
deplored than to be noted because "perhaps at the heart of this 
apparently senseless denial there lurks a grain of wisdom, in which we 
can glimpse the germinating seed of future experience. "34 What needs to 
be done is to discern these germinating seeds and nurture them. 
Agamben's work is profoundly interdisciplinary. His earliest 
writing involves a meditation on aesthetics, and the role of the work 
of art in contemporary consciousness. He examines the structure of 
subjectivity as expressed in diverse structural relations, including 
those of poetry and philosophy, psychology, and linguistics, as well as 
through treatments of spatiality and image, in Stanzas. Throughout his 
work he has addressed issues of language, psychology, and most recently 
devoted extended reflections to politics and ethics. His 
interdisciplinary practice is tied to his insight that events in 
western political life have radically altered the conditions under 
which traditional disciplinary boundaries were established. 
Understanding the phenomena of interest demands thinking across 
traditional disciplinary lines. 35 
The diversity of these concerns is tied together by the guiding 
thematic thread of potentiality. Durantaye has identified profoundly 
interventionist motives behind this concern, linking them to 
reflections on political power and happiness. 36 Agamben himself has said 
33. Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End, 83. 
34. Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 
2007) 17. 
35. Giorgio Agamben, "Absolute Immanence," in Potentialities, ed. and trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) 220-239, 239. 
36. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 15-17. Interestingly, Durantaye notes here 
the resonance of Agamben's interest in potentiality with remarks made by Adorno, 
and their common view that the philosophical vocation has to do with 
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that his work constitutes a meditation on the statement "I speak," or 
alternatively, "I can. ,,31 Another characterization of this project would 
be to say that Agamben's work focuses on the structure of modern 
subjectivity, and on an effort to move beyond the nihilism that the 
philosophical roots of modernism have uncovered. Agamben is a thinker 
who regards the grand tradition of western philosophy as having 
provided a fundamentally or radically dangerous conceptual basis for 
collective political life. His project concerns itself with the roots 
of western political institutions and western understandings of 
knowledge and the self. It always implies and sometimes states 
explicitly that these foundations or roots are the deep wellsprings of 
contemporary nihilism. Overcoming that nihilism, or turning it in the 
direction of happiness, calls for locating and rethinking those sources. 
That rethinking draws on the work and insights of others. Most 
famously, Agamben draws heavily on Heidegger, an early and profound 
influence, and on Walter Benjamin. He has stated that Benjamin has 
acted as an "antidote" to the influence of Heidegger. 38 At points, it 
seems clear that Agamben's own work constitutes an effort to articulate 
Heidegger's insights with those of Benjamin. 39 
Both Heidegger and Benjamin make language a central focus for 
philosophy. Not surprisingly, language appears as a privileged location 
for the observation and analysis of fundamental issues for Agamben as 
well. And while Agamben does not explicitly engage with Lacan, he does 
link the analysis of language and law throughout his work, beginning 
intervention in a system that makes change for the better appear radically 
impossible. 
37. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 73-76, 129. 
38. Ibid., 53. 
39. The text of The Open presents the clearest example. In that text, 
chapters devoted to Heidegger's treatment of the difference between human and 
animal consciousness are followed by a chapter on Benjamin that acts as the 
antithesis to Heidegger's position, followed by a concluding chapter that 
serves less as the Hegelian synthesis than as a snapshot of the newly attained 
immanence. 
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with his treatment of melancholy, fetishism, poetics and semiology in 
Stanzas. His diagnosis of the dilemma faced by contemporary culture 
returns again and again to the relation of subjectivity to the matter 
of language, and with the relationship of having language or being-in-
language to human potentialities. Implicit in these relations -are other, 
linguistically mediated, relations of sacrality and profanity, of 
identity and community, and of vocation. 
Agamben's Interest in Language 
Language matters profoundly because of the way it constitutes, or 
seems to constitute, subjects, their subjectivity, and the world. The 
Western metaphysical tradition has set language at the root of humanity 
itself, identifying the anthropos as the z60n logon echon. One facet of 
Agamben's project has been to uncover the complexities this 
identification introduces into humanity's understanding of itself. 
These complexities arise because of the way language itself constitutes 
an articulation of different things: language (langue) and speech 
(parole), words and discourse. 4o This way of thinking makes human beings 
the site or place of the articulation between language as a field of 
potential and its discrete appearances in speech, its utterances or 
events. Human beings themselves become, in effect, the apostrophe or 
empty space of this articulation. 
Another facet of the project, however, has to do with an uncovering 
of the dualities that run through and contribute to language. So, 
language reveals itself over and over to have a material side, to 
consist in something. 41 Language involves a legion of inner 
articulations, including those of the semantic and semiotic series that 
form rhyme. Poetry brings these inner linguistic articulations to light, 
40. Agamben, Infancy and History, 59. 
41. Agamben, Idea of Prose, 37. 
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while prose allows it to remain implicit in use, hidden in plain sight. 
The making of articulations themselves is an integral part of the 
western metaphysical project, which fascinates Agamben.42 
One point Agamben emphasizes, in the text Language and Death and 
thereafter, is the way entry into language as a speaking subject 
effects a radical occlusion of the singular matter of the speaker. This 
occlusion of the singular stems from the entirely general and timeless 
character of the system of personal pronouns. This limited set of words, 
which seem so full of singular content, suffice for the communication 
of infinitely varied singularity because of their status as 
"shifters. ,,43 They function, in fact, as indicators of an event of 
language, something which has a perfectly general and universal, 
strictly impersonal, aspect. Right at this point, language epitomizes 
something that Agamben finds fascinating: the coexistence of unique and 
general, singular and universal aspects in the construction of human 
linguistic subjectivity. The site of the construction of sUbjectivity 
through the use of language appears, in Agamben's analysis, as always 
already also a site of the potential awareness of something radically 
excluded from language in the act of its use. 
Agamben, then, traces the western perception of the human subject's 
profound emptiness or negativity back to the origins of that 
subjectivity in the use of language, and of the way those origins have 
been appropriated philosophically. He has traced this core insight 
across diverse areas of application. In Stanzas he emphasizes the way 
this structure of sUbjectivity emerges in and contributes to the 
insights of medieval theology and religious practice, psychology, in 
literature, and linguistics. In Language and Death he investigates the 
42. Agamben, ibid., 39-41; Time That Remains, 87; Stanzas, 152-157. 
43. Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, 19-26. 
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way the metaphysics of language treats but fails to go beyond the 
negative foundation of the linguistic subject, and contrasts it with 
the use made of that negativity in early renaissance love poetry. In 
The Open he examines the role of these linguistic metaphysics in the 
operation of the "anthropological machine" that grounds an essential 
understanding of Being on a negative articulation of human and animal. 
Homo Sacer, especially the "ethics of witness" presented in Remnants of 
Auschwitz, extends this core insight to politics and ethics. 
Identity and Community 
One significant consequence of this involvement of language in 
SUbjectivity is that the essentially linguistic elements from which 
people form identities can become traps. This is particularly true in a 
historical period when the proximate matter of these elements, that 
renders them communications of something, has ceased to hold, and terms 
of identification are used spectacularly as nothing but pretexts. Yet 
another facet of Agamben's work sets out from this recognition towards 
the destination of an understanding of community that cannot be 
appropriated in this way by totalitarian efforts, because it does not 
ground itself in identifications of this kind. The fruit of this effort 
appears in The Coming Community, to be considered below.44 
Another side of Agamben's critique of linguistic reification, 
however, appears in his critical appraisal of the institutions of 
contemporary political life. Homo Sacer is one case in point, where an 
essential element of Agamben's critique of the state form is its 
institutionalization of a structure of sovereign decision that is, at 
bottom, a consequential decision about what something is to be called 
or named. Aristotle's fundamental discussion of the polis, in contrast 
to the oikos and the marketplace, distinguishes between natural life 
44. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 156-161. 
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(z@n) and that life that is to be called "good" (eu z@n), a distinction 
Agamben refers to most often as the distinction between bios, a 
particular form of life, and zo@, common life. 4s The possibility for 
something like a biopolitical "bare life" to arise as a political 
problem owes almost everything to this original calling. Similarly, the 
sovereign decision on the "state of exception" that constitutes the 
power of the state on Agamben's analysis also rests in a constitutive 
power to name, and to make that naming a justification for action. 46 
Contemporary politics has become a site in which specified ways of 
being-in-Ianguage are attached to concrete practices with life or death 
consequences. 
Yet another approach to the question of identity and identification 
has to do with the assumption of individual subjectivity. Agamben's 
work deals, at every point indirectly, with the crisis of an 
understanding of what the classical humanities thematize as 
individuality or personal identity. This problem sometimes appears as 
the question of "whatever being" or singularity, sometimes as the 
question of the articulation of the exemplary and unique with the 
shared or impersonal, as genius or special being, sometimes as the 
problem of expression and belonging in the creation of and relationship 
to the work of art. 47 Ultimately, it is the problem of "face," that 
place in which human beings try to "seize hold of their own appearance 
and of their own being-manifest."48 
45. James Gordon Finlayson, "'Bare Life' and Politics in Agamben's Reading 
of Aristotle," The Review of Politics 72 (2010) 97-126, argues that Agamben 
frankly misreads Aristotle, and Greek literature of the period generally, in 
alleging this distinction. Finlayson's critique, while cogent, underplays the 
more significant distinction Agamben rightly reads in Aristotle between mere 
zoe and that life which may qualify as "good," which he designates by bios. 
46. See Agamben, Homo Sacer. 
47. See Agarnben, The Corning Community; Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort (New 
York: Zone Books, 2007) 9-1B, 55-60; The Man Without Content. 
4B. Agarnben, Means Without End, 91. 
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Vocation, Inoperativity, and Profanation 
Agamben's conclusions throughout his work return to the problem, 
and promise, for humans of their constitutive lack of a fixed nature 
that would impose a vocation or a specific telos on human activity and 
organization. Aristotle raises the question of whether man alone of all 
the animals has no proper work. Agamben answers the question with a 
resounding "yes," and endeavors to draw out the implications of a way 
of being that is essentially without a proper work that forms the 
condition of its existence. 49 That answer has particular relevance to 
the fundamentally utopian question about the "best form of life" for 
human beings, usually implicit if not explicit in reflections on ethics 
and politics. Answers to questions about the good life have 
traditionally been sought in answers to the question of what people are 
supposed to do; the good life appears as the life that permits people 
to do it, and in and through which they succeed in doing it. If, on the 
other hand, there is no specific human vocation - if no "voice" 
addresses Dasein at its source, if there is nothing in particular to 
which humanity is called - then a radical and consequential freedom 
presents itself as humanity's potential. Thinking the implications of 
this radical freedom as something other than terror is another way to 
characterize Agamben's theoretical project. 50 
For Agamben, these implications touch the source of human ethics. 
Being without a proper or fixed work is, in fact, "the only reason why 
something like ethics can exist," rather than a set of "tasks to be 
done" inscribed in human nature like a metaphysical laundry list. 51 The 
human lack of a fixed vocation is also what constitutes the ground of 
politics, "that which corresponds . to the radical being-without-
49. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 6-7. 
50. See in particular Agamben, Language and Death, 106. 
51. Agarnben, Coming Community, 43. 
211 
work of human communities. ,,52 One of Agamben's tasks as a theorist has 
been to foster a due regard for this human lack of work, in opposition 
to moralistic efforts to turn this radical "inoperativeness" in a 
repressive direction, and to the efforts of the integrated spectacle to 
turn it in a biopolitical direction. 53 Durantaye points out Agamben's 
development of this modal view of inoperativeness out of the term's 
origins in radical political theory. This gives the notion of 
inoperativeness in Agamben a specific double meaning. Agamben can 
understand humanity to be capable of a radical political practice that 
would render inoperative the reified linguistic distinctions by means 
of which potentiality is twisted to the exercise of power, because of 
its own constitutive inoperativity.54 
The emphasis Agamben places on "the profane" and "profanation" 
relates intrinsically to this notion of inoperativeness. He develops 
his thoughts on the political value of profanation most fully in the 
essay "In Praise of Profanation," where he cites the core meaning of 
"to profane" as being a return to free use of things that had been 
consecrated and separated for specifically religious use. For Agamben, 
separation and restriction on use "contains or preserves within itself 
a genuinely religious core," and the separations and restrictions on 
use accomplished by property under capitalism and by spectacular 
society within the integrated spectacle are no exception to this 
reading. 55 What has been lost is neither the religious core, nor the 
sacrificial system that effects consecration and removal to a separate 
sphere, but the rites and practices, including play, that restore the 
balance of sacrifice and return what has been separated back to free 
52. Agamben, Means Without End, 141. 
53. Ibid.; Agamben, Coming Community, 44. 
54. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 18-20; Agamben, Idea of Prose, 71. 
55. Agamben, Profanations, 74. 
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use. This form of secular religion eschews redemption, produces guilt, 
and "does not aim at the transformation of the world but at its 
destruction."56 What is given in spectacular society is an effort to 
make everything without distinction unprofanable, in the face of which 
"the profanation of the unprofanable is the political task of the 
corning generation."~ 
How Agamben's readers are to understand his call to radical 
politicized profanation, particularly in light of the specific examples 
of profanation he advances, has given rise to searching questions. 58 
Agamben's portrayal of the contemporary world is one of exigency in the 
face of disaster. The integrated-spectacular world order in which 
people increasingly and exclusively live 
. actually runs the risk of being the worst tyranny that 
ever materialized in the history of humanity, against which 
resistance and dissent will be practically more and more 
difficult - all the more so in that it is increasingly clear 
that such an organization will have the task of managing the 
survival of humanity in an uninhabitable world. 59 
The idea of an alternative to what Adorno termed "the unspeakable world 
that is," hovers around Agamben's works, despite the limited use 
Agamben's texts make of the term that has traditionally designated that 
idea: utopia. In its place, Agamben's rhetoric bends insistently 
towards urging his readers to end or put a stop to what he sees as the 
emblems of the dystopian situation of the global present. In Remnants 
of Auschwitz, he refers to the specter of a soccer match recalled by a 
witness at Auschwitz, between members of the Sonderkommando and the SS. 
For Agamben, as for his informant Primo Levi, that emblem of normal 
life in a context of ongoing horror represents "the true horror of the 
camp" and also "the shame of those who did not know the camps" and yet 
56. Ibid., 80. 
57. Ibid., 92. 
58. Mills, Agarnben, 128-129. 
59. Agarnben, Means Without End, 87. 
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continue to participate in the spectacle of normalcy in the midst of 
universal guilt. "If we do not succeed in understanding that match, in 
stopping it, there will never be hope." In The Open, the urgent problem 
is the two versions of the "anthropological machine," both of which are 
"lethal and bloody" and of which it is a matter "of understanding how 
they work so that we might, eventually, be able to stop them." In State 
of Exception the task appears as "ceaselessly to try to interrupt the 
working of the machine that is leading the West toward global civil 
war." All these stoppages must take place in an opaque zone of 
indistinction between things thought to be distinct, like human and 
animal, law and life, matter and meaning. Agamben has also said that 
only a politics that begins from this confusion can interest him, and 
that its positive task is to learn "how to grasp the stars that fall 
from the never dreamt-of firmament of humanity.,,60 
Utopia in Agamben's Work 
That task, which is the "task of communism," is an explicitly 
utopian one; it corresponds to the "utopia of a classless society." 
Agamben claims that a glimpse of that utopia appears in pornography, in 
the use made of caricatures of class markers. 61 Agamben notes that in 
pornography various signs of class are displayed only to be, literally, 
stripped off and cast aside; in being discarded, they are rendered 
inoperative as barriers to intercourse, social and otherwise. 62 Agamben 
offers a different angle of vision on the matter of the classless 
60. Agarnben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 26; The Open, 38; State of Exception, 
trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 87; Means 
Without End, 139; Idea of Prose, 75. 
61. Agarnben, Idea of Prose, 73-75. Contemporary analysts of pornography 
would concur with Agarnben that the genre incorporates class critique. See Laura 
Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Constance Penley, "Crackers and 
Whackers: The White Trashing of Porn," in White Trash: Race and Class in 
America, eds. Matt Wray and annalee Newitz (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
62. Agarnben ignores here, however, the significance of the class signifiers 
as incitements to the central action of the pornographic narrative; this 
function seems, perversely, to establish their operativity. 
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society in his essay "What Is a People?,,63 There he begins from the 
insight that the word "people," which names "the constitutive political 
subject," also always indicates "the class that is excluded - de facto, 
if not de jure - from politics," namely the poor. 64 He discerns in the 
term "people" another sign of the "fundamental biopolitical fracture" 
he has made it his task to expose. Something that purports to be a 
whole, in this case "the People," actually includes only the exclusion 
of a key portion of that whole. Integrity demands that "the People" rid 
itself of some "people" (e.g., non-nationals, speakers of other 
languages), while honesty demands that "the People" lose its integrity 
by including "the people" it aims to do away with. The class struggle, 
which it is the utopian goal of communism to bring to an end, Agamben 
claims 
is nothing other than this internecine war that divides 
every people and that shall come to an end only when People 
[the political subject] and people [the excluded] coincide, in 
the classless society or in the messianic kingdom, and only 
when there shall no longer be, properly speaking, any people. 65 
Agamben takes seriously what he reports as Walter Benjamin's "thesis, 
that the Marxian concept of a 'classless society' is a secularization 
of the idea of messianic time. ,,66 For Agamben, talk about "the 
messianic" amounts to talk about utopia. 
Agamben does, however, make a limited number of explicit references 
to utopia outside the context of "messianic" motifs. Those references 
have in common an obscure form of spatiality. He introduces his 
reflections in Stanzas as a "topological exploration . . constantly 
oriented in the light of utopia," on the understanding that "only if 
one is capable of entering into relation with unreality and with the 
63. Agarnben, "What Is a People?" in Means Without End, 29-35. 
64. Ibid., 29. 
65. Ibid., 32-33. 
66. Agarnben, Time That Remains, 30. 
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unappropriable as such is it possible to appropriate the real and the 
positive. ,,67 In an essay on Guy Debord's "Commentaries on the Society of 
the Spectacle," he notes that the Situationists' "utopia is, once again, 
perfectly topical because it locates itself in the taking-place of what 
it wants to overthrow.,,68 Similarly, in The Coming Community, "The 
taking place of things does not take place in the world. Utopia is the 
very topia of things. ,,69 
In each of these cases, Agamben's comments are explicitly spatial. 
The space to which they refer is the phantasmatic, poetic space he 
identifies in The Man Without Content as the space of art. Agamben 
concludes that work with the observation that art in late modernity is 
required to confront the problem of humanity's inability to appropriate 
its own historical time and place by means of a seamless cultural 
transmission that locates it in an intelligible world. Art accomplishes 
this task by renouncing its "guarantees of truth," namely its 
traditional relationship to culture, to permit it to create a 
phantasmatic space independent of culture in which humanity might 
continue to seek to know its own meaning through reflection on its 
culture. 7o Art does not necessarily succeed in this task; indeed, in the 
contemporary world it seems doomed to fail. More important for this 
study, however, is the way Agamben locates in art an exemplar of a kind 
of knowledge that dwells in the creation of an outside out of materials 
found exclusively within the world. 
This section aims to make clear how this perplexing treatment of 
utopia features in Agamben's overall work by looking more closely at 
the works in which he treats utopian themes at greatest length. A 
67. Agamben, Stanzas, xix. 
68. Agamben, Means Without End, 79. 
69. Agamben, Coming Community, 102. 
70. Agamben, Man Without Content, 114. 
216 
closer look at The Coming Community, The Open and The Time That Remains 
will demonstrate that Agamben's utopianism incorporates an attack on 
the idea of utopia as a represented future. It is instead a call to 
risk a specific form of non-knowledge that takes place in proximity 
rather than identity. The index of this thought's utopianism is its 
connection to happiness, and its riegative relation to pain, the core 
methodology of power. 71 
The Coming Community of Whatever Being 
Antonio Negri reads The Coming Community as a jolt in which "the 
experience of redemption presents itself as distopia."n This jolt comes 
early, in Agamben's use of the experience of the souls in limbo as a 
figure for simple happiness. He presents the perdition of the non-
damned as a divine abandon without pain, a "neutrality with respect to 
salvation" that constitutes "the most radical objection that has ever 
been levied against the very idea of redemption. ,,73 Whether or not Negri, 
who favors an orientation toward redemption, should persuade Agamben's 
other readers depends on the assessment of the "whatever being" that is 
the material of the community that is coming. While Agamben presents it 
as "lovable," happy, free and "simply human life," its content is in 
many ways uninspiring. 74 Its "exemplars" are "[t] ricksters or fakes, 
assistants or 'toons," and one way to think of it might be to think of 
"the planetary petty bourgeoisie" minus "bad mediatized advertising. ,,75 
71. According to Agamben, potentiality is the deferral of pleasure, or pain. 
"Power grounds itself" on the various forces which constrain potentiality to 
pause, and to delay its ultimate satisfaction. "Power bases its authority on 
this upgathering of pain. It literally leaves the pleasure of man unfulfilled." 
Agamben, Idea of Prose, 71. 
72. Antonio Negri, "The Ripe Fruit of Redemption," http://www.generation-
online.org/t/negriagamben.htm, May 23, 2010, 1. 
73. Agamben, Coming Community, 6. 
74. Ibid., 2, 7. 
75. Ibid., 11, 65. 
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This coming community that emerges from Agamben's presentation 
seems to lack many of the features typically associated with political 
utopias. His descriptions are evocative, abstract and figurative rather 
than precise or polemical; they do not include pragmatic solutions to 
familiar political problems, like class conflict or ecological 
degradation. The community of whatever being Agamben described does 
respond, however, to one pressing historical and political problem. The 
totalitarian phenomena of the late 20th century demonstrated the 
vulnerability of various forms of collective identification - not only 
nationalism or traditional nativism, but progressive or revolutionary 
identifications like socialism or communism - to capture and cooptation 
by the state. A community with no criteria for totalitarian exclusion, 
however, would be an almost unimaginable community with no criteria for 
inclusion, either. Agamben's work in The Coming Community is an effort 
to develop the philosophical basis for such community that would be 
invulnerable to such cooptation. 76 
Agamben accomplishes this task by developing the basis for a 
community of what he calls "whatever being." This being defines a form 
of singularity, and of these singularities' co-belonging, that 
accommodates all potential manners or ways of being while avoiding 
determination by any of these. He presents a series of examples that 
develop the notion of this mode of being: the example, a form of purely 
linguistic being which illustrates a general case in a way that is 
entirely specific, and which creates an empty space for communication; 
a line of handwriting, in which all the characteristics that make the 
general letters part of someone's handwriting in particular cannot be 
filtered and separated from the writing to yield a general writing 
without any specific characteristics; the halo, which is the 
76. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 156-161. 
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inessential addition to perfection which permits the individuation of 
the entirely general blessedness of paradise. 77 
Whatever being is not immune to evil. Agamben addresses the problem 
of evil in this context only briefly. For the coming community, "truth 
is revealed only by giving space or giving a place to non-truth - that 
is, as a taking-place of the false, as an exposure of its own innermost 
impropriety. ,,78 "Evil . . . is the reduction of the taking-place of 
things to a fact like others, the forgetting of the transcendence 
inherent in the very taking-place of things. ,,79 In Agamben's scheme, 
evil appears as a metaphysical attitude that denies the routine and 
awe-inspiring character of the facticity of the world, its contents, 
and its inhabitants. It is also a specific inadequacy in facing the 
exposure to death, the "power of not-being" that constitutes a "demonic 
element" in every being. "Evil is ... our fearful retreat from it in 
order to exercise - founding ourselves in this flight - some power of 
being. ,,80 Evil, in other words, from a different perspective, is that 
response to the problem of the death-drives that violently suppresses 
the awareness and accommodation of the power to not-be in itself by 
projecting it onto another singularity and violently asserting the 
power to be against it. Evil amounts to a refusal to rely on the power 
to not not-be, the anxious refusal to let-be the power to not-be in 
every thing. 
The persistence of this "demonic" temptation exposes the coming 
community at every moment to evil. Thus, in spite of its often 
delightful descriptions, it does not constitute a utopia in the 
ordinary sense. It has not vanquished the possibility of suffering. In 
77. Agarnben, Coming Community, 10, 20, 54-56. 
78. Ibid., 13. 
79. Ibid., 15. 
80. Ibid., 32. 
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fact, under current conditions, it is decisively exposed to violence. 
Agamben paints the coming community in the colors of happiness and 
blessedness, drawing from an unusual range of sources: the novels and 
stories of Robert Walser, the discussions of Thomas Aquinas and the 
Talmud, medieval images of heaven, rabbinical and cabbalistic stories 
of the world to come, and hosiery advertising. What these diverse 
images share is a sense of simplicity, an unassuming joy in facticity, 
and an innocent impropriety. The coming community emerges in the guise 
of a delightful, happy place, full of slightly misshapen but utterly 
ravishing singularities. But these singularities are perfectly 
"exposed" in their "exteriority." They really have nothing that might 
be called inner resources, and they have no shelter in a more powerful, 
overarching identity. Agamben explicitly points out the vulnerability 
of this community without identity or presuppositions to state violence: 
"Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in 
common there will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will 
appear. ,,81 
"The very topia of things" 
This vulnerability to violence and suffering at the hands of an 
entity that is based on presuppositions or identities suggests that the 
coming community is not an ordinary utopian community. It is, however, 
a community of being with utopian possibility. Moreover, this utopian 
possibility is embedded in its constitution as whatever being, because 
"Whatever. is the event of an outside" and incorporates as its 
constitutive possibility "the absolutely non-thing experience of a pure 
exteriority," a "being-within an outside."n The passage to an outside 
that takes place in the encounter with whatever being, which Agamben 
81. Ibid., 87. 
82. Ibid., 67, 68. 
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terms its "face," is fundamentally a grounded experience of 
potentiality in relation to things "as such." 
Agamben develops an argument to support this understanding of 
whatever being in an appendix to the main text of The Coming Community, 
titled "the Irreparable." That appendix is presented explicitly as text 
that "can be read as a commentary on section 9 of Martin Heidegger's 
Being and Time and proposition 6.44 of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus" 
and which, as such, deals with the question of "the relationship 
between essence and existence. ,,83 Agamben's commentary has been read as 
being in fundamental accord with Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's 
treatment of this question of metaphysics. 84 This reading, however, does 
not do full justice to the actually utopian import of Agamben's 
thinking on this point. It would be helpful, in fact, to read it also 
as a commentary on Adorno's concluding comment in Negative Dialectics, 
"Represented in the inmost cell of thought is that which is unlike 
thought. ,,85 
Agamben concludes his brief, dense argument with the statement "How 
the world is - this is outside the world.,,86 For an ontological 
reasoning that denies the possibility of an outside vis-a-vis the world, 
this statement simply states the impossibility of a perception of "how 
the world is." However, Agamben has explicitly stated that this 
perception is possible, and takes the form of seeing something as 
"irreparable" and "in its being-thus. ,,87 This amounts to a perception of 
its simultaneously non-necessary and non-contingent existence from the 
perspective of a non-thing experience of exteriority, i.e., from the 
83. Agamben, The Coming Community, 89. Section 6.44 of Wittgenstein reads 
"It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists." 
84. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 198. 
85. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 408. 
86. Agamben, Coming Community, 106. 
87. Ibid. 
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perspective of "whatever being." This being explicitly has the capacity 
to lose itself in things "to the point of not being able to conceive of 
anything but things" and then "in the experience of the irremediable 
thingness of the world" to experience the event of an outside. Again 
explicitly, "The taking-place of things does not take place in the 
world. Utopia is the very topia of things. ,,88 
In other words, the very human potential to notice that it 
perceives things as such, as things, constitutes the opening up of a 
limit, and effects the taking-place of a passage outside the world. 
This odd and yet also familiar experience of thinking and speaking that 
catches itself in the act, constitutes the transformation of the aporia 
of the irreparably factitious character of the world into the "euporia" 
of the "threshold" that makes evident its relationship with an outside. 
Whatever being, which only ever emerges as whatever singularity, is the 
site of the taking place of that experiential event. That is, whatever 
being, whatever singularity, is the potential experience of the utopia 
that is the very topia of things. 
Recognizing whatever being as the site of this experience of an 
outside makes sense of Agamben's paradoxical statement about 
"redemption" as the "advent of a limit" in the recognition of 
irreparability.89 That statement bears quoting at length. 
We can have hope only in what is without remedy. That things 
are thus and thus - this is still in the world. But that this 
is irreparable, that this thus is without remedy, that we can 
contemplate it as such - this is the only passage outside the 
world. (The innermost character of salvation is that we are 
saved only at the point when we no longer want to be. At this 
point, there is salvation - but not for US.)90 
Initially, the idea of hope in what is without remedy appears 
paradoxical. The paradox is resolvable insofar as hope, which depends 
88. Ibid., 103. 
89. Ibid., 10l. 
90. Ibid., 102. 
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upon the possibility of a position that defeats the twin poles of 
necessity and contingency, is possible. This position is available, but 
only in the encounter with what is "without remedy," that is, in the 
encounter with what is irremediable, irreparable. Hope is only possible 
in the encounter with that which simply is in its character as "that 
which it is," its character as "the thus." This character is explicitly 
not its character as the bearer of thus or thus identifiable property, 
but its character as whatever being, its character as being nothing 
other than "the thus," the irreparable. 91 
The innermost character of "salvation," then, entails an encounter 
with "the thus" that does not give rise to a desire for salvation. If 
"we" are saved at the moment when we no longer want to be, it is 
presumably less because "we," whoever we are, have achieved some 
remarkable form of transcendence, than it is because "we" are no longer 
faced with the kind of challenge that makes us wish we were someone 
else, somewhere else, facing something else. But if "we" are longing 
for some kind of salvation, "we" definitively are not participants in 
whatever being it is that no longer wants to be saved. "We," however, 
for whom there is not salvation, might be in a position to interact 
with the things taking place around us in ways that contribute to a 
happier experience, whether in the world or outside it, at some other 
point, for some other "we." 
Agamben's utopia, the not-in-the-world that is the very taking 
place of things as things, whatever they are, involves a definite 
linguistic relationship, which Agamben describes as "the being-in-
language-of-the-non-linguistic."~ Grasping this relationship is an 
effort to counter Wittgenstein, and also Heidegger, in a move that will 
91. Ibid., 103. 
92. Ibid., 95. 
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bring the "unutterable" to expression, and recognize that the "thing of 
thought is not the identity but the thing itself" or, in other words, a 
thing that "transcends toward itself, toward its own being such as it 
is. ,,93 
Agamben describes transcendence toward itself further, as an 
element of linguistic signification that differs both from meaning and 
from denotation, an element he claims is the inner meaning of the 
Platonic theory of ideas. In what he calls "a Gnostic reading of the 
Platonic idea," he presents the idea as the "being-such" of each thing 
which is this aspect of linguistic being. This "being-such" amounts to 
an exposure or knowability of the thing's features, not as predicates 
but as "a limit . . a halo;" being-such is in effect a mode of being 
that hovers in the gap between linguistic and non-linguistic being. 94 
This mode of being becomes apparent as an event of relationship; it 
takes place as a consequence of the difficult to think being-in-
language-of-the-non-linguistic. That constitutes a relationship of 
language and something non-linguistic as a relationship of some non-
thing exteriority that gives itself to knowing what is knowable as 
something knowable with something that gives itself to knowing as 
something which can be known as something knowable. 
Agamben's line of reasoning in The Coming Community is not at all a 
simple embrace of an immanence of being in existence. Instead, it is a 
recovery of a form of transcendence, albeit a strictly limited form. 
Transcendence does not present itself as an alternative world lying 
beyond the world of things into which someone might be able to step, as 
into a fully formed utopia. Transcendence presents itself instead as a 
utopia that transforms the aspect of the existing world into that of 
93. Ibid., 95. See Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 9 and 408. 
94. Ibid., 101. 
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one way or manner of being alongside other potential, imaginable ways. 
None of these potential ways escape the irreparable facticity of the 
world of things. This awareness of irreparability, however, exposes the 
potential of that irreparability. That aspect of the world, therefore, 
constitutes a threshold before which the profane things of the world 
present themselves as available for creative use. The re-formed or 
trans-formed world that takes shape in that creative use would still be 
irreparably thus, but its difference from some other manner of being-
thus might not be a matter of indifference. 
Anthropological Machine Out of Order 
A profanely re-formed or trans-formed world would presumably be the 
site for the coming community. Agamben develops another approach to 
understanding the nature of that re-formed or trans-formed world in The 
Open. The text of The Open is a reflection on treatments of the 
relationship of human to animal, a classic philosophical theme. These 
reflections are contained within an inclusio that focuses on a 
miniature in a Hebrew Bible in the Ambrosian Library in Milan. Agamben 
begins The Open with a description of that miniature, and returns to 
the image at the conclusion of the text. 
The :j..mage in question depicts "the messianic banquet of the 
righteous on the last day." In that tiny and telling depiction, "the 
miniaturist has represented the righteous not with human faces, but 
wi th unmistakably animal heads. ,,95 Agamben at first suggests that the 
picture may point towards a new form of articulation between animal and 
man [sic], a reconciliation. Such a reconciliation would, as we have 
seen, parallel one of the traditional themes of utopian discourse in 
the western tradition, in which the estrangement between humanity and 
nature, including humanity's own animal nature, has been identified as 
95. Agamben, The Open, 2. 
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a source of suffering. He concludes with a reading of the illustration 
that sees in it a happy renunciation of the effort of articulation and 
reconciliation. That renunciation would signal the "Shabbat of both 
animal and man," allowing the image to present a "figure of the 'great 
ignorance' which lets both of them be outside of being, saved precisely 
in their being unsavable."H 
Agamben's theme of unsavability echoes the irreparability 
announced in The Coming Community. In that work it is the signature of 
a mode of being that provides a foundation for a viable community. Its 
re-emergence at the conclusion of The Open, in relation to the utopian 
project of the reconciliation of human and animal natures, reinforces 
its role as a utopian motif in Agamben's work. Its relationship to the 
dominant critical moment in The Open further demonstrates the changed 
understanding of the subject whose task it could be to "contemplate a 
human nature rendered perfectly inoperative" because of the suspension 
of the effort to maintain the always articulated, and always separated, 
concepts of human and animal. 97 
Between the two arms of this inclusio, the heart of The Open is 
Agamben's development of a critique of the way the notion of "the 
human" has been understood. This paradigm, moreover, relates intimately 
to the understandings available within the western tradition for 
imagining the completion or consummation of human life. In Agamben's 
view, the complex western imagination of the fulfillment of human 
nature, whether that is conceived as the "messianic end of history or 
the completion of the divine oikonomia of salvation" poses a critical 
limit problem concerning the difference between animal and human, which 
involves "a fundamental metaphysico-political operation in which alone 
96. Ibid., 92. 
97. Ibid., 87. 
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something like 'man' can be decided upon and produced. ,,98 What Agamben 
calls the "anthropological machine" that produces the recognition of 
the human in its differentiation from the non-human which it resembles 
also determines the parameters of the imagined fulfillment of the non-
nature of humanity, whether in a theological or political ideal. 99 
Agamben traces the roots of this debate back to the earliest 
intellectual sources of the western tradition in Aristotle's De anima, 
considering its deployment in several exemplary moments, including 
Heidegger's treatment of profound boredom. "Man," he claims, "is always 
the place - and, at the same time, the result - of ceaseless divisions 
and caesurae. ,,100 These divisions precede and implicate the articulations 
that have been thought to define humanity, such as the articulation of 
body and soul or the articulation of a natural with a social or 
spiritual element. This is no small matter, as the western humanistic 
tradition rests on some understanding of "the human," and a decision on 
one understanding in preference to another is decisive for the self-
representation of culture and the imagination of ideal life. In each 
case he examines, Agamben uncovers an effort to locate something to be 
identified as the proper domain of humanity by virtue of its contrast 
with something designated as animal. In each case, moreover, the effort 
fails. The negative definition of the human as the not-animal always 
already includes the animal within itself, in the form of an attempted 
exclusion; it always ends with a demonstration that what is claimed as 
most properly human fails to distinguish what is called human from what 
is called animal. 
The relationship of the human to the animal therefore takes the 
form of what Agamben has identified elsewhere as a state of exception. 
98. Ibid., 21. 
99. Ibid., 29. 
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In political life, the bare life or zoe that Aristotle relegates to the 
oikos, the household, remains included in the form of an exclusion in 
the specific form of political life (the bios politikos) of the 
political community, or polis. This inclusive exclusion or exclusive 
inclusion is the point of entry in western politics for the lethal 
biopolitics of the contemporary state. In The Open, Agamben identifies 
the structurally analogous relationship between the animal's bare life 
and the human life in which it is included. The anthropological machine 
includes animal life within human life in the form of an exclusion; 
humanity is its negation, the denial of animality that produces the 
human's specificity in contrast. That relationship leaves this bare 
life exposed at the center of human life. The humanity that claimed at 
every point to be something essentially other than that merely bare 
life can sustain this demand only by taking upon itself an essential 
negativity or nullity. "Ontology . . is not an innocuous academic 
discipline, but in every sense the fundamental operation in which 
anthropogenesis, the becoming human of the living being, is realized."lDl 
That realization underwrites the nihilism of contemporary culture: 
" . because the world has been opened for man only by means of the 
suspension and capture of animal life, being is always already 
traversed by the nothing."l~ 
Agamben sees a way past the alternatives donated by Heidegger's 
thinking on this matter, which pose a choice between the technological 
solution of biopolitics or the embrace of the abandonment of animal 
immanence. This way entails a recourse to "a sort of Benjamin ex 
machina. ,,103 Agamben analyzes a collection of Benjamin's statements as 
proposing "an entirely different image of the relationship between man 
101. Ibid., 79. 
102. Ibid., 80. 
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and nature and between nature and history" with which his investigation 
is concerned. 104 While nature remains an area of "closedness" and 
"night," it is not thereby deprived of knowledge and even redemption. 
Nature for Benjamin appears as the "saved night," which maintains a 
relationship with something unsavable, completing it, and thereby 
disclosing itself as a "messianic nature" whose rhythm is happiness .105 
Instead of humanity consisting in the mastery of an animality that 
excludes knowledge and cultivation, Benjamin suggests that what needs 
to be mastered is the very relationship itself between humanity and 
animality or nature. This mastered relationship does not require an 
articulation of "nature and man in order to produce the human through 
the suspension and capture of the inhuman," but rather seems to put the 
anthropological machine on hold, suspending both terms of the polar~ty. 
A different sort of being altogether, not yet named in language, takes 
up residence "in between nature and humanity.,,106 In Benjamin's account, 
"the woman" acts as a kind of maieutic eternal feminine, who does not 
so much draw the man ever higher, but "cuts" his mysterious bonds to 
his natural mothers and perhaps even life itself, permitting him to die 
and be reborn. 107 Agamben's development of Benjamin's image takes the 
form of an exegesis of Tit.ian's Nymph and Shepherd in the 
Kunsthistorisches Museum of Vienna. He reads the painting as an image 
of post-coital otium that provides a more intimate picture of something 
like whatever being as "the supreme and unsavable figure of life. ,,108 
104. Ibid., 8l. 
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Christian Rang, December 9, 1923, trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Walter Benjamin, 
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Agamben's vision of completed in-humanity here is bound to corne as 
a disappointment to some of Agamben's readers. It raises legitimate 
suspicions with respect to his analysis, as well. This may have 
something to do with Durantaye's careful avoidance of this element of 
The Open. Catherine Mills notes that there is something old-fashioned 
about this image of completed life, standing as it does in a long 
tradition of "casting women as the privileged figures of ephemerality," 
unable to rise to the level of the universal themselves but able to 
give men .the necessary boost, as well as women's "closer relation to 
the physiological or biological," all of which seem operate in this 
text. 109 Mills has less to say about the fundamentally romantic casting 
of "the woman" as the figure of specifically "messianic" nature in this 
fragment, in what is difficult not to read simply as yet another 
version of the eternal feminine. 
It may be, however, that Agamben's thought is here operating at or 
near the limit of the representations available to it in the system 
with which we have to work. Agamben's - and Benjamin's - inadequate 
resort to the metaphor of heterosexual fulfillment may be an effort to 
aim for territory in the neighborhood of the place between-two staked 
out by Irigaray. Agamben's particular limitation here is a failure to 
treat explicitly the conflation of woman, animal, and nature that 
complicates the "simultaneous division and articulation of the animal 
and the human" of which "man has always been the result."llo That 
conflation, as others have amply demonstrated, is every bit as old as 
the one that forms the states of exception with which Agamben works; he 
could continue to cite Aristotle's Politics. The life he tries to 
imagine here, however, which will presumably require a suspension of 
109. Mills, Philosophy of Giorgio Agamben, 115. 
110. Agamben, The Open, 92. 
230 
these metaphors as well, is in its own wayan effort to read the 
surpassing of humanity's historical task as calling - as does Irigaray 
- for "an unprecedented inquiry into the practico-political mystery of 
separation."lll 
Agamben on Messianic Time in The Time That Remains 
Agamben's understanding of messianic or completed time is set out 
most completely in The Time That Remains, a detailed exegesis of the 
first verse of the Epistle to the Romans. According to Agamben, Paul 
recapitulates or sums up the entire contents of the much longer letter 
to the Roman church in the words of the incipit contained in Romans 1:1. 
"Understanding the incipit therefore entails an eventual understanding 
of the text as a whole.,,1l2 Agamben reads this verse, in opposition to 
most standard translations, as "Paul, called as a slave of Jesus the 
Messiah, separated as apostle for the announcement of God.,,1l3 The text 
of The Time That Remains is an exegesis of the meaning of each word and 
phrase of this identification of the author of the letter to follow. 
The letter to the Romans is significant, in Agamben's words, 
because it is central to the Pauline letters; these in turn constitute 
"the fundamental messianic text for the Western tradition.,,1l4 This 
messianic message has been blunted across 2,000 years of Christian and 
Jewish exegesis of the Pauline corpus, for reasons having to do with 
the paradoxical position of "a messianic institution - or rather, a 
111. Ibid. 
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messianic community that wants to present itself as an institution."us 
The paradox Agarnben identifies here has to do with time, and the 
peculiar challenges faced by a community that understands the Messiah 
to be perennially "behind" or "ahead" of it in time. Agarnben's 
statement here is particularly revealing, and worth quoting at length 
for that reason. 
In both cases, we are confronted with an aporia that concerns 
the very structure of messianic time and the particular 
conjunction of memory and hope, past and present, plenitude 
and lack, origin and end that this implies. The possibility of 
understanding the Pauline message coincides fully with the 
experience of such a time; without this, it runs the risk of 
remaining a dead letter. The restoration of Paul to his 
messianic context therefore suggests, above all, that we 
attempt to understand the meaning and internal form of the 
time he defines as ho nyn kairos, the "time of the now." Only 
after this can we raise the question of how something like a 
messianic community is in fact possible.1l6 
Agarnben's concern with messianic time, and with the formation of a 
messianic community, has surfaced already. Its impetus seems to corne 
particularly from the relationship it has to the notion of an end to 
history, a notion he derives once again from Benjamin. In the 
Theological-Political Fragment, Benjamin identifies "the Messiah" as 
the only one who completes history; precisely the completion of history 
holds out the promise for an end to the dialectical operation by which 
the desirable world is endlessly postponed. For Agarnben, as for 
Benjamin, messianic time, the "time of the now," incorporates an effort 
to employ thought itself as a spanner to throw into the works, and to 
put a stop to the lethal machine that seems to be everywhere in 
operation, not in a future opportune moment, but by seizing the 
opportunity of this moment. For this reason, Agarnben identifies the 
Pauline treatment of messianic time, at least his reading of this 
115. Ibid. 
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treatment, as being of central importance in facing the political 
challenges of the present. 
The question Agarnben seeks to address specifically is "What does it 
mean to live in the Messiah, and what is the messianic life? What is 
the structure of messianic time?,,117 While presumably this is the 
question perennially before the Christian community to which Paul 
writes, it is also at this time, as becomes clear in the course of the 
seminar of which The Time That Remains is a record, a pre-eminently 
political question that is irrevocably before the global political 
community. This political question remains on the agenda despite, even 
perhaps because of, the "fall of communism," as Agarnben reads Marxism 
as straightforwardly presenting a secularized form of messianism. lIB 
The term kletos, klesis, "called," "calling," interests Agarnben. 
His analysis of the verb "to call" involves a glance at the theory of 
callings or Stande that was associated with the Pauline text. He 
investigates the textual history that induced Luther to translate 
klesis with the German Beruf, and which then obtained a "new ethical 
meaning" among the Lutherans and Calvinists. Weber understood the term 
calling to convey an attitude of "eschatological indifference." Agarnben, 
however, concludes that Paul is not talking about an attitude of 
eschatological indifference, nor of a command to steadfastly refuse to 
leave the calling in which one first hears of Christ. Instead, his use 
of this language "signifies the immobile anaphoric gesture of the 
messianic calling, its being essentially and foremost a calling of the 
calling.,,1l9 That is, in Agarnben's analysis, Paul understands the 
messianic invocation as being one of calling all of the profane, 
117. Ibid., 18. 
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worldly callings, whatever their character, into an altered messianic 
use. 
Agamben's discussion of the term aphorismenos is also detailed. 
Here, he finds that Paul has devised a way of thinking about division 
that cancels or nullifies existing divisions. The term aphorismenos 
stems from the same conceptual field as the term Pharisee, the group 
set apart for special observance in 1st century Palestine, the group 
that appear throughout the gospel accounts of Jesus' ministry. In 
following the meaning of this term, Agamben notes that 'the principle 
of the law is thus division. ,,120 The people of the land are divided from 
the pharisees, as the Ioudaioi or Jews are divided from the ethne or 
"people".u1 Into this fundamental division of the law, between Jews and 
non-Jews, Agamben sees Paul drawing another dividing line that renders 
the initial division inoperative, null and void. By making further 
distinctions, e.g., "Jew according to the breath" vs. "Jew according to 
the flesh," he inserts a division into the pre-existing division, which 
creates a new, neutralizing category, that of non-non-Jew. This 
category exists beyond the existing divisions of identification, and 
offers the possibility of uniting people in a way that does not depend 
on any identification. 
Here Agamben is explicitly setting his reading of Paul and Romans 
in opposition to that of Alain Badiou in Saint Paul: The Foundation of 
Universalism. 122 Agamben is specifically reading Paul not as a founder of 
universalism, but as someone who destroyed universalism in favor of 
something more particular, a particular category that sidestepped 
identification, and in which dis-identified individuals could belong 
120. Ibid., 47. 
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apart from any shared identification. This is precisely the opposite of 
universalism, which unites by finding a transcendent shared 
identification or that bridges gaps between competing identities. Far 
from being a "producer of the Same," Paul is rather a producer of 
strategic and effective difference, the specific difference of a 
"remnant. ,,123 
For Agamben, the remnant makes it impossible for any part of a 
thing to correspond to any whole. It is relevant to notions of 
democracy and people. The "people," for Agamben, has the structure of a 
remnant, "that which can never coincide with itself, as all or as part, 
that which infinitely remains or resists in each division" and which 
"is the figure, or the substantiality assumed by a people in a decisive 
moment, and as such is the only real political subject."u4 It is the 
only real political subject because it is the subject that functions 
for the sake of a specific transformation in the decisive moment of its 
constitution. Agamben makes explicit note of the relationship of the 
Pauline remnant to the Marxian proletariat, noting that more than one 
analogy may be drawn. His sympathies seem to lie with an analysis of 
the "pleb" offered by Foucault, to the effect that while the pleb 
itself may not exist, something plebian characterizes many phenomena, 
and represents, with respect to power relationships, "their limit, 
their ruin, their consequence. ,,125 
For the understanding of Agamben's political subject, then, this 
Pauline understanding of the remnant is of first importance. Agamben's 
remnant is a subdivided group, a non-non-participant with respect to 
pre-defined identities, groups whose political interests and programs 
are already defined by social position and historical agendas. It has a 
123. Agamben, Time That Remains, 53. 
124. Ibid. 
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freedom of action provided by its non-coincidence with any of these 
pre-established groups, and by its own non-status as the "all" of some 
future, telic condition, which it may nevertheless also be free to 
envision. 
Agamben labors to clear up a number of misconceptions with respect 
to this messianic time. First, it elucidates something about the 
relationship of kairos, or "occasion," to chronos, or chronological 
time, the time that passes in regular rhythm and whose passing can be 
measured by clocks and calendars. He notes that any kairos always has 
as its disposal chronos, in effect has no other time than chronos to 
provide it with substance, making it something graspable. Messianic 
kairos is, in the end, nothing other than "seized chronos," not some 
additional or other kind of time. 126 Implicit in this analysis is that 
all chronos is potentially kairos. Kairos consists, ultimately, of 
ordinary time in the aspect of its having been seized in and for a use 
specific to an occasion. 
Similarly, the parousia involved in Paul's discussion is not 
something supplemental that can be added on to the representation of 
time. The messianic community might be depicted as living its life in 
endless deferral, but such an endless deferral is not the Pauline 
picture, according to Agamben. Rather, the parousia already establishes 
a messianic time of the now. The time of the now lengthens out, not in 
order to endlessly defer its fulfillment, but so that its instantaneous 
present character can be grasped. Here Agamben has recourse to Kafka's 
comment that the Messiah will not come on the last day, but on the very 
last day. Agamben sees the same structure, of the stretching out of 
time, at work in Paul's texts. Pauline messianic time is still "the 
day," not the "very last day." 
126. Ibid., 69. 
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He focuses as well on the phrase "eis euaggelion theou." For 
Agamben, a matter of first importance is that in the letter to the 
Romans, the announcement of something is indistinguishable from the 
something that is being announced. "The letter is thus the 
impossibility of distinguishing between the announcement and its 
content."U? This indistinguishability is particularly significant for 
Agamben, whose interest in every question originates in its peculiar 
illumination of the problem of language. In the gospel - that is, in 
the announcement, the euaggelion, not in the literary genre of a 
narrative of the life of Jesus - at every point the text of the letter, 
the announcement of the message, and the good announced coincide. In 
elucidating this problem, Agamben finds himself drawn into the 
difficulties of Paul's critique of the law. 128 
Here again Agamben discerns an internal division peculiar to Paul's 
thought, and one that defines the nature of the messianic. Agamben's 
presentation of this internal division will take the reader all the way 
to what he describes as an experience of the pure event of language, 
which for Agamben will serve to reinsert a specific encounter with 
something other than language, something outside language, as an 
outside that counters the pervasive nihilism of the critical moment 
that makes for the legibility of the Pauline messianic text. How he 
arrives at this denouement is significant, and hinges on a series of 
articulations of linguistic and judicial theory. The themes that are 
perennially important to Agamben, and that surface in all of his works 
appear here as well: inclusionary exclusions and exclusionary 
inclusions, divisions of divisions, the significance of poetry as an 
articulation of semantic and semiotic series, the relationship of Hegel 
127. Ibid., 89. 
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to Heidegger, the fundamental role of potentiality, and the importance 
of making things inoperative. 
According to Agamben, the Pauline treatment of the law figures 
prominently in the interpretation of the pure announcement that is 
inseparable from its content and the good signified in that content and 
announcement. This treatment does not simply oppose faith to law, as an 
opposition of two things external to one another, but delves into an 
area in which it becomes possible to understand that the law is 
fulfilled in its being made inoperative (in Greek, katargein). 
"Messianic katargesis does not merely abolish; it preserves and brings 
to fulfillment."Ug Significantly, he notes that Luther translates the 
Pauline verb katargein as aufheben, the verb associated with the key 
process of the Hegelian dialectic, that which preserves in going beyond 
or negating. He suggests that the characteristic double meaning of 
aufheben picked up by Hegel owes its origin to the double meaning of 
katergein encoded by Paul, and transmitted and bequeathed to German by 
Luther and his influential translation of the Biblical text into the 
vernacular. 
Philosophically; "what is essentially messianic and historic is the 
idea that fulfillment is possible by retrieving and revoking foundation, 
by coming to terms with it."l3O This messianic fulfillment would provide 
a response to the problem identified by Adorno of the perpetual, 
however micrological, remainder left over in the passage of things into 
concepts. The "conceptual utopia" that Adorno envisions and seeks to 
elucidate in Negative Dialectics is here given a slightly different 
formulation, and a more promising outlook, in Agamben's formulation of 
what is truly messianic. 
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Utopia as "The Profane" 
Agamben's repeated references to profanation almost certainly have 
as one point of reference the quote from Ludwig Feuerbach that begins 
Guy Debord's text The Society of the Spectacle: 
But certainly for the present age, which prefers the sign to 
the thing signified, the copy to the original, representation 
to reality, the appearance to the essence . illusion only 
is sacred, truth profane. Nay, sacredness is held to be 
enhanced in proportion as truth decreases and illusion 
increases, so that the highest degree of illusion comes to be 
the highest degree of sacredness. 131 
As noted, Agamben states repeatedly his admiration for and concurrence 
with Debord's analysis in this text, and his conviction that Debord's 
assessment of the critical issues and tasks of his time is correct and 
prescient. The appearance in the text, as a point of departure, of the 
structural opposition between sacred and profane, and its association 
with illusion and truth, resonates with emphases in Agamben's texts. 
Agamben emphatically presents profanation as something to be pursued, 
while sacredness is something to be interrogated and exposed in the 
context of the state, the state based on the capture of "bare life" as 
"sacred life." What might be worth noting is that the "bare life" that 
is "sacred" is called in official discourse and political speech "human 
life." This "human" life, however, is the "bare" life that the human 
shares with all other forms of life, rather than anything specifically 
human as to its form of life. That is, bare life is not some unique 
form of life that distinguishes the human form from any other life form. 
It is, rather, life without any particular quality other than its 
situation of being organized within a state that claims or can claim, 
and, according to Agamben's analysis, always claims in its foundation, 
131. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, cited in Debord, 
Spectacle, 11. 
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a state of exception in which it includes an outside and excludes an 
inside. 
Agamben's solution to the problem posed by bare life takes the form 
"the form-of-life [bios] of the human must coincide with its bare [zoe] 
life." The bare life that becomes profane rather than sacred - that is, 
that reverts to common use - must designate human life. It must at the 
same time coincide with that bare life that the state, in its state of 
exception, attempts to claim as its own. This analysis suggests that 
the stakes could not possibly be higher at the present moment for 
humanity and for the globe. The life that human beings share with all 
other living things, the "bare" life or nothing-but-a-live-being that 
is at stake in contemporary politics and praxis, is that without which 
there is no life at all, but only death. 
The utopian moment, the only utopian possibility within the purview 
of these texts, lies in the possible extrication of life itself from 
its imprisonment in the core of the state, and its reversion to common 
use, for whatever being and purpose. 
Philosophy as Strategy and Intervention 
Agamben is yet another thinker for whom philosophy itself is a 
practice. From the perspective of utopian discourse, his thought 
concerns the root obstacles and possibilities for utopia, in the sense 
of a condition that ends practices and structures that produce 
suffering. Agamben's work is political practice in the form of theory 
that addresses the deep conceptual tap-roots of contemporary 
understandings and practices. His work bespeaks the conviction that 
seeing how ideas and associations arise, how they come to acquire their 
hold on the collective imagination and how they trace their 
trajectories of meaning and development matters. Homo Sacer offers a 
particularly apt example of this line of thinking. It locates the roots 
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of the state form in the theorization of the Greek polis, and locates 
the treatment of "bare life" in the polis as the kernel of western 
political thinking. His identification of the negativity of language, 
and the analysis that roots contemporary nihilism in the functioning of 
language itself, offer another example of this style of thinking. 
Something akin to psychoanalysis in this method links Agamben's 
work to that of Irigaray. This theory amounts to an elucidation of how 
things came to be, as a result of choices made; this method then 
indicates places where other choices could have been, and perhaps could 
still be, made. Agamben's focus on original thinking underlying 
institutions suggests that institutions themselves carry with them, in 
their structures, the conceptual tendencies on which they have been 
built. The "building" metaphor suggests that some institutions cannot 
serve certain ends, by virtue of their original engineering. The task 
of thinking through this original engineering or architecture, then, 
becomes both vital and "strategic." 
Durantaye notes that Agamben takes the issue of philosophy as 
strategy fully seriously. This strategic conviction coincides with his 
admiration for Debord and for Benjamin, both of whom he identifies as 
strategic thinkers and writers. Moreover, the realm of this strategic 
operation, in Agamben's view, includes the potentiality of the 
intellect and the various powers of life that are implicated in 
political ontology. Strategic choices cannot be narrowly political, but 
have to be taken at the level of first philosophy. The idea that 
political life involves simply pragmatic and superficial maneuvering is 
both foreign, and counterproductive. Instead, "political thought and 
political strategy have to reconnect with a lost ontological element," 
that takes them beyond immediate instrumental considerations, and makes 
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political actors and thinkers aware of the stakes always already 
involved in their political practice.l~ 
The impatience critics sometimes express with this style of 
thinking contributes to its appearance as an impractical form of 
utopianism. By calling such basic institutions and structures as 
language and the state into question, his work seems to invalidate all 
potential political activity. It is difficult to imagine political 
activity that is not oriented towards state power, and that does not 
function through the unexamined use of ordinary language. The 
difficulty of imagining such political activity may in fact be one 
index of its necessity. What emerges as the most profoundly utopian 
feature of this utopian discourse is its effort to facilitate radically 
different thinking, by means of calling into question categories and 
forms that well-intentioned political actors typically take for granted. 
Textual Form and Considerations of Language 
Agamben's texts are conventionally academic on one level: they 
address topics and make arguments. While they are not treatises of 
systematic philosophy, and while they rely heavily on philological 
methods which some critics question, they unfold conventionally, 
compared to texts by Adorno or Irigaray. At the same time, however, 
they embody methods of indirection, digression, illustration and 
unanticipated juxtaposition that create a striking mood, more like that 
of lyric poetry than the standard philosophical paper, and that 
encourage reflection on their implicit meanings. This effect is most 
evident in Idea of Prose, which consists of a series of fragments, 
incorporates line drawings and woodcuts as illustrations, and 
presumably aims to generate a response around what is not said as much 
as around what is. 
132. Durantaye, 196. 
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The claim that Agamben's texts aim to generate a response around 
what is not said as much as they do around what is requires extension. 
The generation of effects that, in a less linguistic medium might be 
labeled as employing "negative space," is a recurrent feature of 
Agamben's texts. The argument of The Open, for instance, leaves spaces 
around its presentation of facts and arguments for inference about the 
message of the text. Similarly, the text of The Coming Community relies 
heavily on intertextuality, resonance of one example with another, and 
aura to create its mesmerizing effect on the reader. In this respect, 
Agamben's texts resemble the medieval commentaries on sacred literature, 
and the philological glosses of the 19th century, both of which he has 
expressed admiration for as creative forms. 133 
Indirection in Agamben's texts is related to the theory of 
representation he presents, and to his concern with a "pure potential 
for representation. ,,134 The problem with representation in the integrated 
spectacular situation is that representation feeds and supports the 
spectacle's alienation of images from concrete possibilities. 
Representations of positive states, as images for contemplation, 
undermine what potential for activity might subsist. Readers who find 
nothing directly represented in a text, and who persist in efforts to 
engage with the text, are compelled to create their own solutions to 
this representational problem. These readers thereby experience their 
own potentiality for representation. Readers who undergo this 
experience may then be able to contribute to the constitution of a 
subject of utopian possibility. 
133. Agamben, Infancy and History, 144; Durantaye, Agamben, 126. 
134. Durantaye, Agamben, 121-147. 
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The Problem of Language from a Utopian Perspective 
Language is intrinsically alienating. To appear as a subject within 
language, the speaker - the subject of the enunciation - must adopt a 
universal position via one of the personal pronouns known as 
"shifters." So, for instance, "I" does not refer exclusively to the 
particular or singular person making a particular enunciation, but is a 
universal position shared with all other speakers who are capable of 
saying "I" under appropriate circumstances. Perhaps paradoxically, then, 
the use of these shifters, which arguably helps form the psychological 
subject, is in tension with the articulation of a radically singular 
perception, history, or position. If by the subject someone might want 
to denote the singular existence dealt with carefully in The Coming 
Community, whatever being, language turns out to be a blunt instrument. 
Language and Death, Infancy and History, and Remnants of Auschwitz 
all point to a phenomenon of language that makes speech about or from 
the place that would seem most immediately accessible to an individual 
precisely least accessible, and indeed foreclosed. Agamben's texts 
identify this foreclosure as central, definitive of the western 
tradition, and deeply influential in the present context he identifies 
as "nihilism." 
The aporia or dilemma is that a person, to enter into speech and to 
make a reference to a personal experiential existential subject, must 
deny or alienate a portion of the truth of that subject, in order to 
participate in the linguistic world that is that person's inheritance. 
As far as any existing linguistic theory knows, the phenomenon of 
personal foreclosure happens in every language, since every language 
contains what Benveniste identified as "shifters," which make reference 
only to the instance of discourse, and which can thus be seen to change 
their meaning or rather not to have a stable meaning when they are 
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decontextualized, as they inevitably are over time. Insofar as they 
represent or point to the instance of discourse in its originary place, 
time, and context they have one truth content; insofar as they 
represent or point to the taking place of discourse in general, any 
possible context of discourse, they mayor may not lack all truth 
content. 135 Moreover, a speaker or writer, an individual practitioner of 
enunciation, undergoes an unavoidable self-alienation in taking up the 
position of the speaking subject, and simultaneously perpetrates an 
unavoidable effacement of the specificity and concreteness of others in 
taking up the position of the intersubjective references coded in a 
language's personal pronouns. 
The logic of the argument goes something like this: "I", a 
personal pronoun, refers not to a specific concrete subject, but to a 
situation of discourse; it denotes "the specific concrete individual 
uttering the given instance of discourse." As such, the word "I," 
viewed from one direction, is the most personal and specific of words. 
But viewed from another angle is the most impersonal and general of 
words. In taking up the use of the personal pronoun "I", a speaker or 
writer identifies himself or herself as the "place of the taking place 
of language," but as the place of the taking place of language, which 
can be a condition shared with many, this place becomes a place where 
the immediate, personal, specific, concrete predicates of the speaking 
subject disappear, or are silenced in the taking place of language in 
general. The phenomenon of silencing remains in effect, regardless of 
the specific content of the discourse, even when the discourse 
135. Whether a word "represents" a concept or function, or whether it 
"points to" a concept or function makes a theoretical and practical difference, 
and these terms signal the tension between a representational and a semiotic 
understanding of language. The differences between representational and 
semiotic theories of language are far beyond the scope of this work. 
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describes a series of intensely or emphatically personal predicates, of 
any kind. 
In an everyday pragmatic register, such logic appears ridiculous. A 
statement of the form "I've lost my car keys" or "I'm losing my 
religion" is fairly clear and communicates something to a participant 
in the original discourse, something concrete and fairly precise in 
most contexts. Most people don't recognize, or feel, their intense 
self-alienation in speech when they utter enunciations of that form. If 
people did, very little of the ordinary business of living, from 
functional to tender, would occur. The argument that the everyday 
pragmatic context and its demands are exclusively inauthentic, the 
realm of das Mann and so on, deserves to be questioned. Tucking 
children into bed at night, for instance, is not the appropriate 
context for confronting one's being-towards-death and its doubling in 
language - not to say it does not become such an occasion rather 
routinely - and is certainly not ordinarily the context for sharing 
such reflections with the other as other. It is rather, normally, the 
context for accepting the grace of immediacy and communicability. 
But when the context for reflection and deeper consideration 
presents itself, when the car keys have been found and the day's 
calendar arranged and when the child is asleep, the logic presents 
itself as more compelling. It reasserts itself in reading texts, and in 
particular sacred texts, that make use of personal pronouns: "Deliver 
me according to my righteousness," "let not your right hand know what 
your left hand does," "oh you of faith," and so on. The discourse goes 
on, long after its context has altered. The specific addressees seem 
interchangeable - and yet, are in other ways not interchangeable, and 
in the distance between this interchangeability and this non-
interchangeability, this sensed non-"fungibility" in the terms of 
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Adorno, this "not same" in the terms of Irigaray, lies the concrete 
individual's sense of the death of the self and the barrier of language 
in the encounter with language and speaking. The communication of the 
personal, specific, concrete, irreproducible individual subject, the 
communication of the truth of this subject, and particularly of the 
communication of its full truth, continues to elude those subjects, 
even in language, whenever that truth is separated from its everyday 
pragmatic context. Nevertheless, the sense that there exists some truth 
that fails to enter or to be visible in that everyday pragmatic context 
also bedevils these subjects. 
In other words, the essential negativity of the foundation of 
authentic being in "being the there" or "grasping the this" understood 
as the "taking place of language," and the death of the existential or 
phenomenological subject in a Voice that calls to the place of the 
taking place of language, is what Agamben's study exposes for 
consideration. What is exposed in that analysis is that the western 
tradition seeks something like "the mystery of life," or the source of 
individual consciousness, in the very moment of its loss in language, a 
loss which can be perceived as a loss only at a remove from commonplace 
life, a remove from the "prosaic," everyday pragmatic register into the 
register of separated reflection. 
In separation, moreover, is to be understood not a complete 
separation but a shift of emphasis or focus, with a commensurate 
forgetting of or de-emphasis on the concrete realities that enable and 
necessitate the taking up of the everyday pragmatic register, which 
cannot be done without even for a moment. 
This logic underlies Agamben's "philosophy of witness" or "ethics 
of witness." In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben identifies an 
"experimentum linguae" (an experiment of language) that pertains to 
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"bearing witness." Catherine Mills criticizes Agamben's philosophy of 
witness, in her final analysis, for its "non-relationality." Whether 
this criticism stands deserves careful consideration. It would seem 
that inter-relationality, inter-subjectivity, would be one of the 
presuppositions or prerequisites of something like "bearing witness," 
as the audience for the testimony would be required. The citation of 
Nietzsche's discourse on the "last man" suggests as much, that the 
relationship of self-referentiality and the splitting of the individual 
subject into producer and consumer, sender and receiver, thought and 
intellect, "it" and "I", continues even into the thoughts of the "last 
man." Why does the text label this experiment an experiment of language? 
The answer to the question arises from a consideration of the example, 
or incident of Hurbinek, a "child of Auschwitz," who cannot speak 
language although he is about three years old, and whose story is 
related in Primo Levi's memoir The Drowned and the Saved. 136 At one point 
Hurbinek begins to repeat a sequence of sounds that Levi and his fellow 
prisoners think might be a word or a name, but which none recognize. It 
seems to be an insistent effort to communicate. The word, or name, 
remains forever unintelligible, however. Some days after this initial 
effort at speech, the boy dies. 
Agamben points out that "Hurbinek cannot bear witness, since he 
does not have language," that is, the sounds that emerge from him do 
not take the form of words known to the others who might relate to him. 
The others recognize his word as a word, or something like a word, but 
not its meaning. Levi says of him "he bears witness through these words 
of mine. ,,137 Agamben's commentary identifies a double exclusion from 
testimony, which bears witness "completely" through the vehicle of 
136. Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New 
York: Summit Books, 1988). 
137. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 38. 
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Levi's language. For Agamben, Hurbinek becomes the exemplar of the 
complete witness, whose language of testimony ~no longer signifies and 
that, in not signifying, advances into what is without language, to the 
point of taking on a different insignificance - that of the complete 
witness, that of he who by definition cannot bear witness.,,13B The text 
points us toward the recognition that what is at stake in the ~true 
testimony" or the testimony from someone who could speak from 
experience, someone who had both been there and had seen and 
experienced the experience of the camps, it is not enough to be in the 
presence of the non-sense of language itself, but rather ~that this 
senseless sound be, in turn, the voice of something or someone that, 
for entirely other reasons, cannot bear witness."l" 
The would-be witness cannot bear complete witness because that 
witness has not seen everything there was to see, and has not 
experienced everything that could have been experienced. So to the 
reality of having seen all that could have been seen, or experienced 
all that could have been experienced, no one can bear witness by 
definition, because the possibility of a voice or speech arising from 
that place is definitively exhausted. But for Agamben, this ~lacuna" of 
testimony, in which the witness cannot provide the adequate witness 
because of the inadequacy of language, because of the foreclosure of 
the personal in and through language, . must ~give way" to the different 
impossibility of bearing witness that arises from not having language. 
On the other hand, what will be decisive for the inhabitants of the 
coming community will be an appropriation of the being-in-language 
Agamben depicts as that which is most common to humanity. His analysis 
of the Platonic idea in The Coming Community indicates something of 
138. Ibid., 39. 
139. Ibid. 
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what he is trying to accomplish through his meditations on language. He 
encourages an appropriation of humans' own "being-in-language," which 
amounts to an appropriation of humans' status as related both to the 
concept of humanity and the idea - that is, the "thing itself" - of 
humanity. "Only those who succeed in carrying it to completion -
without allowing what reveals to remain veiled in the nothingness that 
reveals, but bringing language itself to language - will be the first 
citizens of a community with neither presuppositions nor a 
State . ,,140 
His analysis here is reminiscent of Adorno's treatment of subject 
and object, and of the problem of the "non-identity" between the object 
and its covering concept. Agamben resorts to Aristotle's treatment of 
synonymy and homonymy to make his argument. Individual instances of a 
nominal class or category (e.g., "horse") are Aristotelian "synonyms" 
wi th respect to tha.t class; they are "homonyms" with respect to the 
"idea," or in Agamben's terms "having-name. ,,141 While it is possible to 
point to this as "being-in-language," the idea itself has no name of 
its own; it is hidden under the linguistic word, that is always welded 
to its concept. Hovering around that word, however, is everything 
discernible in the "whatever" being that remains non-linguistic while 
being in language. 142 All those microscopic features that cannot solidify 
as predicates of the concept are nevertheless the very essence of 
"whatever being"; these are the "smallest intramundane traits" noted by 
Adorno as being "of relevance to the absolute.,,143 At this point, 
Agamben's analysis of whatever being and Adorno's analysis of the goal 
of negative dialectics radically converge. 
140. Agamben, Coming Community, 83. 
141. Ibid., 75 
142. Ibid., 76. 
143. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 
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Treatment of Subject-Object Relationship 
For Agarnben, in effect, the experience of language and whatever 
being's being-in-language joins tongue in groove to the problem of the 
relationship of subject to object, however it is conceived. What it 
might mean concretely to appropriate one's own being-in-language is not 
immediately clear. Agarnben's example, of Tiananrnen, leaves almost 
everything to the imagination. What it does not leave to the 
imagination is the prediction that whatever appropriation of being-in-
language will be undertaken by these citizens of the corning community 
will excite the opposition of the State. What forms this appropriation 
of being-in-language might take, and how those forms of community are 
to find ways to co-exist with, avoid, or deconstruct the State is left 
as an exercise for the reader. 
That exercise is, in fact, far from incidental. Agarnben ultimately 
poses a strongly autopoietic thesis of the subject, that emerges from 
the ruin of the western philosophical effort to identify an objective 
ground for this subject that gives it substance and direction. This 
effort itself constitutes the objective historical foundation of 
western nihilism. Its theoretical version culminates with Hegel and 
Heidegger both announcing the negativity at the center of subjectivity, 
and which is also reflected in the poetry of the stil novo and its 
acknowledgement of talk about "nothing." Its translation into practice 
is illustrated most decisively by the Nazi death camps, but has become 
the paradigm of contemporary global politics. The triumph of the 
integrated spectacle has stripped language of every substantive content, 
rendering language itself discernible as an apparatus of non-
communication. 144 
144. It seems necessary to recall at this point that language is also not 
fully an apparatus of non-communication, even for Agamben. 
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The exigency of coming to grips with this evident negativity has 
been a theme in Agamben's work from his first book, The Man Without 
Content. There, Agamben quotes Nietzsche, in the preface to the Gay 
Science, saying "Ah, if you could really understand why we of all 
people need art " but "another kind of art . an art for 
artists, for artists only! "145 Agamben's thesis in The Man Without 
Content is that the creative act faces the modern artist with a 
profound threat, a terrorizing experience. What is supposed to be 
"self-expression" becomes a profound realization of an absence of 
content for expression. This confrontation with the absence of the 
fixed human subject, along with the absolute dissolution of a tradition 
that provides determinate content for the working out of human 
subjectivity, underlies the problem of the artist, as well as that of 
the arts, in the contemporary period. 
Agamben's ties to the Situationist International, which endeavored 
to transform society through a free creative use of what is available, 
connects with the formlessness and absence of a determinate work to 
which the human person is "called." That art, an art without 
determinate contents, that is so urgently needed, then must be an art 
for artists, in a world in which everyone is required to become an 
artist. Here, his final meditation on Benjamin and the question of 
tradition and transmissibility has to do with the resignification of 
meaning. What emerges from Agamben's discussion of Benjamin's interest 
in quotation, his comments on the collector, and his thoughts about the 
past, is that the past can be an alien body. If for Adorno the extent 
to which the past forms the present subject figures prominently as an 
145. Agamben, The Man Without Content, 7. The first edition of The Man 
Without Content, published in 1970, coincided with the original German 
publication of Adorno's posthumous Aesthetic Theory, Adorno's last work thus 
coinciding with Agamben's first. 
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obstacle to action, for Agarnben the extent to which Benjamin "makes 
alienation from the past into a value" signals the possibility of a 
more revolutionary relationship to the past. 146 
Agarnben draws a contrast between a traditional and a contemporary 
culture. In contemporary culture, aesthetics is founded on the 
destruction of the transmissibility of culture, of tradition. In a 
traditional culture, "an absolute identity exists between the act of 
transmission and the thing transmitted. ,,147 Culture is not a vehicle for 
the transmission of something other than itself, some body of knowledge 
or special truth. Rather, culture just is the flow of what people know, 
are, and can be. "For it is the transmissiblity of culture that, by 
endowing culture with an immediately perceptible meaning and value, 
allows man to move freely toward the future without being hindered by 
the burden of the past. ,,148 The past is not in those circumstances 
something heavy and alien with which each person must come to terms in 
some way. Rather, the past travels with the present, lightly, as 
whatever continues to be of use. People today have lost this 
relationship to culture. 
Durantaye suggests that Agarnben sees the role of art as being to 
guide people, show them who they are, and indicate to them what they 
can do and become. Art no longer simply fulfills this function for 
moderns and post-moderns. In this, Agarnben and Adorno see something 
similar. Durantaye, however, may not take seriously enough Agarnben's 
interest in and homage to the Situationist project, or its relationship 
to Benjamin's notion of the constellation, or its relationship to his 
own concept of "making use" of things in a profane way. Maybe everyone 
146. Ibid., 105. 
147. Ibid., 107. 
148. Ibid., 108. 
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does not need to become a poet, as Durantaye worries .149 But the "art for 
artists only" that Nietzsche calls for, a call that Agamben echoes, 
does have something vital to do with the status of producer, the 
technikes, that each person is required to assume. The reservation of 
this humbie status to "the creative activity of the genius who is 
burdened with the imperative to produce beauty" is the mark of the 
destruction of culture as a place of human habitation. 150 What is called 
for is an active reappropriation of this process not as a return but as 
a new creatively technical endeavor. Durantaye's remarks on The Man 
Without Content are perspicuous; the potential confusion involves the 
extent to which the tradition and transmission of culture take place in 
the oikos, the realm less of "art" than of "craft." That distinction, 
which is itself a product of the rise of aesthetics, with its 
segregation of "high art" and its relationship to a culture that could 
not be transmitted organically, needs to be borne in mind. The humble 
technikes was never an artist in the modern sense of that term, and the 
anonymous detourniste who might be heir to that earlier function 
similarly will not be "that kind of poet" even though she is in effect 
reasserting humanity's "poetic dwelling. ,,151 
The meditation on time and rhythm that Agamben begins in The Man 
Without Content comes to fruition in The Time That Remains. Agamben 
thus succeeds in linking religion and art or aesthetics, and in drawing 
149. Durantaye, Agamben, 37. 
150. Agamben, Man Without Content, 111. 
151. "Poetically man dwells on earth," presumably the literary referent of 
Agamben's statement of "man's poetic status on earth," comes from a poem by 
Holderlin, "In lovely blueness." The line is taken up in a 1951 essay by 
Heidegger, " ... Poetically Man Dwells ... " See Martin Heidegger, " ... 
Poetically Man Dwells ... ", trans. Albert Hofstadter, in Philosophical and 
Political Writings, ed. Manfred Stassen (New York: Continuum, 2006) 265-278. 
Perhaps significantly, in this essay, Heidegger makes a comment on potential: 
human beings can fail to dwell poetically on earth because they also can 
succeed in dwelling in this way. If they had no potential to dwell poetically, 
it would be pointless to say they do not do it. Agamben is more likely to 
reverse this logic: if humanity dwells unpoetically, it could also not dwell 
unpoetically. 
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out what might be their messianic potential for contemporary human 
beings. Contemporary human beings are those who, as Agamben notes, have 
lost their standing in a secure present, who have lost control of their 
gestures, who no longer have the capacity for experience, who, in 
effect, are utterly lost in the face of an objective that is at hand 
but to which there is no way, precisely because it is at hand. However, 
while it remains true that human beings have no essential work, that is, 
have nothing they must do, they have as a potential a kind of rhythmic 
character, an ability to mix form with substance, and to effect a pause 
between past and present, that can constitute the rhythmic, poetic 
appropriation of time into meaning. The messianic is, it seems, one way 
that people might take a new kind of hold on the past and occupy the 
present as the caesura or epoche between past and future, in a manner 
that does not leave the past as an oppressive and alien force hanging 
threateningly over human life. 
Recognizing this subjective potential, then, involves a 
renegotiated understanding of space and time. It eliminates 
presuppositions, but leaves what we might still want to call subjects, 
or "whatever being," free to make a profane or playful use of the full 
range of materials available to contemporary life. This subject would 
have the potential to create, from the nothing that is human life, that 
form that would be inseparable from life that constitutes ethics, and 
to suggest and guide through formation into a world that would offer 
the happiness, and end the suffering, that everywhere and always has 
borne the name of utopia. In other words, the utopian chronotope is the 
space-time that humanity in itself is - at least, potentially. 
The Space and Time of Potentiality 
As noted previously, subjects of utopian possibility need both 
space and time that are sufficiently open to permit action. Space 
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cannot be so dense, or so tightly controlled, as to prevent action that 
challenges the unspeakable world that is. The structure of time must be 
such that action can occur. What can take place in it cannot be 
completely determined by what has taken place in the past, or abandoned 
to an invisible telos presumably to arrive in the future. Agamben's 
treatment of these two issues contributes to a distinctive 
understanding of "whatever being" as that subject of possibility that 
is in a position to undertake a messianic form of activity. That 
activity makes use of the "time of the now" (the Pauline ho nyn kairos 
that Agamben links to Benjamin's Jetztzeit) that is "shot through with 
messianic time." 
The Outside Inside 
Agamben's approach to the space of action involves recognizing the 
presence of an outside already inside, at the heart of the structures 
of western life. The state of exception that is the rule of political 
life in the contemporary period has the structure of a capture of an 
exclusion, the incorporation of something - like bare life - in the 
form of its exclusion, and the exclusion of something that is already 
presupposed and within. The potentiality that resides in this structure 
has to do with the exteriority that has already been set up as the 
innermost cell of the state of exception. 
The "whatever being" that is the core concern of The Coming 
Community is particularly important here. First, whatever being 
consti tutes "the event of an outside" in its relationship to humanity. 152 
It does this in a precise and predictably singular way, by inhabiting a 
relationship to an idea. This relationship makes "whatever being" a 
"threshold," "a point of contact with an external space that must 
152. Agarnben, The Coming Community, 67. 
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remain empty. ,,153 This outside, understood in terms of something like a 
threshold or something that is "at the door," can also be thought of as 
the passage that makes a determinate space accessible, its "face" or 
its eidos - its form. 154 Agamben's statement on this point is worth 
quoting at length: 
The threshold is not, in this sense, another thing with 
respect to the limit; it is, so to speak, the experience of 
the limit itself, the experience of being-within an outside. 
This ek-stasis is the gift that singularity gathers from the 
empty hands of humanity.155 
In other words, "whatever being," this event of an outside, is also an 
experience of this outside as something whatever being inhabits or 
stands within. This makes whatever being simultaneously an experience 
of standing within - within the threshold and the "outside" which it is 
in itself - and of standing "without" or "outside," in a Heideggerian 
"ek-stasis" - outside the "empty and indeterminate totality," called 
"humani ty," that delimits the space of belonging .156 
Of note is that the structure of whatever being, which is the 
experience of being-within an outside, is precisely counterposed to the 
structure of the state of exception. The state of exception is 
structured as the capture of an ex-clusion in the form of an in-clusion 
or in-corporation. This ex-clusion is specifically an in-clusion, or 
presupposition. This structure, which appears obsessively in Agamben's 
work, perhaps because it appears obsessively in the structures of 
western thought, is associated in Agamben's work in every case with the 
threat of death. In the form of the anthropological machine, it is 
deadly. In the form of the camp, the nomos of modern political life, it 
153. Ibid. 
154. The Platonic term appears in the text with dramatic emphasis. 
155. Ibid., 68. 
156. Ibid., 67. 
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is the precondition for annihilation. In the form of the sovereign 
state, it is the exposure of sacred life to death. 
In State of Exception Agamben "speaks, in regard to the state of 
exception, of a 'no-man's-land' he sees lying between 'civil law and 
political fact'" that then opens the potential for a reversal of the 
state of exception itself, or rather, for an institution of new 
categories. 157 Agamben is taking his analysis of the state of exception 
as is well-known from Walter Benjamin's 8th thesis on history, which 
calls for a real state of exception that would "better our position 
against fascism," and which Agamben seems to believe has corne into its 
own "now of legibility." 
But we have seen the perception of a space between two positions 
already, both in Adorno and in Irigaray. This is not the first time we 
recognize a "between" that has been labeled utopian, for in Adorno the 
"no-man's-land" is explicitly a potentially utopian space. In Irigaray, 
the space between two, which is only barely perceptible and is indeed 
imperceptible for those who refuse to recognize the subject position of 
Woman, is the place where a utopian future might begin, in encounter. 
Agamben also illustrates this space in the between "man and animal" of 
"the open", and in fact this space between constitutes the open. 
In the innermost cell of these structures of lethality, therefore, 
a perpetual spaciousness abides. That spaciousness is intrinsic to the 
ontological structure of the being, whatever being, these structures 
have formed to contain, maintain, retain and restrain. Its potential, 
which is always an exteriority, is inexhaustible. The task of the 
coming community will be to open up this event of the outside, 
constituted by the relation of "humanity" to its singularity. In an 
alternative formulation, it will be to transform the "biopolitical body 
157. Durantaye, Agamben, 338. 
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that is bare life . . . into the site for the constitution and 
installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life 
and a bios that is only its own zoe. ,,158 That is, it seems, roughly 
equivalent to finding a way to refuse the temptation to render abject 
and expendable one or another specific singular manifestation of the 
life that living beings share, and learn how simply to live, together. 
The distance between this formulation and the classical description 
of utopia as the ultimate reconciliation of humanity with nature is 
micrological, as well as real and consequential. It is precisely the 
difference, following Agamben's analysis, between a form that makes the 
space accessible to the kind of thought that might be able to make use 
of it, and the kind of thought that can only work obsessively to 
abandon it to containment. In Agamben's sense the only available space 
for practice is always already fully occupied by zoe. The good news is 
that the space is always already accessible. The bad news is that the 
singularities who will be in a position to make use of it are still 
irreparably factical, for better or worse. Moreover, they still need to 
see the possibilities, and to cultivate the preference for not doing 
otherwise than making use of them. 
Time 
A bios that is at every point its own zoe, equivalent to a form of 
life that fully exhausts itself in life itself, will have a particular 
relationship to time as well as to space. That time is always available, 
and in Agamben's treatment seems to constitute the Jetztzeit, the ~time 
of the now," or the ho nyn kairos of the Pauline formulation. In fact, 
it bears an intimate relationship to the time that humans represent, in 
whatever way, in the tenses of language and the turns of phrase that 
create images and representations of time. 
158. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 188. 
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To elucidate this point, Agamben draws first on a linguistic 
analysis that terms "operational time" as the time it takes for someone 
to form a linguistic representation of time. He then makes the 
connection between this "operational time" and the familiar theory of 
shifters developed by Benveniste, pointing out that this operational 
time is what opens the possibility for language to refer to its own 
taking place. It also provides the basis for a striking note, regarding 
the self-presence of consciousness, that points out that lapse and 
delay, a dissynchrony, inhabits the core of the subject that is, as 
Benveniste's theory goes, constituted linguistically. The experience of 
self-presence, for this reason, takes the form of the experience of 
time. Agamben then extends this discussion to the realm outside 
linguistics and discourse. 
"It is as though man [sic], insofar as he is a thinking and 
speaking being, produced an additional time with regard to 
chronological time, a time that prevented him from perfectly 
coinciding with the time out of which he could make images and 
representations. This ulterior time, nevertheless, is not 
another time, it is not a supplementary time added on from 
outside to chronological time. Rather, it is something like a 
time within time . . . which . . . allows for the possibility 
of my achieving and taking hold of it. ,,159 
Agamben's designation of this intimate, operational time as time 
humankind produces in its life as thinking and speaking beings is of 
particular interest in the context of Agamben's theoretical 
relationship to Debord. According to Debord, "By demanding to live the 
historical time that it creates, the proletariat discovers the simple, 
unforgettable core of its revolutionary project."lW The vehicle for 
doing this may be the operational time that Agamben identifies here. He 
defines "messianic time," in light of this operational time, as "the 
159. Agarnben, The Time That Remains, 67. 
160. Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 106. 
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time that time takes to come to an end. ,,161 Messianic time can be 
understood as the livable, usable time that affords an opportunity for 
radical action, produced from within the seemingly seamless and closed 
context of the spectacle. 
Agamben labors to clear up a number of actual and still potential 
misconceptions with respect to this messianic time. First, messianic 
time elucidates something about the relationship of kairos, or 
"occasion," to chronos, or chronological time, the time that passes in 
regular rhythm and whose passing can be measured by clocks and 
calendars. He notes that any kairos always has at its disposal chronos, 
in effect has no other time than chronos to provide it with substance, 
making it something graspable. Messianic kairos is, in the end, nothing 
other than "seized chronos," not some additional or other kind of 
time. 162 Implicit in this analysis is that all chronos is potentially 
kairos. Kairos consists, ultimately, of ordinary time in the aspect of 
its having been seized in and for a use specific to an occasion. 
Similarly, the parousia involved in Paul's discussion is not 
something supplemental that can be added on to the representation of 
time. The messianic community might be depicted as living its life in 
endless deferral, but this is not the Pauline picture, according to 
Agamben. Rather, the parousia already establishes a time of the now, 
which lengthens out, not in order to endlessly defer its fulfillment, 
but so that its instantaneous present character can be grasped. Here 
Agamben has recourse to Kafka's comment that the Messiah will not come 
on the last day, but on the very last day. Agamben sees the same 
structure, of the stretching out of time, at work in Paul's texts. 
161. Agamben, Time That Remains, 67. 
162. Ibid., 69. 
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Agamben's discussion of the figures appropriate to messianic time 
sheds additional light on this peculiar and vital structure of 
possibility. Pauline typos, the relation of a figure in the past to a 
figure of or in the future, is one of these structures. Recapitulation, 
sometimes referred to as "summing up," is another. Messianic time 
involves a "summary judgment" and fulfillment or fullness of time, 
including in its historical dimension. In both these temporal and 
discursive structures, there is an irreducible activity implied on the 
part of the messianic community, the messianic actors who live in 
messianic time. The typological relation is not eternal, but 
specifically created or constructed, held together and realized in the 
time of the now. The recapitulation of summary judgment, or of 
recognizing how events in a present complete and modify events of the 
past, is also a production of activity in the now time. For this reason, 
Agamben emphasizes that messianic time is emphatically not oriented 
solely, or even primarily, towards the future, but rather towards the 
past and its relationship to the future, as well as to the present. It 
represents a decisive settling of accounts and revelation of the 
potential still locked up in memories and images of the past. 163 
The Very Topia of Things 
Agamben's work is both radically revolutionary, and profoundly 
utopian, in the thoroughly obscure way that a blank page is thoroughly 
obscure. He has been described as reactionary as well as utopian. Zizek 
makes him the representative of the position, with respect to the "full 
hegemony of global capitalism and its political supplement, liberal 
democracy," of "acceptance of the futility of all struggle" and an 
associated passive waiting for an outburst of "divine violence."lM The 
163. Ibid., 77. 
164. Zizek, ibid., 337-338. 
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reading presented here does not support that assessment. Rather, it 
sees Agamben's work as a radical rethinking of the political bases on 
which current western forms of life rest. Implicitly, his work 
continues to insist that a refusal to address the intrinsic lethality 
of these forms, and a continued embrace of these forms, will continue 
to undermine efforts to construct the messianic community that he would 
stress needs to be brought into being. That community would have the 
potential to seize the time of the now, the time that human beings 
themselves create in their common lives and works, and make use of it 
to bring the oppressive accumulation of historical time to an end. 
This positive assessment of the core of Agamben's thought does not 
mitigate the criticisms that, as noted, are legitimate foci of 
attention. Practical questions remain. Chief among these are the 
negotiation of the practical problem of how to make use of distinctions 
and divisions that have a history of oppressive use in ways that 
restage and neutralize their oppressive force. How, in other words, can 
the distinctions involved in sexual difference, for instance, be made 
use of for the purposes of creating new forms of subjectivity, while 
pursuing a form of "messianic community" that eschews a foundation on 
the basis of presupposition or identity, both of which generate 
exclusion and abjection? 
This reading of Agamben's work nevertheless discerns a potentiating 
framework. That framework provides for the discernment and cultivation 
of a subject of utopian possibility by means of a making use of what is 
available to whatever being in the present circumstance, even the dire 
circumstances of the integrated spectacle. That includes language, 
relationships, and the space and time both of bare life and of a re-
engineered poetic dwelling. What might motivate such a free use could 
be the promise of happiness contained in the announcement of the 
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possibility of this form-of-life, the form of which remains unspecified, 




Introduction - The Subject of Utopia 
Summary 
This investigation of utopian discourse in the work of Theodor W. 
Adorno, Luce Irigaray and Giorgio Agamben has observed that each of 
these writers addresses what could be termed a ~subject of utopian 
possibility." This subject might be capable of thinking a vitally 
necessary alternative to what presents itself as reality, and perhaps 
even of undertaking the poetic task of fashioning that alternative. 
Their shared address to this subject of possibility, and their shared 
refusal to specify the contents of this alternative, signal a more 
fundamental commonality. Each of these authors pursues a similar 
direction in developing a minimally and sufficiently metaphysical 
position that might maintain itself in a materialist, post-metaphysical 
context. That is, each of these authors pursues a project that aims to 
satisfy the metaphysical condition for utopian imagination, with the 
possible effect of augmenting its practical import. 
The Subject of Utopia 
As rioted earlier, there are at least two ways to understand the 
phrase ~the subject of utopia" that are relevant to the study of 
utopian discourse that has been pursued here. ~The subject" can mean 
the subject of a sentence: the word that does the action of the verb, 
that undergoes the experience of something, or that bears the 
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description of a predicate. By extension, it can mean the occupant of 
the subject position sketched by that grammar. Alternatively, the word 
"subject" can point towards some matter under discussion, the main 
theme of a conversation, work or course of study. 
One conclusion of this comparison of utopian discourse in works by 
Adorno, Irigaray and Agamben is that these three thinkers take similar 
positions on the subject of utopia in both of these senses. With 
respect to the subject of utopia in the first sense, they discourage 
the idea that their readers are, or might at any moment become, 
subjects of utopia. Their texts address fellow subjects of dystopia. 
They refuse to delineate the as-yet-unmet subject of utopia. With 
respect to the subject of utopia ~n the second sense, they share the 
"iconoclastic" mode identified by Russell Jacoby, that eschews detailed 
representation of the utopian condition. 1 In the case of Agamben, this 
avoidance of representation has even been labeled a formal "anti-
utopia. ,,2 
A second conclusion is that despite these refusals of utopian 
representation these three thinkers nevertheless participate in utopian 
discourse. They do this by producing a specific form of utopian 
discourse that works to cultivate the idea of possibility on which 
utopian imagination depends. This cultivation includes the development 
of an account of something like metaphysical experience that can be 
tenable in a post-metaphysical context. This account, broadly similar 
across the different writers' works, is addressed to a subject, in the 
first sense, of utopian possibility. The subject of possibility is in a 
position to exercise utopian imagination, and in time to consider 
active participation in a utopian project. Utopian discourse here is 
1. Jacoby, ibid. 
2. Salzani, ibid. 
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not a discourse that describes utopia, but one that constructs 
sUbjectivity with respect to an open horizon of utopian possibility. 
That effort at utopian imagination may be arduous; that utopian 
project may be miniscule. The texts' invitation can certainly be 
refused or ignored; these texts are neither coercive nor invariably 
persuasive. In fact, as previously noted, they have earned their 
reputation for repelling readers as much as for enticing them. However, 
people call these writers "utopian" for a reason. That reason includes 
their insistent recruitment of a subject of utopian possibility. 
A final conclusion is that what makes this discourse utopian is how 
it engages in and encourages further talk about "possibility" in the 
sense of "subject matter." Utopian discourse is metaphysical discourse; 
in a post-metaphysical age, it is impossible discourse. Each of these 
authors nevertheless pursues this impossible, but imperative, 
synchronization of a tenable metaphysical position with a strictly 
material, post-metaphysical world. Each finally locates this utopian 
possibility in solidarity with the matter of suffering. The subject of 
possibility takes place, where and when it takes place, in close 
proximity to a subject matter which transcends the discursive subject, 
even though the discursive subject could also be said to transcend that 
particular suffering. The "messianic light" these authors glimpse is 
material. Suffering matter itself constitutes the metaphysical 
substance that might make, and may suffer, the promise of utopian 
happiness. The suffering of this promise may, furthermore, lead to a 
practice of oppositional thinking and acting that could yet materially 
alter the dystopian context. 
This chapter lays out the case for these conclusions. It first 
discusses how the address to subjects of dystopia works to constitute 
the subject of possibility. This discussion summarizes structural 
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similarities across the three authors, noting significant differences. 
It then turns more specifically to the way these texts delineate the 
subject of possibility as subject matter. Here, it argues, these 
writers share an approach that locates in the subject matter of 
suffering itself the persistent conditions for utopian possibility. 
This material constitutes the potential for collaboration in the 
creation of the indispensable event of an "outside" or "other." This 
exteriority, in turn, is the critical event on which the possibility of 
utopian imagination depends. By recognizing suffering matter as the 
location of this minimally but sufficiently metaphysical difference, 
these thinkers identify an alternative and largely overlooked place 
from which to pursue the "negation of suffering" that is the 
constitutive content of utopia. The negation of suffering that proceeds 
from this place proceeds differently from those approaches to utopia 
that have relied on the domination of "nature;" it promises to create a 
different form of negation. A response to suffering from this place 
proposes, though not without ongoing risk, to elude the dystopian 
consequences of more properly metaphysical approaches on one hand, and 
of "anti-metaphysical" materialisms on the other. 
In the end, the "messianic light" associated with utopia is a 
material, and for that reason promising, semblance - or poetic practice 
- of transcendence. This insight situates the "weak messianic" moment 
in this utopian discourse in relation to the "subject of utopian 
possibility" which the discourse addresses and discursively constitutes. 
Critical Comparisons 
One Dystopian Assessment in Three Parts 
Each of these authors pronounces a dire dystopian assessment. The 
specific assessments differ, but are nonetheless compatible with one 
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another. A single account could be pieced together from these singular 
dystopian assessments. 
This emergent account would not be a scholastic variation on one of 
the familiar critical themes of the late 20th century. Although it 
suggests the presence of something like a root oppression, it does not 
lend itself to the idea that resolving this root oppression will tidily 
revolutionize reality. Nor is the root a familiar one, already 
thematized by critical theorists of one stripe or another. None of 
these accounts would satisfy partisans of Marxian class analysis, for 
instance. Class is not the fundamental variable in these dystopian 
assessments, and the active participation of the revolutionary subject 
in the dystopian state of affairs is one of the problems. None would 
fully satisfy the demands of feminists, multiculturalists, or post-
modernist linguistic analysts. 
Instead, these accounts identify systemic practices as the central 
problems that become the core obstacles to utopian happiness. Adorno 
targets a complex of instrumental reason, reification and fetishized 
commodity exchange that acts out the dynamics of an approach to logic 
that imposes equivalence on unlike phenomena, a reliance on abstraction 
that disregards its ineluctable inaccuracies, and an acceptance of the 
alienation of consciousness from its contents. In effect, he sees a 
need to rewrite the western script for the production of knowledge. 
Irigaray identifies the dystopian problem as the ongoing repression of 
sexual difference, which is cause and consequence of a foreclosure of 
feminine insight, language, and subjectivity, as a pervasive culture-
wide practice with psychological and linguistic underpinnings and 
systemic socio-economic, political and ethical consequences. Agamben 
returns again and again to the recurrent structure of the state of 
exception as the culprit in a structural bind in which western 
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civilization finds itself, but investigates the way it plays itself out 
across a range of phenomena, from the politics of the sovereign state 
to the conceptualization of the relationship of human and animal to the 
importance of the contemporary relationship between artist and audience. 
If there is a single thing that could be changed, which would 
realign the forces of society, for these authors, it is not as simple 
and concrete as money was for Thomas More. And yet, it can be argued 
that there is a single thing, and that the compatibility of the 
different accounts is secured by the fact that the thing is the same 
for each of these theorists. The root problem they each identify is the 
ineradicable participation of physical or material life in every moment 
of human transcendence, whether individual or collective, along with 
the persistent denial and suppression of this participation by the 
dominant accounts of reality. 
The Enlightenment rationality Adorno and Horkheimer identify in 
Dialectics of Enlightenment, which strives to dominate nature while 
denying its own participation in nature, can be explicated further by 
Irigaray's analysis of the foreclosure of the feminine precisely 
because of the fundamental similarity of the process involved. The 
foreclosure of the feminine would be explicated further by Agamben's 
identification of the structure of the state of exception, which is 
paradigmatically that of an exclusion that is an inclusion, an 
inclusion that is an exclusion, although Agamben himself does not make 
the move of reading the state of exception in relation to gender. 3 These 
different analyses do not simply reduce to "the same thing;" they are 
saying different things, and focusing on different aspects of the 
dystopian problem. The specific dynamics they identify, however, mesh 
3. That he does not has been one source of criticism of Agamben's treatment 
of his material. See Mills, ibid., 114-115. 
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with one another in time and space. In effect, they demonstrate 
themselves to be different aspects or coordinates of the same dystopian 
constellation. 
The significant similarity in these accounts has to do with the 
role of inarticulate matter, which linguistic or ideological 
consciousness presents as "nature," "woman," "bare life," or "the 
given." Inarticulate matter, which conventional wisdom sometimes 
regards as the stuff of objective reality, is also the very site of 
dystopian suffering. It is related to consciousness as its -
consciousness's - place and time of possibility, and as its source for 
alternative realities. It is only "given reality" from one, narrow, 
point of view, the point of view according to which "nothing changes." 
It is also, perpetually, the concrete site of possibility. Because of 
this, the cultivation of a form of consciousness that attends to and 
respects this source of intelligence, both in its difference from the 
abstractions in which it may be apprehended linguistically and 
conceptually, and in its struggle to surpass the restrictions it 
experiences in "reality," is central to the cultivation of utopian 
imagination. 
Dystopian Suffering 
The suffering of inarticulate matter, however conceptualized, is 
the ultimate dystopian index for these theorists. The dystopian 
situation effectively denies and forecloses a reality or a portion of 
reality that depends on a perduring material substrate. That reality -
whether thematized as the Adornian concrete, Irigarayan Woman, 
Agamben's radical singularity of whatever being, or something else -
dwells constitutively and intimately within human life, and suffers 
from its relegation to mute obscurity and the consequent 
misapprehension or denial of its needs. Whether that mute obscurity 
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derives from the inability of identity thinking to recognize 
significant differences between an exemplar of a concept and its norm, 
or from the systematic distortion of experience and self-constitution 
shaped by a phallogocentric symbolic order, or from spectacular 
redirection of desire away from use and toward illusion, the 
consequences are suffering. 
These differing accounts all problematize the existence of 
suffering as an artificial and avoidable consequence of the dystopian 
way of life, theorize its increase and its assumption of specific forms 
in contemporary society, and recognize the need to orient ethical life 
towards the trans formative negation of suffering. Their dire dystopian 
diagnoses respond to a condition of pervasive suffering imposed by the 
system that organizes the late modern way of life. The problem they see 
is not that happiness is impossible in the dystopian world. The more 
serious problem is that some happiness is possible, but only in a 
partial and compromised form, and one which requires ignoring or 
acquiescing to the suffering of others. This is the situation Adorno 
terms the "universal guilt context." Agamben sees in it the 
perpetuation of the infamous soccer game outside the crematoria of 
Auschwitz, described by Primo Levi. Pursuit of the compromised 
happiness available on dystopian terms actively blocks the approach to 
a transformed context in which dystopian suffering would be negated. 
Critical Assessments of These Dystopian Accounts 
These individual dystopian accounts, as well as the single account 
that could be constructed from them, are still not fully adequate to 
the symptoms of the contemporary dystopian situation. The refinements 
that are most needed lie with the treatment of the categories of gender 
and race, and with a more nuanced treatment of the dystopian problem of 
human cruelty. That assessment itself implies that the problem of class 
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and the role of control of the means of production has been adequately 
treated by these accounts. In fact, each of these authors' dystopian 
assessments builds loosely on a Marxist chassis, and accepts the 
fundamental validity of a core class analysis. None, however, gives 
class division, or the structural position of the working class, the 
status of root oppression. On this point, their shared ability to see 
class dynamics and processes inflected by other variables, in 
particular (for Irigaray) the reality of sexual difference and its 
thematization in contemporary society, and (for Adorno and for Agamben) 
the operation of cultural-industrial or spectacular influences, is a 
mark of these theorists' perspicacity. 
Their perspicacity also has its limits. Adorno and Agamben are, as 
we have seen, far from feminist. Adorno's language in Minima Moralia, 
for instance, has been analyzed as displaying a treatment of women, and 
working class women in particular, as primarily objects of possible 
enjoyment for men. 4 His relatively simple use of the concept of 
"nature," commonplace within the tradition he critiques, but also a 
problem with that tradition, signals the limitation of Adorno's views. 
This limitation underscores one of Adorno's own insights, namely the 
deep conditioning of knowledge by its circumstances. To be fair, 
however, Adorno and Horkeheimer are also capable of recognizing the 
patriarchal character of the tradition they criticize. 5 Agamben does not 
rise to this standard. Agamben's uncritical incorporation of Benjamin's 
romanticist treatment of woman, nature, and the animal is one instance 
of his failure to address the issue of gender in his work. If not 
4. Claudia Leeb, "Desires and Fears: Women, Class and Adorno." Theory and 
Event. 11:1 (February, 2008). 
----5-. "The 'happy match' between human understanding and the nature of things 
that [Bacon] envisaged is a patriarchal one: the mind, conquering superstition, 




feminist, however, Adorno's and Agamben's analyses lend themselves to 
critical feminist readings, and leave open significant possibilities 
for explicitly feminist extensions. 6 
Irigaray's relationship to feminist analysis is more complex. 
Feminist theorists have been among Irigaray's most outspoken critics, 
based on understandings of her early work that read it as grounded in a 
traditional and essentialist treatment of the female body, and of some 
of her later work that blanch at her advocacy of sexuately-specific 
civil rights. Sympathetic readers of Irigaray, however, find her 
treatment of excluded differences fruitful for the development of 
ethical political models that extend beyond identity politics to 
suggest ways of appreciating whatever form of difference is most 
vulnerable to exclusion in the relevant political context. 7 
These readings of Irigaray also constitute one answer to the 
objection that none of these theorists deals explicitly or emphatically 
with the problem of race, at least not in the sense in which race has 
come to be a problem for analysis and for dystopian concern in the 
United States. Adorno and Agamben do discuss race in the context of the 
status of Jewishness vis-a-vis European nationalities, its salience in 
Nazi Germany, and racism in the form of anti-Semitism. Irigaray does 
not address herself explicitly to racial matters at all, despite her 
increasing emphasis on questions of multi-cultural communication in her 
later work, in particular Sharing the World. Implicitly, she makes 
sexual difference a model for all other forms of difference. This model 
does not address itself to the specifics of any national case, or to 
the way gender is taken up and intersected by and made to intersect 
6. See Ziarek, "Feminine 'I can'''; Lee, ibid.; Patrice Haynes, "'To rescue 
means to love things': Adorno and the Re-enchantment of Bodies." Critical 
Quarterly 47:3 64-78. 
7. Chanter, ibid.; Deutscher, Politics of Impossible Difference; Ziarek, 
Ethics of Dissensus. 
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with race and class. None of these dystopian accounts are fully, 
concretely adequate to the problems of a dystopian situation 
characterized by racial division, inequality and oppression. Again, 
arguably, the challenge to scholarship is to extend the relevant lines 
of analysis to the most relevant forms of exclusion. Where race matters 
as much as it does in the US, an illuminating critique of the operation 
of racial ideology in exclusionary, spectacular society is necessary.s 
The dystopian problem of human cruelty seems less amenable to 
critical repair. None of these accounts offers a convincing account of 
its genesis, or an approach to its resolution. Adorno comes closest in 
his analysis of the hatred of weakness in Dialectic of Enlightenment 
and of rage as ideology in Negative Dialectics. 9 Agamben's treatment of 
evil as "the decision to remain in a deficit of existence" and to 
suppress constitutive potentiality as a fault falls far short. 10 That 
Adorno and Agamben take the dystopian problem of human cruelty 
seriously, however, is indicated by their explicit engagement with the 
phenomenon of the Nazi death camps. That trauma establishes the 
stringency of the demands a promising response to the recurrent 
phenomenon of human cruelty must meet. If, in the end, they fail to 
make cruelty inconceivable outside the dystopian situation, it is not 
for want of their recognition of the problem. 
Irigaray's omission here is correspondingly unsatisfying. Her 
utopian scenarios are promising and persuasive only to the extent that 
mutual cooperation and communication, unmarred by cruelty or motives 
8. With respect to Irigaray in particular, Patricia Huntington's critical 
appraisal of Irigaray's textual practices and Ewa Ziarek's appreciative reading 
of Irigaray's "labor of the negative" converge in the direction of an ethical 
attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity and persistent dis sensus substantially 
informed by Irigaray's insights. Huntington, ibid.; Ziarek, Ethics of Dissensus. 
9. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 88-89; Adorno, 
Negative Dialectics, 349. 
10. Agarnben, Coming Community, 44. 
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towards domination, is an imaginable alternative reality. She offers 
nothing, however, in the way of a propaedeutic against cruelty. That 
she also simply fails to engage the phenomenon of the death camps may 
be significant. It suggests that, despite her respect for the death 
drives, she may place unwarranted confidence in a paradigm of original 
good will than is consistent with historical and sociological realism. 
The problem is illustrated acutely in her own work by her re-
appropriation of Christian symbolism and the language of redemption. 
Her use of this language ignores the problems associated with the way 
Christian narratives have served in western history as supports for 
domination. Irigaray also avoids developing an analysis of violence 
against women, one direction in which the focus on sexual difference 
might reach to an analysis of forms of cruelty and violence, and the 
threats they pose to utopia. 
Developing a critique and assessment of the role of violence from 
an Irigarayan perspective on the foreclosure of the feminine or woman-
as-subject, along with its conflation with nature and the unconscious, 
would be both interesting and helpful. One line of development here 
could be to focus on the obliteration of sUbjectivity effected by the 
structure and organization of the camp, which would bring Irigaray's 
analysis close to that of Agarnben. To this could be added Irigaray's 
distinctive recognition that the potential subject's development of her 
own subjectivity is necessary for her minimal well-being, such that 
this initial effacement itself constitutes a first cruelty, and a 
precondition for all subsequent cruelties. 
An Irigarayan analysis of violence, however, would not resolve the 
threat to utopian imagination posed by the problem of human cruelty, 
especially in its traumatic late-20th century forms. That threat is the 
peculiar asymmetry that lies between the dystopian assessment, which 
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demonstrates the existence of systemic cruelties as well as systemic 
inducements to extraordinary and idiosyncratic acts of cruelty, and any 
utopian possibility. Whatever utopian possibility might be thought 
seems to be without the protection of powerful interests, and 
vulnerable to the wanton exercise of power. These theorists, in the end, 
address a subject of utopian possibility who lacks even the illusion of 
shelter from the eruption of dystopian cruelty. 
Common Calls for Disruption and Resistance 
The critique advanced by each of these thinkers encourages critical 
readerly engagement as a response to the immediate dystopian situation. 
Each of their dystopian assessments asserts that something is deeply 
wrong with the way of life the reader shares with the writer. The first 
thing that has to change is what people do automatically without 
thinking about it. The situation demands disruption of and resistance 
to the dystopian context. 
Drawing on an observation by Walter Benjamin, this change could be 
characterized as an "architectural" project. ll Benjamin claims that 
people absorb architecture, and the lessons of architecture, in a state 
of distraction. That claim is particularly suggestive when architecture 
is taken as a metaphor for the mind, the habitation of the human 
spirit.12 People absorb the lessons of their spiritual architecture in a 
state of distraction as well, accepting the form of life to which they 
are educated. Often they do so without stopping to orient themselves, 
or to ask whether what they are doing is what they want to or should be 
doing. Habitual patterns of thought influence and reinforce habitual 
patterns of action, and shape the quest for truth. This large, rigid 
complex must be disrupted so that it can be called into question, 
11. Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction." 
12. See also Alain de Botton, The Architecture of Happiness (New York: 
Vintage International, 2008). 
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resisted, and changed. These texts all advocate this response; they all 
function disruptively and critically, by calling attention to the 
contradictions of accepted wisdom and condemning easy acquiescence in 
comfortable routines. 
Texts with this shared critical orientation lead their readers to 
anticipate programmatic recommendations. These texts, along with 
prophetic denunciations and political manifestoes, two genres which 
fulfill their form by enunciating specific behavioral prescriptions, 
participate in a radical rhetorical tradition. The texts studied here, 
however, deny their readers the closure of prescriptions for change. 
The absence of programmatic recommendations in the works of these 
authors may have been more acutely missed by their readers to the 
extent that their association with radical rhetoric raises this 
expectation. That absence may be one more reason why these authors have 
sometimes been labeled "utopian" in the pejorative sense. In fact, 
however, the absence of programmatic recommendations should suggest to 
the reader that the task of constructing adequate concrete responses to 
the situations described by these authors will not be simple or easy; 
its demands exceed the possibilities open to the texts that place it on 
the agenda. 
The form of these authors' texts participates in the resistance and 
disruption they advocate. The hermeneutical operation of understanding 
these texts inaugurates a trans formative process. The subject position 
of having read and begun to understand these texts is already a 
transformed subject position, and is to a degree already distanced from 
the situation the texts critique. The act of reading these texts, and 
struggling to understand them, effects this distancing of the reader 
from the object of the text's critique. In Agamben's terms, the subject 
who has read the text does not fully coincide with the subject who has 
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not yet read it. The act of reading effects a determinate, even if 
slight, change in consciousness. Even if the reader rejects the texts' 
analyses, and does not go on to cultivate a differently motivated form 
of subjectivity, a dent or chink in the smooth armor of the spectacle, 
or of phallogocentric patriarchy, or of the fully administered society, 
remains. 
The transformative impact of these texts resides in the reasons 
they are notoriously difficult to understand. Their difficulty is an 
intentional part of their project. Accessible texts do not disrupt 
established patterns of reading and understanding. Disruptive texts, 
which do, are less accessible. When Judith Butler, another formally 
dissident writer, argued this point she cited Adorno's Minima Moralia, 
which advanced the same position in the 1940s, as her authority.13 
Irigaray has also taken the same position explicitly. Agamben takes the 
position more implicitly, perhaps most notably in The Idea of Prose. 
These texts are not difficult simply for the sake of difficulty. 
Their inaccessibility is specific to their strategies. Adorno's 
arachnid weavings embody a dialectical mentality that circles the 
central point. His writing amounts to dialectics in action, mediation, 
or "unweaving." That is, the text encourages or exhorts the reader to 
look at a topic from multiple angles and to perceive non-identity or 
difference. Adorno's commentators have identified this form as one of 
the keys to understanding of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory in particular. 14 
The work is best conceived as intellectual motion around an idea, 
conducting a painstaking comparison of features, gauging the extent to 
which this or that property characterizes a phenomenon, noting where 
and how generalizations fall short, a method which according to Adorno 
13. Judith Butler, A 'Bad Writer' Bites Back. New York Times. March 20, 1999. 
14. Bernstein, ibid.; Finlayson, "Work of Art and the Promise of Happiness"; 
Hullot-Kentor, Introduction to Aesthetic Theory. 
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gives the best knowledge of the truth, and the falsehood, that lies 
buried in an idea. The difficulty of the procedure is measured by its 
distance from a text that lays out its conclusions in a linear, 
systematic way. Such a text purports to fit its material, when in fact 
such a form can only be imposed on the material, disregarding that 
material's specific contours. 
Irigaray's mimetic texts, according to Whitford, provide a way to 
incorporate, as well as critique, the philosophers with whom she is in 
dialogue. is Her challenge, of getting at the substantive presence of 
something typically seen as absence and lack, or nonexistence, is 
extreme. Irigaray's vision is, if correct, debarred; according to her, 
it is impossible to articulate directly in existing language. While 
Irigaray's readers sometimes long for her to "just say it," she cannot. 
Moreover, even if she could, and did, such direct expression would fall 
short of its purpose. Her goal is to evoke the recognition, and the 
objective context for symbolization, of ideas that have systematically 
been denied expression. The ideas, then, are not already in her readers 
vocabulary or repertoire. They cannot simply be referred to. Instead, 
they have to be generated, caused to emerge from the reader's 
engagement with the text. 
Agamben's indirect and significantly negative non-arguments require 
the reader to struggle to fill in the blanks. His texts are open rather 
than closed. They meander through fields of suggestive prose rather 
than arrive swiftly at a predetermined argumentative point. They slow 
the reader down with deliberate digression or circumlocution, which is 
clearly neither merely decorative nor dispensable. Consistent with 
Agamben's persistent concern with potentiality, the absence of a single 
15. Whitford, ibid., 71-72. 
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governing imperative comes through these texts, perhaps discomfiting 
readers. 
Every text, even a conventional one, has some potential to alter 
its readers. These writers' texts, it is claimed, are substantially 
transformative, and accomplish their effects with additional intensity. 
Because these are disruptive texts, they work against accustomed 
methods of understanding. They do not esteem logic as usual, though 
they arguably employ logic. They call accustomed methods of argument 
into question, challenging those methods' contribution to rigid 
thinking. Whatever understanding of these texts the reader gains can be 
gained only at the price of an adoption of their alternative logic and 
rhetoric. The act of understanding them entails seeing the point of 
view of the text, or at least adopting a point of view closer to that 
of the text's. Since that point of view is catastrophic, it is 
difficult for a reader to remain unmoved. In each case, then, the 
struggle and engagement with the text disrupts and effects a 
transformation in the reader. 
The disruptive effect at which these different texts aim, moreover, 
is a substantially similar one. That effect includes an awareness of 
the limits of language, and the reader's own entanglement in what 
exceeds those limits. This trans formative effect depends on readers' 
refusal to give up on these texts when their difficulties are 
encountered. Nothing guarantees this engaged response. Texts are 
passive, not coercive, however much readers of these texts sometimes 
report feeling oppressed. They reach only as far as the willingness of 
their audience. For that reason, the actual ~interventions" texts of 
this sort can effect are restricted in advance. While the effectiveness 
of the utopian discourse undertaken in these texts has not been a 
primary issue for this study, the question of what will become of these 
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ideas does assert itself. The ultimate impact of this form of utopian 
discourse may depend on whether it can sustain itself in some form 
beyond the narrow boundaries of the texts in which it has been 
developed. 
A Shared Critique of Language 
A critique of language shared by these writers plays a role in the 
disruptive impact of their texts. To a large extent, contemporary 
linguistic theory operates with a sign theory of language. Words are 
more or less arbitrary signs, attached by convention and perhaps 
history to concepts that are adjustible and re-specifiable. Since 
Saussurian linguistics, their meanings are understood to reside in the 
conventionally-established system of differences between one sign and 
another. The idea that there might be a "true" or "just" expression of 
an idea, or that there might be more than an arbitrary connection 
between the physical housing of an idea, its word or name, and the idea 
the word signifies, is difficult to take seriously. These authors do 
not fully share this view, familiar to contemporary readers. Readers 
who approach their texts with the sign-language view commonplace today 
will encounter difficulties understanding them. 
Instead, words or names for these authors retain an intimate 
connection with personal experience and extra-conceptual reality. Words 
are more than empty signs, and meaning is more than a system of 
differences, although the value of the insight that meaning depends to 
some degree on such a system is not lost on Agamben and Irigaray. Words 
also have positive contents. Words and their contents are affected by 
the way their users use them. Words also have a physical presence, 
which works with or against their conceptual function. They are 
themselves things, and as things they have something like a life of 
their own. These authors share an appreciation for the raw material of 
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language, its "body" or "silva," that sets their reflections on 
language, presentation, and communication apart from other contemporary 
thinkers. 16 
The linguistic insight here seems to go back to the denominative 
function of language, and in particular to notions of "enchantment." A 
recognition of the potentially enchanted quality of language is 
consistent with an approach to the world that would not be intent on 
domination. Enchanted language is no longer the language of science. 
Rather, it seems to be a more original language of things, something 
approaching a language of nature, which would of necessity also be a 
language human beings, who continue to embody nature, could share. 
The form this respect for the materiality of language takes differs 
from author to author. Adorno is explicitly careful about the use of 
words that have, by virtue of their history, content that can no longer 
be used to communicate the ideas that need to be discussed. This care 
informs his gesture of reaching back into the past of aesthetic theory 
to resuscitate Kantian terminology to accomplish his purpose in 
Aesthetic.Theory. Agamben pays more explicit attention to the 
distinction between body and spirit that is embodied in language itself, 
although this distinction is noted by Adorno as well. Both Adorno and 
Agamben, in fact, echo the notion that ideal language would correspond 
to things in themselves, a picture of ideal language they both derive 
from Walter Benjamin's image of Adamic language. 
Irigaray seems to share a similar understanding, since in The Way 
of Love she paints a picture of new language that would proceed from 
the self-experience of the sexually different subject, and would 
reflect this experience. This new language would be able to communicate 
sufficiently without a pre-established meaning; this implies that it 
16. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 56; Agarnben, Idea of Prose, 37. 
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can convey something intelligible outside of its participation in a 
pre-developed system of differences. Instead, Irigaray's new words must 
have manifestly variable content, since they cannot be taken always to 
mean "the same thing," but have a mobile relationship to the experience 
of their users. They cannot, then, function as conventional signs; they 
do not exchange information; they are, rather, vehicles for communion. 
All these authors thus suggest that renewed attention to language, 
along with new practices with respect to language, playa role in the 
reconstitution of subjects, or subjectivities, of utopian possibility. 
Where language is a vehicle for the sharing of experience, as distinct 
from the exchange of information, an adoption of a changed relationship 
to language becomes part of the cultivation of an alternative 
subjectivity encouraged by these texts. What this would mean might be 
suggested by certain fugitive experiences with language in which many 
people share, at least from time to time: in participating in 
children's acquisition of language, in occasional intimate negotiations 
over the meaning of a word or phrase, or in the spontaneous invention 
of metaphor. Indeed, this understanding of language substantiates 
Irigaray's claim that what is needed for the complete thinking-through 
of the meaning of sexual difference is a "new poetics," since this 
understanding of language takes the matter of language, which furnishes 
the possibility of poetry, as having a more general significance. 
A Subject Capable of Transformation 
We have seen that each of these theorists places a significant 
emphasis on a renewed understanding of the subject of knowledge and 
action, and its relation to its object or objects. A central common 
feature of this subject is that she is - or could, and ought to be 
actively "under construction." This feature of autopoietic human 
subjectivity provides one of the core conditions for the development of 
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a subject of utopian possibility, although as Adorno notes, it is also 
the source of the persistent problem of dystopian distortion. 
For Adorno, the subject is always already constituted by the forces 
of society and history, nature (inner and outer), and culture, as well 
as by the operation of reason. The exercise of reason, which 
contributes to the development of the subject as separated-from its 
object, and which is called upon to resist the forces of unreason, is 
not historically innocent. It has also contributed to the domination of 
a nature in which humanity itself is thoroughly enmeshed. A relentless 
question for Adorno is whether this conditioned subject can realize any 
independence from the circumstances which construct it, or whether its 
perceptions are entirely prescribed by its history and circumstances. 
This concern explains his insistence on the method of negative 
dialectics, which confronts the concepts through which things are known 
and through which the knowing subject comes into being with 
contradictory signs and indications. The tenacious refusal to ignore 
even the microscopic differences between things as conceptualized and 
things as they present themselves to experiential encounter preserves 
the possibility for influences "external" to the system devised by a 
subject bent on domination. The method of negative dialectics offers a 
slim hope for a subjective solidarity with the concrete, and for the 
fashioning of perspectives that "displace and estrange the world" in a 
prefiguration of "messianic light.,,17 
Irigaray devotes much of her textual effort to laying out 
conditions for the development of woman-as-subject. Woman as subject 
appears in her work as the creation of a complex process requiring 
communication across the lines of sexual difference, communication 
within the boundaries established by sexual difference across other 
17. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247. 
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lines of difference, and processes of "return to self." Return to self 
entails the development of "auto-affection," self-influence or self-
construction. Her treatment, as we saw, seems to require critical, 
iterative reflection and possibly group process. iS Key to understanding 
all of these different bodies of work is the recognition that the 
woman-as-subject occupies the position of a messianic figure. Perhaps 
more precisely, woman-as-subject is a quasi-messianic figure. That is, 
woman-as-subject does not accomplish the work of the traditional 
messiah of messianic religions, ushering in an age that fully redeems 
past history. The advent of 'woman-as-subject does, however, announce 
the beginning of a new relationship of humanity to nature. She ushers 
in the objective conditions for cultivation of a new form of culture 
that recognizes human nature for the first historical time, and permits 
the construction of a new form of politics and ethics. This collective 
life is now based on the distinctive, and no longer repressed, needs of 
the fully human and always not fully "representative", that is 
incomplete in themselves, subjects of sexual difference. The 
cultivation of this subjectivity itself provides the avenue for the 
cultivation of a more adequate utopian vision. 
Agamben sets out again and again to come to terms with a subject 
which is constitutionally uncalled for, lacking a determinate or 
determining "nature" or purpose. His reflections on potentiality, and 
its relationship to a community of "whatever being" that is purposely 
conceived independently of specific identifications or criteria for 
belonging, recognize and require a self-constituting subject capable of 
far greater freedom than it may yet realize. The specific potential 
subjects of the coming community, for whom each particular predicate 
18. How much group process seems to depend upon how we think about auto-
affection. 
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"always matters," can only become what they are through their practice 
of ethics and politics. If they have an urgent task at present, it is 
the development of a form of life inseparable from life itself. 
Agamben's self-constitutive subject remains in a position to choose 
which practices to engage in and which directions to pursue. This 
inexhaustible potential is consistent with the radical break Agamben 
associates with an authentically "messianic" community. 
In each case, then, the current subject of dystopia is identified 
as the site for the recognition and innervation of a subject of utopian 
possibility. The subject of possibility, in turn, becomes the threshold 
for messianic or utopian transformation. These texts leave open the 
question of whether the subject under construction is an individual 
conscious human subject, a "psychological subject," or a collective and 
communal one. Presumably the transformation of even a small area of 
society calls for the development of a collective subject. The 
psychological subject, which is the subject of suffering most people 
care deeply about, however, remains stubbornly singular. Ultimately, a 
promising subject of utopian possibility probably needs to be 
conceivable on both of these levels. 
What the subject clearly is not for these thinkers, however, is 
that transcendental subject of being, knowledge, and reason familiar 
from its autobiographical reflections in the history of western 
philosophy. The delusions of that subject are part of the problem for 
these authors. Part of the solution is a concrete subject of 
possibility, one who both transcends and is transcended by a material 
reality which urges it in the direction of utopian transformation. 
Review and Commentary 
This discourse, then, evokes the need for a response to the 
dystopian problem, described by these authors as having broadly similar 
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features, and in particular the feature of excluding or invalidating 
forms of consciousness that would pose utopian alternatives to the 
prevailing situation. It sketches and enacts a possible response of 
discursive disruption of and resistance to this dystopian. It thereby 
asserts the inadequacy of conventional language to the task of 
communicating a utopian alternative, and evokes a repertoire of 
corrective possibilities. In so doing, it begins to construct the 
desire for, the idea of, and the discursive reality of a subject of 
utopian possibility. Such a subject of possibility differs from the 
ideal subject cultivated in and by the dystopian situation. 
Margaret Whitford has noted that Luce Irigaray's work combines a 
"critical moment" with an indispensable "utopian moment.,,19 Her comment 
could be extended to the work of Adorno and Agamben as well, even 
though Adorno and Agamben develop the utopian moment less fully than 
does Irigaray.2o Whitford's insight identifies a feature that allows 
this utopian discourse to create a compelling dynamic interaction 
between texts and reader. The texts address themselves to the subject 
of a dire present situation, which urgently demands transformation, and 
whose condition the text shares. The chances of transformation are 
small. The text offers no grounds for hope for any built-in tendencies 
towards transformation. It does, however, offer its repertoire of 
disruptive and resistant perceptions, positions and practices, which 
the reader is encouraged to appropriate insofar as she adopts the 
perspective of the text, seeing the danger and agreeing that the danger 
is real. In so doing, additional self-creative dynamics that is, 
dynamics that create a self - are brought into play which could, 
19. Whitford, ibid., 135-136. 
20. As noted earlier, this discrepancy stems directly from Irigaray's 
identification of the foreclosure of the development of woman-as-subject, and 
the need to challenge the phallogocentric structure of language itself, as the 
central focus of her critical and transformative work. 
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however slightly, destabilize the dystopian situation. Where the 
dynamics of the dystopian situation work to make the present appear as 
a universal, rational, and unquestionable set of givens for human life, 
these counter-dynamics challenge the system's pretensions. The subject 
of such counter-dynamics experiences the imperative of thinking an 
alternative to the dystopian situation. In so doing, that subject is 
always already participating in becoming a subject of possibility. 
There is a negative aspect to this self-creative practice. These 
self-created subjects of possibility likely will experience a 
heightened and more acute discontent within the dystopian situation. 
Subjects who are better adjusted to that situation presumably have a 
different experience, more contented if not necessarily happier. 
Heeding the call of utopian discourse may actually increase unhappiness, 
and whether or not that unhappiness will be repaid by subsequent 
personal happiness, or will even prove to have been in the service of 
happiness of any kind, is uncertain. The subjectivity of utopian 
possibility is for this reason, ironically, an alienated one that is 
deeply disturbed by its own dystopian location. But its characteristic 
dissatisfaction sterns from its intuition of a form of happiness not 
accessible to the undisturbed subject of dystopia. 
It remains to show how this subject of possibility, as it takes 
shape in space and time, constitutes a promising site from which to 
imagine, and perhaps to pursue, that negation of suffering for which 
one name is utopia. The reason for this promise has to do with the 
conjunction of the discursively constructed subject of possibility with 
the subject matter of suffering. That conjunction involves the 
participation of space and time in the formation of the subject of 
possibility. 
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The Chronotopic Subject of Possibility 
Human subjects, singular or collective, are in a root sense "made 
of time." They are not only made of time, however. In these discourses 
time merges with the space that human subjects also are, to effect the 
particular kind of space required for the imaginative projection of 
utopia. This recalls Bakhtin's concept of the chronotope. For Bakhtin, 
a chronotope is a four-dimensional concept that solidifies time 
spatially, or that expands space temporally. Space and time become 
interchangeable, or exchange characteristic properties. Examples given 
by Bakhtin include the "encounter time" of the "threshold," or the 
"adventure time" of the homogeneously exotic world of the Greek 
adventure novel. 21 Utopia itself, as noted earlier, is chronotopic, 
uniting a not-now with a not-here. 
For these authors, the time that makes up the subject of 
possibility also constitutes the opening-up of a threshold for utopian 
space. More precisely, the possibility that gives rise to this subject 
erupts as potentially utopian space, within the dense and unmappable 
space of late capitalism, from an "outside" that has not been fully 
captured in that system. It remains "outside" because it has been 
specifically excluded or foreclosed by the system: Adorno's non-
identity, Irigaray's "woman," Agamben's "bare life." The time lived by 
the self-created subject of utopian possibility constitutes space 
cleared for what as yet has no recognized place. This u-topic space is 
not an actual existential phenomenon. It comes into being as something 
inserted from without, in the act of making visible and meaningful the 
differences between official reality and an alternative in which the 
suffering imposed under that official reality would be negated by its 
transformation into happiness. 
21. Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel," 87, 248. 
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Arguably, then, the subject of possibility constitutes a 
strategically important space-time within a dense form of life which 
represents itself ideologically as a totality without alternative. That 
dense form of life, whether conceptualized as late capitalism, the 
society of the spectacle, or phallogocentric discourse, is inimical to 
the cultivation of utopian possibility precisely because of its 
objectively pervasive scope and its persuasive characterization of 
choices that disrupt or resist its operation as futile, objectively 
irrational, or ultimately inconceivable. The space-time of the subject 
of possibility is physical space and temporal consciousness in which to 
cultivate the initially minute discrepancies that belie the absence of 
an alternative to the existing order. These include the non-identity 
between death and reconciliation, the difference between the prevailing 
concept of "woman" and what "woman-as-subject" might incorporate, and 
the non-coincidence between a community erected around some determinate 
identity and a community of whatever-being. The discernment of those 
gaps or discrepancies is itself a sign of the critical taking-place of 
a micrological non-dystopian possibility. That possibility is the 
vehicle for the characteristic mode of influence of the "messianic 
light" named in this utopian discourse. 
The Event of an Outside as Potentially Utopian Space 
The subject of utopian possibility depends upon the credible event 
of an outside. The subject's relationship to this event varies from 
writer to writer. 
Adorno does not envision the subject of possibility as being 
situated outside, but as being attuned to or with something like an 
outside and able to discern its traces through the operation of 
dialectical reflection. In effect, the thinking subject, in the 
practice of a consistently negative dialectics, is able to formalize 
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the negation of suffering implicit in aesthetic expressions of 
suffering and artistic efforts at its transformation. The flesh and 
blood philosopher can reflectively connect these formal negations to 
grateful memories of happiness that constitute the material base of 
something like metaphysical experience. This prismatic thought 
struggles to separate the genuine flickers of happiness, which bear 
witness to a persistent "undisfigured" concrete, from ideological 
resignation to dystopian existence or pleasure taken in its prescribed 
exercises of domination. Adorno's subject perceives, communicates with 
and mediates the possibility of an "outside" to the dystopian context 
indirectly, reflectively and cautiously, suspicious of that subject's 
own indiscernible inner distortions. 
For Agamben and Irigaray, the subject of possibility incorporates 
or is the threshold for the event of an outside. Irigaray's lengthy 
discussions of the sexually different subject's construction of a 
separate dwelling, which she furnishes with a threshold, and orients 
towards a space of encounter from which a return to self has already 
been secured, speak to the intentional cultivation of a subjectivity 
for which the preconditions already exist. Agamben focuses attention on 
the pure event of an outside most explicitly in The Coming Community, 
in his discussion of the relationship of singularity to the whatever-
quality of whatever being. -For Agamben, in explicit contrast to Adorno, 
the singular subject of thought and experience always has available to 
it, by virtue of its exemplarity of whatever being, the ecstasy of "the 
experience of being-wi thin an outside. ,,22 
In each case, however, the extra-dystopian outside in question 
shares important features. It occupies a realm that is concretely 
material. For Adorno, it embraces the discernibly extra-conceptual core 
22. Agamben, Coming Community, 68. 
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of every concept and the mute, uncomprehending witness of the object of 
aesthetics. For Irigaray it is the source of the centuries-long 
conflation of "woman" with "nature" and "matter." For Agamben, it is 
the substrate that makes possible the characteristic exclusion of an 
inclusion, or inclusion of an exclusion, that structures the various 
states of exception that haunt the communal structures of western 
culture. 
As may already be clear, this concrete realm bears the relationship 
of an "outside" to the dystopian context precisely because of its 
exclusion and inadequate thematization within that context. On one hand, 
this exclusion and inadequate thematization is just what makes the 
dystopian context dystopic. On the other, however, it is what permits 
the concrete to appear as the "undisfigured" and corrective alternative 
to that context, rather than as one of its thoroughly conditioned pre-
fabricated eiements. 
Finally, chief among the contents of this outside is the concrete 
matter of suffering. The outside includes the insistent registration of 
emptiness that belies the spectacular representation of reality as 
characterized by plenty, the sensed muscular tension or chronic 
inflammation that asserts the nonidentity of human fulfillment and 
"having a good job," the fatigue that is beyond speech, and every other 
concrete indicator of not-yet-negated suffering. As such, it 
constitutes the raw material of utopia, insofar as utopia is suffering, 
in the form of its negation as happiness. 
This discourse, then, evokes its subject of utopian possibility as 
the observer or threshold of an eruptive event of an outside. The 
grasping of this outside, or rather its potential, occurs in time. But 
the pregnant symbol for the kind of eruption of a trans formative 
outside is that of a messianic event. The time that the subject of 
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possibility makes and lives out of this potentially utopian space is 
messianic time. 
The Auto-Poietic Subject of Possibility as Messianic Time 
The time that emerges in these thinkers' works is explicitly 
"messianic" in their terms. Irigaray's use of the annunciation as a 
figure for the communication across lines of sexual difference she 
envisions indicates an appropriation of available messianic symbols for 
a new use. Agamben's time that remains is once again explicitly focused 
on a kind of messianic expectation. Adorno remains agnostic on this 
point, referring instead to the wish for a divine redemption, which 
while unacceptable indicates for him the limit of the desired and 
desirable utopia. 
Agamben's analysis of the poetic structure of the outside, and its 
associated subjectivity, is probably most illuminating. Poetry, 
philologically speaking, is the activity of making something from 
nothing. It is, in essence, what the practice of humanity entails. The 
ethical and political practice of humanity is formally poetic. This 
follows from the identification of humanity as an intrinsically empty 
condition, one without a work that gives humanity an imperative set of 
practices or behaviors. The practice of humanity, of human life, 
entails ethical and political choices because of its poetic character. 
For Agamben, the definition of poetry further entails the 
recognition of the divergence or potential divergence of physical form 
and human (cultural, linguistic) meaning. The possibility of enjambment 
calls attention to this always-at-least-potential divergence. 
Enjambment registers and renders discernible the non-coincidence of the 
material features of poetic language, the features of sound embodied in 
rhyme and of touch embodied in meter, with its less material features 
of meaning by way of denotation, connotation, implication, association. 
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In prose there is no corresponding possibility of enjambment, which 
does not necessarily mean that there is no divergence, but rather it 
may mean that there is no possibility of its recognition. A prosaic 
situation could be one in which the physical form is entirely plastic, 
or the human meaning is entirely transparent, or it could be one in 
which the potential divergence and source of creative tension between 
the two has been fully suppressed, rendered imperceptible. 
Dwelling prosaically, then, may be a figure for dystopian existence. 
Dwelling poetically may be an alternative figure for messianic 
anticipation, in which attending to and bearing witness to this non-
coincidence of elements, within language and within ourselves, is a way 
of mobilizing the inexhaustible potential incorporated in humanity. 
Agamben's analysis of the Pauline messianic message further emphasizes 
his perception of the active accessibility of messianic time, which is 
consistent with the notion of the self-creation of the messianic 
subjects. The subjects of the messianic event have, first of all, to be 
those who cultivate messianic anticipation, and who prepare themselves 
for participation in the messianic moment. These subjects create 
differences, first of all within themselves, which in turn make a 
difference in practical living. 
The messianism these authors share is not the messianism of the 
messianic religious traditions, or even the messianism of artists who 
have the idea that art can single-handedly change the world. However, 
it is compatible with the structure of an influence that is awaited and 
prepared, an influence that breaks in from outside, or that erupts from 
within the structures of immanence. In all this work there is the 
conviction that within this context of immanence forces are present, 
available, and still accessible that have the potential to transform 
this dystopian context into something else. A different way of life 
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remains possible, although saying so directly and simply would 
constitute an illegitimate reassurance offered to the dystopian context, 
in which that simple statement remains, in many important respects, 
false. 
The essence of messianic symbolism and language for these authors 
is the way relation to it constitutes resistance, and breeds further 
resistance. Even for Adorno, whom Agarnben decries as absolutely 
unmessianic, there is more resistance going on than at first meets the 
eye. It is the vital resistance of renaming, puncturing "identity." For 
Irigaray, the effort to articulate different temporalities across the 
line of sexual difference emerges as a messianic task. Agarnben, as we 
have seen, sees the enactment of messianic anticipation as an ever-
present potential. For Agarnben, the ideal, exemplified in the Pauline 
kerygma, is an announcement which enacts itself and constitutes itself 
as the good announced. In any case, however, messianic resistance is a 
refusal of premature announcements of salvation, and of non-messianic 
faith, that is, faith in anything that is not yet the advent of the 
messianic time. 
Minimal Material Metaphysics 
This discourse asserts itself as utopian in its struggle to sustain 
solidarity with something like metaphysics. Its success in this 
struggle is, in fact, indispensable. Utopian thinking depends upon a 
source of metaphysical ideas, upon a credible unknown outside. That 
metaphysical reality also has to be communicable. It has to have one or 
more points of contiguity, shared reality, with what is to be 
transformed. 
The theories of an event of an outside developed across this 
discourse might be called minimally metaphysical. They are an effort to 
respect the constraints of the critiques of metaphysics, and to avoid 
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something that cannot be credible, while preserving the difference from 
the current context that is a prerequisite for utopian thought and 
discourse. "This," whatever "this" is, cannot be everything. "What is 
must be changeable, lest it be all.,,23 
Philosophy is serious, but then again, it is not all that serious, 
as Adorno noted. Other things matter more; some people's real suffering, 
for instance. The practical question of how to go about pursuing the 
elimination of suffering, while remaining in and cultivating solidarity 
with those who face and undergo suffering, is ultimately central, and 
remains central to the basic enterprise of utopian thinking. That 
practical question becomes a serious philosophical question to the 
extent that the philosophy involved in historically earlier efforts to 
solve that problem have imposed additional suffering, and blocked 
efforts to relieve suffering. These philosophers contend that it has. 
The solution to the question of what the negation of suffering would 
look like and feel like - the utopian solution - cannot take the form 
of the domination of nature sketched out in Bacon's New Atlantis - or, 
according to Irigaray and Agamben, even earlier: in Plato's Cave and 
Aristotle's polis. 
These thinkers pursue the possibility of metaphysical thinking in a 
post-metaphysical age. They respect the impossibility of any "future," 
or traditional, metaphysics. But they also seek to secure for the 
benefit of the subjects of dystopia the good that metaphysics once 
seemed to secure, namely the potential for an effective form of utopian 
imagination. 
We are not the subjects of utopia. We are not even, yet, the 
subjects of utopian striving. Utopian images that would motivate us 
would be manifestly unjust and would fail to represent adequately the 
23. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 398. 
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utopian condition that might be achievable from here. But as co-
subjects of dystopia, along with these authors, their readers are well 
situated to undertake the practices that bring subjects of possibility 
into being. 
A Preliminary, Transformative Mode of Utopian Discourse 
The effort to construct the subject of utopian possibility is the 
genuinely "weak messianic" task, or rather practice, of our day. Its 
transformative discourse links utopia with art and religion, which are 
similarly practical, transformative, and regulated by ideals. That is, 
these enterprises take place through practice; they operate to 
transform their specific materials; and they orient their 
trans formative practices towards a criterion related to an 
understanding of the good. Insofar as the point of contact between 
religion and art lies in the orientation of these two different bodies 
of practice towards the transformation of material life, the 
trans formative practice associated with the subject of utopian 
possibility, which takes place at the point of intersection and 
imagination of a renewed poeisis and a reimagined completion of human 
life, aims at something both religious and artistic, though also other 
than either. This renewed practice is at the same time political 
(having to do with personal and communal decision, in particular about 
values; with what values will be put into practice, with the hierarchy 
of values) and ethical (having to do with the pursuit of the happy 
life). These cannot in the end be separated from one another, which is 
why under the aspect of a system in which the value spheres have been 
separated from one another they appear to deal with similar issues in 
isolation from one another. 
The task of utopia ultimately remains that of the elimination of 
suffering. The effort to eliminate suffering by eliminating that which 
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suffers - Nature-as-Object, e.g., along with its designated human 
carriers - has been shown up as a dismal failure in the west. The task 
could still be pursued differently, in solidarity with that which 
suffers. This different pursuit of the negation of suffering will 
entail a new curriculum, based on the cUltivation of a different kind 
of subject, the "weak messianic" subject of utopian practice, which is 
simply happiness as a way of life. 
The subject of utopia is clearly not "the messiah" in a traditional 
religious sense, however much these authors make use of messianic 
language and messianic terminology in talking about him, her, or it. 
While Irigaray uses the language of parousia, Agamben talks about the 
construction of a messianic community, and Adorno draws out the 
messianic metaphor from time to time, the subject of utopia is not a 
magical figure to be awaited, while the active context of life plays 
out unresisted. A more general understanding of "messiah" as a figure 
designated for a redemptive task might fit the subject of possibility, 
rather loosely. The subject of possibility does incorporate that 
eruption of an outside into the space-time of the here and now, and 
does speak on behalf of someone or something: on behalf of suffering 
concrete material life. 
The subject of possibility does not, however, usher in sweeping 
change, except perhaps in a micrological and preliminary way. In the 
process of searching for and remaining alert to traces of what lies 
beyond the dystopian context, in cultivating skepticism about the lack 
of alternatives to an ideological totality, in practicing fugitive 
forms of change, the subject of possibility undertakes a trans formative 
discursive practice. This sUbjectivity may contribute most by refusing 
to relinquish its unreasonable demands for patently impossible results. 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is customary to think of utopia as a particular form of 
representation. But the idea of utopia requires the idea of 
transformation. Even the representation of utopia is, as Fredric 
Jameson notes, something that purports to force people to "think the 
break." That is, it is a representation of a wish that pushes its 
readers to think the processes of transformation, and perhaps to engage 
in the practices of transformation that might feed in to the utopian 
condition. Even if' those practices do not bring about utopia, they 
might at least render the present dystopian moment more like the utopia 
of the imagination. Utopia, utopian thinking, occurs in solidarity with 
reflection on what in the world needs to change, and on the conditions 
for its change, unfettered at least temporarily by the a priori 
dictates of what is reasonable within the givens of the moment. In 
practice this imagination is never as radical as it could be or needs 
to be. There are things that the imagination from the present cannot 
anticipate. The transformation of character that would be required to 
envision the real utopian change has never yet taken place. While it is 
possible to argue that the ultimate transformation of character does 
not take place until the advent of the utopia, it is equally true that 
the advent of the utopia can only be prepared by the cultivation of a 
new form of human life. This insight, which is one of the insights 
shared by the world's religions as well as by Aristotelian ethics, 
continually returns to the insight that the way forward is built on 
efforts in the present. 
It is these potential efforts in the present, which cut against the 
grain of the present culture, which make demands that are impossible to 
fulfill, and which forego the complete happiness possible in the 
present for the sake of holding on to the vision of something that 
would be superior, that endow humanity in each generation with the 
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"weak Messianic power" noted by Benjamin in the second thesis on 
history. The weak messianic power does not effect the redemption of the 
world. To the extent that it is made effective, however, it does change 
the world, and its responsibility both to the past and the future is to 
pursue a direction of change that heads towards the "messianic light" 
that would be shed upon things from the point of view of the longed-for 
redemption. This requires the cultivation of new people, such as 
Irigaray's woman-as-subject, who have never yet voiced their desires, 
because they have never yet appeared on the earth. When their voices 
are heard at last, they, too, will - as the voice of suffering - point 
in the direction of something like redemption. 
Utopia in this discourse makes a particular quality of life 
together its ultimate aim, and projects less a form than a way of being. 
Transformative practice cannot proceed without a criterion or set of 
criteria for remaining true to the good or goods at which it aims. The 
criterion implicit in the utopian discourse considered here at last 
offers a candidate for the substance to the metaphor of "messianic 
light." 
"Messianic Light" as Practical Criterion 
If "messianic light" is more than an empty metaphor, its content 
seems to be that of a criterion for the efforts of the subject of 
possibility. That criterion is not encoded in an image; one of the 
insights of this discourse, along with all "iconoclastic utopianism," 
is that imagistically encoded criteria for utopia become obsolete, and 
then lend themselves to oppressive appropriation. That criterion is 
also not encoded in a formal procedure, such as the use of reason. 
Indeed, this discourse makes its aim to demonstrate that the use of 
reason as the procedural criterion in western civilization has 
contributed to the specific dystopia facing that civilization today. 
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Instead, the criterion is something that might be called, less 
metaphorically, the well-being of the subject matter. The animal body. 
Woman. Whatever being and its mute but expressive face. The criterion 
of messianic light is that the suffering people continue to care about 
is mitigated, not by suppression or repression or denial, but by 
transformation into happiness. 
We would establish our understanding of it by reflection, according 
to Adorno. It would make itself felt in art, and philosophy as art's 
reflective partner would articulate the direction in which the negation 
of suffering would be available. We would experience it as radiation, 
according to Irigaray, the radiation of the formation of a subjectivity 
of its own, based on difference, but not reduced to symbolizing that 
difference, but cultivating its own content. We would carry it with us, 
halo-like, in the enfleshed faces of whatever linguistic being we would 
cultivate, and would bear witness to it more conscientiously, with 
greater awareness of our constitutive continuity with that material. In 
each case, messianic light is not unproblematically equivalent to an 
immersion in immanence, as if an unmediated knowledge of the utopian 
criterion were available. Nor is it an assertion that the desires and 
preferences accessible to our linguistically-shaped reflection or 
consciousness are in any way "pure" or perfectly reliable indicators of 
the direction of a utopian true north. Nevertheless, the premise is 
that there is a corrective already available. That corrective 
stubbornly perdures in the failures of this source of messianic light 
to conform to cultural expectations; its stubborn discrepancies from 
what is expected. In the way matter transcends spirit, remaining 
outside and beyond its dominating reach, insisting on revealing its 
true character and identity regardless of the names given it by spirit, 
the "metaphysical" possibility that makes possible utopian discourse 
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persists, and stupidly and unreasonably insists on not being satisfied 
with something other than whatever constitutes its satisfaction. 
Developing the skills and the language necessary to pursue that 
satisfaction then becomes the task of the subject of possibility, a 
development which finds its orientation in what has been called here 
"messianic light." 
Post Script: The Work of Messianic Lighting 
Terminology 
The words "jargon" and "argot" each refer to a specialized and 
\ 
generally unintelligible practice of language. "Argot" denotes the 
specialized vocabulary of any class or group, and has nuances of 
criminality or "the underworld." It is unintelligible, when it is, on 
purpose. Argot permits the members of a small gang or "coquille" to 
communicate with one another without tipping off the potential objects 
of their predatory actions. "Jargon" derives from a word which in Old 
French denoted "a chattering," as of animals or birds. It now 
frequently refers to the specialized language of an occupational group, 
but retains its earlier meaning of unintelligible or confused - and for 
that reason, confusing - speech. Specialized professional language is 
both jargon and argot: jargon to outsiders who experience it as 
unintelligible and confusing, therefore seemingly confused; argot to 
the cognoscenti. 
Instances of specialized language have a strategic political and 
philosophical importance, according to Giorgio Agamben.24 They serve to 
break the romantic conflation of people, language, nation and state. 
Since the imaginary order that continues to structure global political 
life is based on this obscure conflation, and since finding ways to 
make this order inoperative is an urgent and important political and 
24. Agamben, Means Without End, 63-70. 
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philosophical task, jargon and argot should excite more than simply 
linguistic or literary interest. They embody issues of communicability, 
belonging, exclusion and presupposition that are enmeshed in the 
practice of language. 
Jargon's relationship to a specialized form of life, such as an 
occupation, makes it a sociological phenomenon. The practice of an 
occupation and the use of its jargon synchronize practical lines of 
difference between practitioners and non-practitioners, and produce 
experiences of belonging and exclusion, communicability and 
incommunicability, presupposition and ignorance. Learning and using 
professional jargon or argot comes with occupational practice. At the 
same time, it constructs the learners and users as conscious and self-
conscious participants in the roles for which the jargon or argot is 
the common parlance, while symmetrically constructing non-users of the 
jargon as outsiders or incompetents. 25 It exemplifies the role of 
language in the fabrication of a specifically constituted sUbjectivity. 
In the jargon or argot of the world of professional theatrical and 
photographic lighting, the words ~grip" and ~throw" have specific uses 
that differ from their more general associations with grasping by hand 
and hurling through the air, so as to produce a turning or twisting 
motion. 26 In that specialized parlance, a ~grip" is ~the crew member who 
hangs lights, pushes dollies, hefts cases, and, on the West Coast, 
handles Reflectors." ~Throw" is the ~distance light travels from Source 
25. Beth A. Bechky, ~Gaffers, Gofers, and Grips: Role-Based Coordination in 
Temporary Organizations," Organization Science 17:1 (January-February, 2006) 3-
2l. 
26. Both "grip" and "throw" derive from Old English, "grip" from gripe, 
grasp and gripa, handful, "throw" from thrawan, to turn, twist or curl. 
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to Subject." In this special context, the "Source" is anything that 
produces light, while the "Subject" is whatever needs to be lighted. 27 
A "grip" is not a "gaffer."28 The province of the gaffer - also 
named the electrician, or "juicer" - extends to everything connected 
with or to the electrical power, or "juice," required to produce 
artificial light. "Gaffers and electricians make light; and key grips 
and grips control light.,,29 This division of technical labor explains 
why "exterior days" in a project schedule, for instance a film shoot, 
"are often called Grip Days, since usually a single massive nuclear 
lighting source is used instead of electrically powered lights.,,3o 
Whatever the source of light, grips construct and place the 
apparatus of reflectors and diffusers that shape and direct its throw, 
to produce specific lighting effects. Ideally, these effects will be 
those desired by the projects' participants, and will also please 
important others, like producers or clients. In essence, grips are the 
crew members who handle the mechanics of the project that calls for 
professional lighting. The exigencies of these mechanics also give the 
key grip the final say on various matters of technical feasibility, 
like whether a camera can or cannot be placed - without excessive risk 
to life and limb - in a particular location. 31 
Grips, then, are neither the primary "Subject" of a lighting 
project, nor the generators or sources of the lighting for the project. 
They are, however, subjects whose involvement in matters of lighting 
27. See Ross Lowell, Matters of Light and Depth: Creating memorable images 
for video, film and stills through lighting (New York: Lowel-Light 
Manufacturing, Inc., 1992); glossary online at http://www.lowel.com/glossary. 
May 1, 2010. 
28. A "gaffer" is lexically "an old man," or in British English a "foreman" 
and an alternative to "godfather," a term with argotic connotations of its own. 
29. Jeffrey M. Hamel, "Lighting vs. Illuminating," at 
http://www.studentfilmmakers.com/news/printer 1610.shtml, accessed June 1, 2010. 
30. Anonymous, "The Art of Grippage," online at 
http://everything2.com/user/fugduP/writeups/Grip, accessed June 1, 2010. 
31. Bechky, 12. 
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can make the difference between satisfactory and unsatisfactory results. 
Their understanding of the results to be obtained, their grasp of their 
craft, and their creative ability to work with the elements of a 
situation and devise solutions to problems as they arise all play a 
role in the success or failure of the project. These subjects mediate 
the throw of light, without being either the lighted subject, or the 
light that lights it. Their work determines whether, for instance, the 
subject emerges as discernibly different from its surroundings, or 
recedes imperceptibly into their shadows. 
The relationship of the grip, who mediates the throw of light, to 
the subject of a lighting project is in some ways analogous to the 
relationship of the subject of utopian possibility who has surfaced in 
the preceding chapters to the subject of utopia itself. One conclusion 
of this study is that the discourse of the three authors considered 
here speaks to a subject of utopian possibility, and works to bring 
that subject of possibility to awareness and possibly to action. This 
subject does not possess utopian subjectivity; being outside utopia, 
this subject can have neither an experience of utopia, nor a clear and 
precise sense of its contours - at least, not a positive one. Instead, 
the subject of utopian possibility is a subject who can form the still-
abstract idea of utopia, take it seriously, and undertake to illuminate 
its possible contents. It is a subject capable of imagining an 
alternative to what presents itself as reality. If it is true, as 
Adorno claims, that perspectives must be found that permit ~messianic 
light" to reach the dystopian scene, it is the subject of utopian 
possibility who will have to act as the grip. 
Working with Available Light 
All light is energetic matter. Light in the act of lighting up a 
leaf, or a face, is an example of matter affecting itself. This is no 
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less true of messianic light. While the name "messianic light" suggests 
something that emanates from elsewhere, the light it casts is always 
already available. As the discourse considered here makes plain, 
messianic light comes from the material world. 
The idea of messianic light is, finally, a tenaciously this-worldly 
idea. Not only is there no other world, it implies, another world is 
not what people really want. Utopia, perversely, is this very world -
with a little difference. 
Presumably, this tiny messianic difference is what mobilizes, not 
impossible energies and alternatives, but ever-present ones that are 
temporarily blocked, ineffective. It appears to be akin to the thought 
of the impossible made possible, a reverse enchantment which frees the 
possibilities frozen in the situation. It works the way the name of 
stone soup works, to put perfectly ordinary soup into the mouths of the 
hungry and to make doing what was always perfectly possible an occasion 
for celebration. Stone soup, after all, differs from soup only by a 
word. But the word matters. It is stone soup whose name makes it seem 
inconceivable, and whose aura of impossibility is the condition for its 
possibility. 
As the story goes, the little difference between dystopia and 
eutopia is so precise and fine, it awaits the coming of the messiah to 
make it. It remains to learn whether the weak messianic power with 
which our generation is said to be endowed could, or will, make as 
little difference as that. 
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